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BEHAVIORAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
UNDERGROUND MINE FIRES
By Charles Vaught, Ph.D.,1 Michael J. Brnich, Jr.,2 Launa G. Mallett, Ph.D.,1
Henry P. Cole, Ed.D.,3 William J. Wiehagen,4  Ronald S. Conti,5
 Kathleen M. Kowalski, Ph.D.,6 and Charles D. Litton7
INTRODUCTION
How do people behave when they are trying to get out of a fire?  Are escape
activities different in each incident, or will most actions be predictable across
events?  Do persons make the same sorts of decisions whether they are re-
sponding as individuals or as group members?
Because the social costs of fire-related deaths and injuries are likely to con-
tinue to rise, societal pressure for greater safety will also undoubtedly increase.
There are, therefore, compelling reasons to further our understanding of action
in fires.  If human behavior in fire is studied scientifically and predicted accord-
ing to some well-defined principles, the benefits will be significant.  Design
engineers could incorporate real-world findings into their plans.  Equipment
manufacturers could gain from insights into how their technology is actually
used in fire emergencies.  Safety personnel would have a better appreciation of
what constitutes adequate evacuation procedures.  Trainers could upgrade the
content of their courses that teach escape skills.  The result would be an overall
improvement in the quality of fire preparedness and safety.
1Sociologist, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, Pittsburgh, PA.
2Mining engineer, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health, Pittsburgh, PA.
3Professor, Department of Education and Counseling Psychology, University of Kentucky,
Lexington, KY.
4Industrial engineer, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, Pittsburgh, PA.
5Fire prevention engineer, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health, Pittsburgh, PA.
6Research psychologist, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, Pittsburgh, PA.
7Research physicist, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, Pittsburgh, PA.
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This book is part of a small but growing body of scientific literature that
examines the human experience in fire.  Some of the first investigations were
conducted in the United Kingdom during the early 1970s.  These and later
studies were directed, for the most part, by psychologists.  Consequently, they
tended to address perceptions, attitudes and the behavior of individuals.  Also,
they focused primarily on responses to fires in public structures such as hospitals
and nursing homes.  The present work differs from those earlier efforts in two
ways.  First, the research and analysis has been performed by an interdisciplinary
team of social scientists and engineers.  In developing their analytic framework,
team members concentrated heavily upon organizational factors.  This research,
then, complements the earlier work of psychologists by adding a group
perspective.  Second, the sites studied are large underground coal mines.  Thus,
an environmental consideration is introduced, because coal mine fires are
qualitatively different from structural blazes.
A review of Mitchell [1990] gives a few points supporting the distinctive-
ness of coal mine fires:  (1) mine workers must evacuate long distances (some-
times miles) in smoke and darkness; (2) the seam height at an operation may be
anywhere from several feet down to 19 or 20 inches, meaning that at some mines
people must crawl out to escape; (3) access to underground workings is always
limited to a few (sometimes only two) openings; (4) a coal mine's roof and ribs
are impenetrable, lying hundreds of feet below the Earth's surface; (5) the coal
provides an inexhaustible supply of fuel; (6) potentially explosive and lethal
concentrations of gases may build up quickly in a mine fire; (7) there is no safe
place to vent pressures and smoke; and (8) firefighting logistics are difficult.
Given these variables, anyone who delays too long before beginning an escape
attempt, who is not able to use an emergency breathing apparatus properly, who
cannot travel the necessary distance to fresh air before his or her oxygen supply
runs out, or who gets lost in the maze of dark smoke-filled entries will likely die.
On December 19, 1984, 27 miners in Utah Power and Light's Wilberg
operation died as the result of a disastrous fire.  Exactly what happened during
the attempted evacuation of that mine can only be hypothesized from the
locations, positions, and conditions of bodies found during the recovery.  Those
hypotheses do not yield information about the decisions made or activities that
took place before these workers succumbed to the irrespirable atmosphere.  This
disaster is, therefore, of limited value as a case study for learning about human
action and interaction during such events.  Over the last 15 years, however,
scientists at the Pittsburgh Research Laboratory have interviewed 48 workers
who escaped from 3 burning coal mines.  They have thus gained a unique
opportunity to study human behavior in this often deadly context.
The theoretical framework for this study is built on three bodies of technical
literature.  Selected literature on fire and human behavior provides the first
source of background information.  Included are the works of social scientists,
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experts in firefighting, regulators, architects, and computer modelers whose
common goal was seeking to understand how people act and react during fire
emergencies.
The second building block for this study is social science literature on col-
lectivities and small groups.  Some organizational studies used directly for the
present research analyze groups in nonroutine situations.
The third area of literature concerns judgment and decision-making in op-
erational settings.  This literature helps to create a perspective from which the
data will be viewed, because escape behavior is a process of making decisions
and taking action.
The group cohesion of coal miners in their normal work environment is well
documented [Vaught 1991].  There is ample evidence that this social solidarity
also affects escape behavior, because emergency evacuation has been found not
to be an individualistic activity.  The authors suggest that when a major fire oc-
curs in an underground coal mine, a new type of group will be formed:  an es-
cape group.  This group may be made up exclusively of members of a work crew
or it may be a gathering of individuals who have little or no previous experience
working together.  Whether the membership is identical with an existing work
crew or not, the escape group must handle tasks very different from those that
are part of routine work activities.  The physical environment and new emer-
gency tasks will help define group dynamics and decision-making during an
escape.
The database of this study consists of  information collected from 48 miners
during open-ended interviews.  All interview sessions began by having the
workers discuss their actions and thoughts from the time they first became aware
that there might be a problem in their mine until they reached safety.  Upon com-
pletion of these narratives, a second cycle of questioning focused on key
decisions and actions.  The accounts were then assessed using a computerized
cross-indexing scheme.  Researchers next placed reported actions within gen-
eralized categories of response.  Team members discovered an array of decision
variables, which can be related to various aspects of individual and group
behavior during the escape process.  Each major finding in relation to the events
has been incorporated into a behavior model of workers escaping from un-
derground mine fires.  The individual findings that make up this model are
treated as chapter topics in the book.
Because of the importance of this research, an attempt has been made to
address as wide an audience as possible.  The book is written first for mining en-
gineering students and people already in mining who must, at some point in their
careers, plan for and respond to fires.  Second, it seeks to expand the knowledge
of system developers, who can benefit from insights into real-world emergency
decision-making.  Finally, social scientists should gain from this exploration of
what is still a little understood area.
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Since anticipated readership is varied, the content will address appropriately
diverse fields.  For example, mining experts will read a discussion of social sci-
ence methods while social scientists are given an overview of the underground
workplace.  With this diverse audience in mind, the authors have kept jargon to
a minimum and presented relevant issues in a straightforward manner.  It is
hoped that this approach will stimulate the sharing of ideas across the boundaries
of specialization.
References
Mitchell D [1990].  Mine fires: prevention, detection, fighting.  Chicago, IL: Maclean Hunter
Publishing Company.
Vaught C [1991].  Patterns of solidarity: a case study of self-organization in underground
mining [Dissertation].  Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, Department of Sociology.
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CHAPTER 1.—REVIEW OF SUPPORTING RESEARCH
Human beings tend to organize their view of the world according to certain
generally accepted standards.  Thomas Kuhn [1970] termed these shared view-
points "paradigms."  In relation to research, paradigms function much the same
way for science as they do for law:  they contain canons for the collection of
evidence, determine what is admissible, establish rules for debate, and provide
guidance for judging merit.  Paradigms, however, also tend to make people blind
to issues that fall outside their scope of authority.  Thus, while paradigms help
to reveal some aspects of reality, they conceal others.  Sometimes, though, there
is a perceived need so strong that it calls a paradigm into question.  A likely
result is that someone will innovate and begin to address an issue from a new
perspective.  The person who first threw a forward pass in football is an
example.
The paradigm that has governed thinking about firefighting dates from the
last century.  During the Industrial Revolution and after, people came to see
technological development as a way to conquer their environment.  The solution
to just about any problem lay in an application of natural science and
engineering [Canter 1990].  Conditions not amenable to a mechanical fix were
unthinkable.  Such a mind-set was carried over into codes around the world,
where "people's safety is addressed exclusively in engineering terms" [Sime
1985].  This means that human volition has been left out of the equation, and
individuals are treated as inanimate objects about whom designers can determine
such things as Flow Capacity of Door Openings in Panic Situations [Peschl
1971].  In fact, designs based on such false assumptions about human beings are
not sound.  For this reason, researchers are taking a closer look at how people
actually behave in panic situations.
Fire and Human Behavior
Writers have dealt with human behavior in fire for several years now.  The
early literature was composed mostly of "anecdotal accounts [that] tended to
concentrate on the horrifying, 'panic' reactions" [Wood 1990].  Stevens' [1956]
article on the Church Oyster Roast fire panic is a good example.  These items were
of interest to firefighting professionals and appeared in publications such as the
Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association.  Some technical design
studies also included the human element, although in a very limited way.  One
example of such work is Galbreath's [1969] Time of Evacuation by Stairs in High
Buildings.  This study, published by the Canadian National Research Council's
Division of Building Research, focused on the movement of people while they
were evacuating buildings.  It did not, however, look at factors that might influence
choices of direction, evacuation speed, or other response variables.
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The first systematic investigation of human responses to fire threats was
completed in the United Kingdom during the early 1970s.  Data for this project
were collected by interviewing approximately 2,000 individuals who had been
involved in almost 100 fires [Wood 1990].  Fire brigade officers did most of this
work, administering questionnaires at the fire scenes.  In this descriptive study,
"behavior was examined both at a general level and with particular reference to
two specific behavioral variables, evacuation of the building and movement
through smoke."  Variables such as age, sex, experience with fire, and prior
training were considered.  Wood looked at what actions people took and who
took them, but did not attempt an explanation of those actions.  To achieve such
an analysis, Wood suggested that "more intensive studies will have to look at
people's attitudes, knowledge and beliefs concerning fire."
After the completion of Wood's study, "there was an intensification of in-
terest and effort, with some major, systematic studies and numerous smaller
ones...being carried out" [Paulsen 1981].  A U.K. anthology [Canter 1990] pro-
vides an overview of these studies containing chapters "written by scientists with
interests in:  (1) specific settings in which fire may occur, (2) ideas related to
behavior in fire, and (3) building models of behavior in fires.  A second edition
of the book was "edited to keep the original detailed case studies and to add
information about some major incidents that occurred since the first edition was
published."  This volume remains the best available summary of the field of
human behavior in fire.
Four observations may be made about the research mentioned to this point.
First, data gathering was typically limited by the scattering of survivors after the
event or by the death of those with important information about an attempted
escape.  Second, the sites studied were frequently structures such as hospitals or
hotels.  Third, the only nonstructural setting investigated involved a fire in an
underground transportation station [Donald and Canter 1990].  While access to
the surface was limited in these tunnels, the affected area was small in com-
parison to mine fires.  In any case, most people threatened by the blaze were
individuals who did not know each other or their surroundings very well.
Further, few had training in how to respond to such a situation.  Finally, much
of the past work on how humans respond to fire only addressed the behavior of
individuals and did not consider group-level variables.
Only recently have researchers begun to consider the behavior of groups
during fire evacuations.  Sime [1985] tested an "affiliative" model involving
patrons of the Summerland Leisure Centre, a seaside complex in the United
Kingdom, where 50 people died in a fire in August 1973.  His model predicted
that people facing potential entrapment would move toward familiar places and
persons.  Sime contrasted such a notion with the engineering assumption un-
derlying escape route design.  Designers, he argued, presume there is a deter-
ministic relationship between an exit's location (assuming availability) and its
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use in an emergency.  In his study of the Marquee Showbar evacuation, Sime
found that two important factors other than proximity to an exit affected di-
rection of movement.  These were individuals' familiarity with a particular travel
route and their ties to others elsewhere in the building.  Sime concluded that the
variable of affiliation is not addressed sufficiently by those who ought to be
concerned with how humans actually get out of structures.
Turner and Toft [1989] point out that during the Summerland Leisure Centre
fire individuals based their actions on family group membership:  "Instead of im-
mediately escaping themselves, therefore, many parents desperately looked for
their children frequently causing additional confusion and panic."  Johnson
[1987] reported similar findings in a study of the evacuation of the Beverly Hills
Supper Club during a fire:  "Throughout the...interviews are reports of a concern
by one primary group member for another and multiple reports of group mem-
bers exiting together, often hand-in-hand."  Even when family relationships were
not present, other forms of groups were evident:  "Many...reported from the Em-
pire Room that they were seated at tables with others from their workplace, and
both there and in the Crystal Rooms the frequent use of names of others in
descriptions of the escape indicated the presence of social bonds."  This evi-
dence of individuals reacting to the locations of others and staying with a
specific group of people points to the importance of understanding group actions
and interactions during various fire emergencies.
Collectivities and Small Groups
Attempts have been made to learn about the behavior of collections of
people in other stressful settings.  One strategy has been to contrive a "panic" sit-
uation and observe the results.  Researchers using this approach have created
laboratory fabrications of various emergency conditions that might affect small
groups or organizational components.  Kelley et al. [1965] conducted experi-
ments requiring mutual dependence during mock panic escapes.  They found that
when members of a group took their cues from each other, one of two things
happened:  if there was little optimism about escape, interaction proved to be
harmful; a high level of optimism, on the other hand, was reinforced by inter-
action.  The authors further determined that public expressions of confidence
reduced anxiety and greatly increased the percentage of people who managed to
escape.  Guten and Allen [1972] studied group panic behavior under varying
likelihoods of success.  They concluded that the perceived chances of escape
influenced the intensity of their subjects' efforts.  People tried harder when they
were uncertain about the outcome.  In addition, individuals tended to panic more
in ambiguous predicaments than in those circumstances where danger was high
but the probability of escape was very low.
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In an attempt to improve the chances of escape in emergency conditions,
Sugiman and Misumi [1988] directed two field experiments.  One took place at
an underground shopping mall and the other was held in a fire school basement.
In both cases the problem involved evacuating several dozen participants
through one of two or three exits.  In their investigation, the authors compared
a pair of emergency evacuation methods.  The control method consisted of
having a leader indicate the direction of an exit with a loud voice and vigorous
gestures.  This is the traditional approach used in evacuation drills.  In the ex-
perimental method, a leader quietly chose an evacuee and asked that person to
follow along.  It was found that this experimental method worked especially well
when the leader-to-evacuee ratio was fairly high.  A subject directed by the
leader, and three or four people who saw what the leader was doing, would begin
heading toward an exit.  Thus, an escape group formed.  Individuals nearby grad-
ually joined this emerging group without any direct influence from the leader.
Sugiman and Misumi concluded that more people were evacuated in less time
by using small groups as levers to activate the collectivity than by relying on
shouted directions.
Korte [1969] investigated the effects of group communication on male
subjects' willingness to give help in a staged medical emergency.  Sixty sets of
three individuals—a true participant and two plants—were placed in small ad-
jacent rooms interconnected by intercoms.  Experimental conditions were varied
according to levels of responsibility (some subjects were told the other two
would be strapped down for monitoring) and communication patterns among the
confederates (none, minimal, or total).  As an experimenter delivered  instruc-
tions over the intercom, he pretended to have a severe asthma attack.  The test
criterion was whether or not a subject would leave the room and locate the
victim to see if he needed help.  Interestingly, 50% of those who believed they
were the only ones available to go to the stricken person's aid did so.  Only 37%
of those individuals who thought the others were also free went to help.  Re-
garding communication, the highest level of intervention (55%) occurred among
subjects who overheard no discussion over the intercom.  Participants least like-
ly to respond (35%) were ones who heard the confederates expressing concern
and trying to diagnose the problem.
Obviously, such experiments may be of questionable validity because they
are often far removed from the actual situations they intend to explore [Sime
1985].  Therefore, attempts have been made to bridge the gap between experi-
mental and real-world conditions through realistic simulations.  Drabek and Haas
[1969] put three teams of police communications personnel through a series of
exercises in order to assess organizational stress.  First, they established a base-
line by simulating three routine situations.  Then, a mock disaster was held.  The
authors found organizational stress to exist in terms of increased discrepancies
between demand for services and the system's capacity to respond.  As a result,
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decision-making processes changed.  Officers, who under normal conditions
functioned autonomously, began to ask each other for information before making
decisions about how to handle calls.  This teamwork evolved as the stress
mounted.
Reinartz [1993] conducted an empirical study to determine whether a
simulated nuclear powerplant incident might be a valid way to gain insight into
team behavior under stress.  In addressing some of the methodological issues in-
volved, she focused on a critical point concerning validity.  There is one im-
portant feature of emergencies that simulations are unable to recreate.  The life-
or-death consequences of one's actions.  Noting that this matter is raised often
as a form of criticism, Reinartz [1993] offered a counterargument.  The com-
plexity of a task, its nonroutine nature and the associated time constraints are
stressors in themselves.  She found support for this contention in certain be-
havioral attributes of team members.  Individuals were observed to speak
rapidly, repeat themselves, show irritation, and pace aimlessly.  Additionally,
there were performance-related characteristics such as the narrowing of at-
tention.  The author concluded that in those situations where direct observation
of group processes is not possible, simulations provide a reasonable alternative.
Many researchers are willing to sacrifice classical scientific rigor for a better
understanding of what happens in real events.  After reviewing 15 years of re-
search on observed behaviors "in actual crowd situations," McPhail and
Wohlstein [1983] reached several conclusions, two of which are pertinent here:
"First, there is growing evidence that...most individuals assemble and remain
with friends, family, or acquaintances.  Those social units constitute sources of
instructions and sanctions for the individual's behavior.  We must learn what
participants do; when, where, and with whom they do it; and at whose sug-
gestion and with what sanctions they behave as they do...Finally, while we know
far more today than 15 years ago...much of what we know is that traditional
characterizations are inaccurate and traditional explanations will no longer
suffice."
Aveni [1977] is one of those who argued that existing approaches to the
study of behavior in crowds were inadequate.  According to this author, most of
the literature dealing with collectivities has been based on individual levels of
analysis.  Aveni collected data on persons in crowd situations and found that a
majority of the participants were actually interacting with others.  Such findings
strongly suggest a need to give group-level variables more consideration when
thinking about how people act in mass events.  A similar idea was put forth by
Shibutani [1955], who pointed out that people tend to adopt the outlook of
groups with which they identify.  These perspectives influence and reinforce in-
dividual behavior in many circumstances that would otherwise be characterized
by confusion and indecision.
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Levit [1978] reviewed disaster literature in order to abstract several prin-
ciples of behavior in extreme situations.  He listed some of these as general-
izations.  They are included here, along with a few illustrative points by other
authors:
(1) A distinct syndrome is associated with response to emergencies.  Its
expression, however, differs by culture context.  Jacobson [1973] described this
effect in her discussion of group reactions to confinement in a skyjacked plane.
(2) Individuals tend to perceive and interpret disaster cues in reference to
familiar aspects of their environment.  Tornadoes, for instance, are thought to
sound like approaching trains [Taylor et al. 1970].
(3) People will see the initial problem in different ways and hence make
survival decisions that vary in quality.  Spitzer and Denzin [1965] found that
one contributing factor, level of knowledge, varies widely among affected
populations.
(4) The incidence of nonrational behavior (panic) is much less prevalent
than popular accounts imply.  In fact, it is hard to understand why this stereo-
typed image has hung on for so long.  Sime [1990] speculated that the concept
has proven useful in minimizing responsibility when designs do not work as
expected.
(5)  Good preparation leads to a more effective response.  Experience real-
ly is the best teacher, according to Sorensen [1983].  The main point in Levit's
seven principles of behavior is that planning for emergencies must take into
account anticipated behavioral patterns of collectivities.
Dynes and Quarantelli [1968] connected what is known about real life
"unstructured" behavior with scientific theories of organization.  Their rationale
was that much of the activity taking place in nonroutine events involves in-
stitutionalized behavior.  The authors viewed group behavior in extreme situa-
tions as being one of four different types.  They derived this typology from a
cross-classification of two variables:  the nature of group tasks during a crisis
(regular or nonregular) and whether group structure is old or new.  Each cell of
the resulting two-by-two matrix will characterize one type of group, as shown
in table 1.1.
Table 1.1.—Types of group behavior in disasters (after Dynes and Quarantelli [1968]).
REGULAR TASKS NONREGULAR TASKS
OLD STRUCTURE Type I - Established Type III - Extending
NEW STRUCTURE Type II - Expanding Type IV - Emergent
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An example of type I is a police force directing traffic around the scene of
a disaster.  Type II could be a group, such as Red Cross volunteers, that exists
only on paper until an emergency takes place.  Type III is illustrated by a con-
struction company using its workers and equipment in a rescue operation.  Type
IV might be an ad hoc group running a command center.  The concepts and
vocabulary developed with this typology have been used and extended in a
variety of related research projects [Bardo 1978; Drabek 1987; Johnston and
Johnson 1989].
One reason researchers have revised Dynes' and Quarantelli's typology is to
address the time element.  For example, Drabek [1987] added phases used by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  These phases are:  mitiga-
tion, preparedness, response, and recovery.  Another modification of the ty-
pology recognizes that some disaster tasks and structures may not be routine, but
also are not necessarily new.  Bardo [1978] introduced the concept of latency.
Latent tasks and structures do not exist in day-to-day operations, but are in place
to be used when needed.  For example, a safety department may have an emer-
gency response plan that covers actions to take during any large-scale disaster.
As  these events occur infrequently, tasks are not routine, but are defined in the
plan and used occasionally.  They could, therefore, be considered latent when
not in use.  A similar argument can be made for structures, e.g., the local Red
Cross chapter will be activated as a functioning emergency response organ-
ization when needed.
Several insights may be drawn here.  First, emergency activities (including
escape) are not individualistic.  They tend to be group responses.  Therefore,
models based on assumptions of individual behavior will be inadequate for
certain purposes, such as in the creation of design features.  Second, leaders can
have a significant impact on people's perceptions and subsequent behavior.
Thus, they may influence the group's survival chances.  Third, individuals are
more likely to help others in some situations than in others.  Generally, if the
responsibility is perceived as diffuse, a person is less apt to offer assistance.
Fourth, informal groups may emerge in organizations for the purpose of dealing
with nonroutine situations.  Finally, team decision-making may become more
common under conditions of stress, even in organizations that do not encourage
teamwork.
Decision-Making
Much early work on decision-making was done by cognitive psychologists,
resulting in an individualistic orientation to the research.  From this perspective,
the person is actively involved in a process characterized by a number of
elements:  (1) the detection of a problem, (2) a definition or diagnosis, (3) con-
sideration of available options, (4) a choice of what is perceived to be the best
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option given recognized needs, and (5) execution of the decision based on what
has gone before [Flathers et al. 1982; Baumann and Bourbonnais 1982].  At any
moment in this process it is possible for a person to miss elements, either
because of external factors or because of his or her mental state.  When this hap-
pens, solving the problem becomes more difficult and at some point will be
impossible.
Researchers have focused on a few variables that seem to have significant
impact on one's ability to solve complex problems under time constraints.  These
are (1) an internal state [Hedge and Lawson 1979], which is the sum of an
individual's psychomotor skills, knowledge, and attitudes, (2) a condition of
uncertainty [Brecke 1982], caused by faulty or incomplete information received
from the environment, (3) stress [Biggs 1968; Jensen and Benel 1977], generated
both by the problem at hand and by any background predicament that might
exist, and (4) complexity, which refers to the number of elements that must be
attended to.  These factors reflect the underlying demands on decision-makers
in most life-or-death situations.  Whether the individual is an airline pilot,
a firefighter, a nurse, or a coal miner, an emergency event imposes the necessity
of dealing with an enormous quantity of sometimes faulty information in a very
short timeframe.
Kuipers et al. [1988] conducted a "thinking aloud" experiment to determine
how three expert physicians made decisions when choosing among difficult
diagnostic and treatment alternatives.  The authors found that when these doctors
were faced with considerable uncertainty and risk, their thought processes did
not resemble a classic decision tree.  Rather, decisions were constructed through
an incremental process of planning by refinement.  Kuipers et al. [1988] noted
that early decisions were made using simplified, abstracted information about
alternatives.  More specific data that might have had a bearing upon choices
were not considered until later.  Additionally, the physicians tended to express
likelihoods not as numbers, but as symbolic representations.  Conclusions
reached by these researchers suggest that humans use a more primitive category
system in their decision-making processes than a "rational man" model would
indicate.
Nakajima and Hotta [1989] studied information-seeking as it related to task
complexity.  They examined several features of predecision behavior:  (1) per-
ceiving the existence of a decision to be made, (2) searching needed information,
and (3) evaluating and integrating this knowledge.  There were 75 subjects, who
were required to choose among 3 or 6 alternatives described by 6 or
12 attributes.  The investigators discovered that people shifted their search
processes to adapt to the environment.  Moreover, their subjects were prone to
make a tradeoff between effort and error.  More difficult tasks were tackled by
employing simplification strategies, even when it was obvious the resulting
decision might not be optimal.
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Dorner and Pfeifer [1993] looked at strategic thinking behavior among
40 participants in a computerized forest firefighting game.  Twenty of the
subjects were placed under conditions of stress involving disturbing "white
noise."  The others were left free to focus on their tasks.  Everyone then went
through five hour-long exercises having differing levels of difficulty.  Dorner
and Pfeifer found that subjects under stress saved as much of their forests as did
those who were unhindered.  However, behavior patterns were not the same.
Stressed persons worked with general outlines of the situation, while nonstressed
individuals relied more on in-depth analysis.  As a result, stressed participants
made fewer errors in setting priorities.  Nonstressed players, on the other hand,
were better able to control their firefighting operations.
Jaffray [1989] discussed findings from several experimental studies calling
the standard model of decision analysis (expected utility theory) into question.
Stated simply, the premise underlying this concept is that people attach units of
value to the probable outcomes of certain courses of action.  Therefore, as-
suming rational behavior, a person will seek to maximize the value (utility) of
his or her efforts.  The motive to act is based on some utility of that behavior's
outcome combined with a perceived chance of success.  A problem, according
to this author, is that activities under risk do not fit the paradigm.  Real-world
behavior is affected by factors such as shifting reference points, simplification,
and other biases that make attempts to equate rational behavior with utility
maximization very difficult.  Jaffray closed his article with an expressed opinion
that the expected utility theory of decision-making under risk has lost its
dominance.
Using such a model to describe group decision-making is even more of a
stretch, because, as many social scientists realize, group behavior is the result of
more than aggregated individual motives.  There are system properties that
people create through interaction [Tuler 1988].  Communication is one of these
properties that has received a considerable amount of attention recently.  Jarboe
[1988] tested small group problem-solving effectiveness.  Forty discussion
groups, composed of four subjects each, were set to work on a contemporary
issue.  Their task was to report out a solution.  One of Jarboe's most intriguing
and relevant findings involved the role of solidarity.  Solidarity, formed in the
communication process, led to increased satisfaction with procedural details.
Jarboe concluded that too much solidarity, however, tended to affect pro-
ductivity.  It was in situations marked by a certain amount of tension (though not
stress) that the most ideas were generated.
Klein [1993] noted that stressors that affect individual decision-making may
have an even greater impact on team performance.  He listed several of the more
common ones:  (1) time pressure can throw off coordination; (2) ambiguity is
multiplied, because not only do individuals feel uncertain but no one can be sure
how others are interpreting events; (3) noise, which does not always affect
14
individual performance, may seriously degrade group communication; (4) team
members who feel responsibility could experience frustration since they have
less control; and (5) high work loads are a problem insofar as people have to
cope with coordination difficulties when tasks are not completed on time.  In
Klein's opinion, much can be learned about team decision-making by considering
how it functions under stress conditions.
Tuler [1988] reviewed research on individual, group, and organizational
decision-making during technological emergencies.  He identified four cate-
gories of factors that can affect performance and result in decision failures.
First, structural characteristics such as physical layout, organizational hierarchy,
and work rules can have a great impact on the interactions of people.  Second,
workplace culture is very important.  Human information processing and de-
cision strategies depend heavily on subjective criteria.  Third, communication
networks are critical.  Recovery from a system failure may hinge on the ability
of information to flow quickly, accurately, and reliably.  Finally, the kinds of
tasks that individuals must perform will have a bearing on their proficiency in
emergencies.  Tuler concluded that scientists and engineers need a better under-
standing of behavior in real systems.
Discussion
There are three general themes in the literature reviewed above.  The first
is that, as far as system design procedures are concerned, human behavior is a
"black box."  This means that designers have assumed people will act in what-
ever way the system demands.  At times, such an approach has led to disastrous
or nearly disastrous consequences [Klein 1993].  For example, at the Indian
Point No. 2 nuclear powerplant, one of two sump pumps blew a fuse and the
other developed a stuck float mechanism.  Since these were redundant systems
designed not to fail at the same time, workers decided that an indicator light
showing high water in the sumps must be defective.  In other words, confronted
with an obvious malfunction somewhere, personnel chose to render the simplest
explanation (a faulty indicator light), rather than believe a fail-safe system had
failed and act on that assumption.  This allowed 100,000 gallons of water to ac-
cumulate at the bottom of the reactor vessel.  It was only when another failure
required technicians to enter the building that the water buildup was discovered
and a catastrophe averted [Perrow 1984].
In fact, individuals are not limitlessly tractable.  Their thinking is structured
and their behavior is patterned.  They will bring their own interpretation and re-
sponse to such things as warning indicators.  This fact led Tuler [1988] to
comment:  "Great attention should be given to developing systematic design and
implementation approaches that enhance the correspondence between the
behavior demanded of individuals...and the behavior of which they are capable."
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A second general theme points to the fact that emergencies tend to involve
groups rather than individuals acting alone or in aggregate.  Groups respond
differently than individuals.  Group decision-making is not just a mental process;
it has a social element.  "Social processes suggest that organizational, social, and
cultural values are important factors in behavior and error generation" [Tuler
1988].
A final theme regards rational choice which, insofar as designers incorporate
people into their plans, is the model used to explain human behavior. This theory
implies the existence of complete information, a set of utility functions attached
to alternatives, and individuals who make decisions according to maximization
rules. Even if persons acted in conformity with this model, "evidence suggests
that organizations [do not]" [Tuler 1988].
In the process of examining worker responses to underground mine fires,
this book explores significant areas that Tuler [1988] identified as needing
further research.  They are (1) the effects of faulty or incomplete information on
decision-making, (2) ways in which knowledge bases and organizational
structure affect decision behavior and outcomes, (3) how communication
constraints can hinder strategic thinking, (4) the impact of time pressure on
group acts, (5) development of shared mental models, (6) how group think leads
to bad decisions, and (7) the role of simulations and other training in enhancing
respondents' proficiency and performance.  These issues will be addressed from
a perspective that sees "little to be gained from proving one more time that the
model of rational choice is counter to mountains of evidence" and instead "views
processing of information as secondary and recognizes that the main context for
making decisions lies in...cultural, and above all, structural factors" [Etzioni
1992].
References
Aveni A [1977].  The not-so-lonely crowd: friendship groups in collective behavior.
Sociometry 40(2):96-99.
Bardo JW [1978].  Organizational response to disaster: a typology of adaptation and change.
Mass Emergencies 3(2-3):87-104.
Baumann A, Bourbonnais F  [1982].  Nursing decision-making in critical care areas.  J Adv
Nursing 7(5):435-446.
Biggs JB [1968].  Information and human learning.  North Melbourne, Australia: Cassell
Australia Ltd.
Brecke FH [1982].  Instructional design for aircrew judgment training.  Aviat Space Environ
Med 53(10):951-957.
Canter D [1990].  Fires and human behaviour.  London, U.K.: David Fulton Publishers,
pp. xii, xiii, 2.
Donald I, Canter D [1990].  Behavioral aspects of the King's Cross disaster.  In: Canter D, ed..
Fires and human behaviour.  London, U.K.: David Fulton Publishers.
Dorner D, Pfeiger E [1993].  Strategic thinking and stress.  Ergonomics 36(11):1345-1360.
16
Drabek T [1987].  Emergent structures.  In: Dynes R, DeMarchi B, Pelanda C, eds.  Sociology
of disasters: contributions of sociology to disaster research.  Milan, Italy: Franco Angeli, p. 271.
Drabek T, Haas JE [1969].  Laboratory simulation of organizational stress.  Am Sociol Rev
34(2):223-238.
Dynes R, Quarantelli EL [1968].  Group behavior under stress: a required convergence of
organizational and collective behavior perspectives.  Sociol and Social Res 52(4):416-429.
Etzioni A [1992].  Foreword.  In: Zey M, ed.  Decision-making: alternatives to rational choice
models.  Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, pp. viii, ix.
Flathers GW, Giffin WC, Rockwell TH [1982].  A study of decision-making behavior of
pilots deviating from a planned flight.  Aviat Space Environ Med 53(10):958-963.
Galbreath M [1969].  Time of evacuation by stairs in high buildings.  Building Research Note
8.  Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: National Research Council of Canada, Division of Building Research.
Guten S, Allen V [1972].  Likelihood of escape, likelihood of danger, and panic behavior.
J Social Psychol 87(1):29-36.
Hedge A, Lawson BR [1979].  Creative thinking.  In: Singleton WT, ed.  The study of real
skills:  compliance and excellence.  Vol. 2.  Baltimore, MD: University Park Press.
Jacobson SR [1973].  Individual and group responses to confinement in a skyjacked plane.
Am J Orthopsychiatry 43(3):459-469.
Jaffray JY [1989].  Some experimental findings on decision-making under risk and their
implications.  Eur J Operational Res 38:301-306.
Jarboe S [1988].  A comparison of input-output, process-output, and input-process-output
models of small-group problem-solving effectiveness.  Communication Monographs 55(2):121-
142.
Jensen RS, Benel RA [1977].  Judgment evaluation and instruction in civil pilot training.
Champaign, IL: University of Illinois.
Johnson N [1987].  Panic and the breakdown of social order: popular myth, social theory,
empirical evidence.  Sociol Focus 22(1):171-183.
Johnston D, Johnson N [1989].  Role extension in disaster: employee behavior in the Beverly
Hills supper club fire.  Sociol Focus 22(1):39-52.
Kelley HJ, Dahlke CA, Hill A [1965].  Collective behavior in a simulated panic situation.
J Exper Social Psych 1(1):20-54.
Klein GD [1993].  Naturalistic decision-making: implications for design.  Dayton, OH:
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Crew System Ergonomics Information Analysis Center, pp. 132,
133.
Korte C [1971].  Effects of individual responsibility and group communication on help-giving
in an emergency.  Human Relations 24(2):149-159.
Kuhn T [1970].  The structure of scientific revolutions.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Kuipers B, Moskowitz A, Kassirer J [1988].  Critical decisions under uncertainty:
representation and structure.  Cognitive Sci 12(2):177-210.
Levit RA [1988].  Human behavior in extreme situations: generalizations from a review of
the disaster literature.  In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society, 22nd Annual Meeting
(Detroit, MI), pp. 125-128.
McPhail C, Wohlstein R [1983].  Individual and collective behaviors within gatherings,
demonstrations, and riots.  Annual Rev Sociol 9(4):579-600.
Mitchell D [1990].  Mine fires: prevention, detection, fighting.  Chicago, IL: Maclean Hunter
Publishing Company.
Nakajima Y, Hotta M [1989].  A developmental study of cognitive processes in decision-
making: information searching as a function of task complexity.  Psycholog Reports 64(1):67-79.
Paulsen RL [1981].  Human behavior and fire emergencies: an annotated bibliography.
Washington, DC: National Bureau of Standards, report No. NBSIR-81-2438.  Elsevier Science
B.V.
17
Perrow C [1984].  Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies.  New York, NY:
Basic Books.
Peschl IASZ [1971].  Flow capacity of door openings in panic situations.  Bouw 26(2):62-67.
Reinartz S [1993].  An empirical study of team behavior in a complex and dynamic problem-
solving context: a discussion of methodological and analytical aspects.  Ergonomics 36(11):1281-
1290.
Shubutani T [1955].  Reference groups as perspectives.  Am J Sociol 60(3):562-569.
Sime J [1985].  Movement toward the familiar: person and place affiliation in a fire
entrapment setting.  Environ and Behav 17(6):697-724.
Sime J [1990].  The concept of 'panic.'  In: Canter D, ed.  Fires and human behavior.  London,
U.K.: David Fulton Publishers.
Sorensen JH [1983].  Knowing how to behave under the threat of disaster: can it be
explained?  Environ and Behav 15(4):438-486.
Spitzer S, Denzin NK [1965].  Levels of knowledge in an emergent crisis.  Social Forces
44(2):234-237.
Stevens R [1956].  Church oyster roast fire panic.  Quart Natl Fire Protection Assoc 49(4):
277-285.
Sugiman T, Misumi J [1988].  Development of a new evacuation method for emergencies:
control of collective behavior by emergent small groups.  J Appl Psychol 73(1):3-10.
Taylor J, Zurcher L, Key WH [1970].  Tornado: a community responds to disaster.  Seattle,
WA: University of Washington Press.
Tuler S [1988].  Individual, group, and organizational decision-making in technological
emergencies: a review of research.  Ind Crisis Quart 2:109-138.
Turner B, Toft B [1989].  Fire at Summerland leisure centre.  In: Rosenthal U, Charles M,
Hart P, eds. Coping with crises: the management of disasters, riots and terrorism.  Springfield, IL:
Charles Thomas, p. 177.
Vaught C [1991].  Patterns of solidarity: a case study of self-organization in underground
mining [Dissertation].  Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, Department of Sociology.
Wood P [1990].  A survey of behavior in fires.  In: Canter D, ed.  Fires and human behavior.
London, U.K.: David Fulton Publishers, pp. 83-94.
18
CHAPTER 2.—OVERVIEW OF THE UNDERGROUND
ENVIRONMENT AND STUDY SETTINGS
This chapter details the perspective from which collected data have been
examined.  The first part, intended primarily for lay readers, discusses several
topics related to mining as an enterprise.  Initially, the organizational functioning
of a typical large mine will be described.  It is the formal structure above a miner
that decides the conditions of his or her work.  A second point of concern is the
technology itself.  An underground coal mine is a sociotechnical system, with
workers and machines organized in particular ways during production.  Third,
general conditions and dangers underground will be described in detail.  The
physical environment of an operation is a powerful factor in the work life of
miners.  Fourth, a discussion of the process of formal training is given.  During
this training, a new worker is taught what the organization expects of him or her
in the role of safe, productive, coal miner.  Next, there are outside organizations
that act as significant forces in the workplace.  Examples include the Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), State agencies, and the United Mine
Workers of America (UMWA).  The roles of these entities will also be
examined.  The second part of this chapter will depict each study site as a
concrete setting, so that findings can be interpreted in their proper context.
The Organizational and Technical Nature of Mining
A coal mine is a complex system.  It is defined as all parts of a mining
plant's property (both underground and surface) that contribute, under one man-
agement, to the extraction or handling of coal [American Geological Institute
1997].  As suggested, many functions that must be carried out at an operation are
only indirectly related to coal mining and processing.  Even the jobs that are di-
rectly related tend to be numerous and varied [Wallwork 1981].  According to
Palowitch [1982], the chief reason for this sophistication is that "after more than
two centuries of exploiting our coal resources, today's coal industry finds itself
saddled with a horrendous legacy of human impairments and environmental
damages which society demands be corrected."  Now, the effects of government
regulation are evident in every aspect of the mining industry.  Any operation, if
it is to survive, must be administered with an eye for social efficiency and ac-
countability.
Long-range planning is needed to ensure that the mine produces coal in a
cost-effective manner.  One of the first things that must be considered is location
and method of access.  To extract coal from an underground mine, a coalbed (or
"seam") must be reached from the surface.  The term "portal" is generally given
to any entrance that provides access to a coal mine.  In hilly terrain, such as is
found in Appalachia, the coal may "outcrop" on a hillside.  This allows direct
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entry to the coal seam via a horizontal tunnel ("drift") opening.  At other
locations where there is no outcrop, it may be possible to open a "slope" tunnel
that angles down from the surface and intersects with the coal seam.  If the seam
is too deep for a slope to be feasible, a "shaft" must be constructed.  This shaft,
which may be 20 ft or more in diameter, is opened vertically from the surface to
the coalbed and allows access via a large elevator.
During long-range planning there is a general focus on such essentials as
equipment type, deployment, utilization, and haulage.  Laying out a mine also
involves auxiliary factors including ventilation arrangements, roof support plans,
power distribution, and communications.  All of these planned systems are in-
corporated into a "projection map" that is developed by a team of technical
specialists.  This team will include, at various times, mining engineers, electrical
engineers, industrial engineers, and company geologists, among others.  The
mine map serves the same purpose for a person running an operation that an
architect's blueprint serves a building contractor.  It provides an overview of the
project, shows where features should be located, helps management direct crews
effectively, and serves as a tool in the planning of everything from maintenance
schedules to capital expenditures for major equipment purchases.
Responsibility for translating the long-range plan into day-to-day operations
belongs to a mine superintendent.  This person is in charge of the overall mine
complex, including surface facilities.  An assistant superintendent helps the su-
perintendent perform his duties and at some sites oversees all underground
operations.  At least one general mine foreman reports to the assistant super-
intendent.  This individual directs day-to-day underground operations.  For each
working shift at the mine, there is at least one shift foreman ("shift boss") who
reports to the general mine foreman.  The shift boss is in charge of mining-
related activities including coal extraction and service work.  Each production
crew in the mine is placed under the direction of a section foreman ("face boss")
who manages mining operations on his or her section and who reports to the
shift boss.  There are also supervisors who oversee specialized support work
underground.  These foremen manage (1) maintenance, (2) belt installation,
(3) supply activities, and (4) track laying and repair.  All of these individuals
report to the shift boss or the general mine foreman.
The long-range plan provides structure for a superintendent's short-range
planning.  If coal is to be mined productively, it must be obtained systematically.
This requires the integration of several weekly plans into a smooth limited pro-
jection.  One of the most important functions of a superintendent and his sub-
ordinates is to maintain an effective extraction cycle at the point of production.
To do this extraction, plans must incorporate the following factors:  (1) a deter-
mination of the shift for each section at which coal production will take place,
(2) a decision about when the section will be idled so that belt and power moves
can be made, (3) the scheduling of regular equipment maintenance, (4) provision
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for special projects such as the installation of belt head drives, and
(5) preparation for any tasks that cannot be accomplished during regular
workdays, such as shutting down and repairing the ventilation fan.  The better
a mine superintendent is at planning for and taking care of all of these details,
the more smooth-running and efficient an operation will be.
After entering their portal and reaching the underground workings, a typical
production crew will board a self-propelled personnel carrier known as a
"mantrip" and travel to their "working section."  This is where coal is extracted,
and may be miles from the portal.  "Working faces" are the individual places on
a working section where mining activities take place.  Here, sets of parallel
tunnels ("entries") are driven through the coal seam following a predetermined
plan developed by a mining engineer.  Mine entries are 16 to 20 ft wide and as
high as the coal seam is thick.  The number of entries being mined in a working
section varies from 2 to 10 or more depending on many factors.  As parallel
entries are developed, they are connected by perpendicular tunnels ("crosscuts").
Like entries, crosscuts are also usually 16 to 20 ft wide and as high as the coal
seam is thick.  Crosscuts, or "breaks" as they are sometimes called, allow work-
ers and equipment to move between and among the entries.  The walls of entries
and crosscuts are called "ribs," while the ceiling above is called the "roof" or
"top."  The mine floor is typically called a "bottom."
As coal is mined, a working section advances  toward the boundaries of the
coal property.  This advancement is generally known as "development mining"
and follows a "room-and-pillar" mining plan.  With a room-and-pillar plan,
entries and crosscuts are opened through the seam while large blocks of coal
("pillars") are left in place to help support the mine workings.  In the United
States, most development mining following a room-and-pillar plan uses
"continuous mining" technology.  Work crews on a continuous mining section
are usually composed of 8 to 10 individuals.  A typical crew might consist of
(1) one face boss, (2) one continuous miner operator and a helper, (3) two roof
bolting machine operators, (4) two shuttle car operators, and (5) one mechanic.
These workers perform two operation cycles at the working face that include
(1) cutting and loading of coal and (2) support of the mine roof above the entry
or crosscut.
With continuous mining, operations progress sequentially at each face on a
working section.  First, an area from which coal has already been extracted
(commonly called a "cut") must have its roof supported.  The roof is "bolted" by
one or two miners who operate a "roof bolter."  The roof bolter is a rubber-tired,
electrically powered machine with rotating drill heads.  It puts holes in the mine
roof.  Steel bolts (48 to 96 inches long) are then inserted into these holes and
tightened.  They bind together layers of rock strata located above the cut.  This,
in effect, creates a supporting beam between coal pillars and across entries and
crosscuts.  Thus, the roof is prevented from collapsing.  Next, a "continuous
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miner" is "trammed" into the face.  A continuous miner is an electrically
powered machine that moves along on crawler tracks similar to bulldozer treads.
The machine has a rotating drum ("ripper head") about 10 ft wide and 3 ft in
diameter, on which cutting bits are mounted.  The ripper head rotates and cuts
coal from the face.  A pair of mechanical gathering arms, located beneath the
ripper head, then sweeps the dislodged coal onto a short conveyor.  This con-
veyor moves the coal to the rear of the machine, where it is dumped into a
shuttle car (or "buggy").  A buggy is a rubber-tired electrically powered haulage
vehicle that can carry 6 to 10 tons of coal.  Usually, two buggies transport coal
from the face to a conveyor belt dumping point.  From this dumping point on the
working section, coal is typically transported out of the mine via a series of
conveyor haulage belts.  In some mines, however, coal is dumped directly into
small rail cars.  Groups of these cars, known as "trips," are pulled by electrically
powered locomotives to a main underground dumping point.  From there, the
coal is transported out of the mine via conveyor belt.
Once a mine (or a portion of it) is developed, the development sections may
then become "retreat" mining sections.  In retreat mining, coal pillars that were
originally left in place for support of the mine entries and crosscuts are them-
selves extracted.  The basic approach is to mine in a series of cuts, supporting
the roof with timbers, bolts, or a combination of both.  As these pillars are re-
moved completely, the mine roof they once supported collapses.
In many large mines, retreat mining has been replaced by longwall mining.
To establish a longwall, two parallel continuous miner sections, each consisting
of two to four entries, are advanced 5,000 ft or more to a predetermined point.
They are then turned and driven toward each other until they join.  Once these
sections are joined, they have created a large block of coal, 600 to 1,000 ft wide
and approximately a mile long, that is known as a longwall "panel."  Crews on
a longwall mining section are made up of 8 to 10 individuals.  A crew might con-
sist of (1) one supervisor, (2) two shearer operators, (3) two shield operators,
(4) one headgate operator, (5) one tailgate operator, and (6) one mechanic.
These workers run large specialized equipment, which has been dismantled on
the most recently mined longwall section, then brought in and set up at the new
face.  Panel extraction consists of completely removing this large block of coal
that was created during the development process.  Strata are allowed to cave
behind the longwall as coal is mined back in the direction from which the
parallel "setup" sections were started.
Longwall mining operations depend on the use of self-advancing hydraulic
roof supports called "shields."  These are massive overhead steel structures sup-
ported by large multistage hydraulic jacks.  The jack system allows shields to be
raised and lowered mechanically as a face is advanced.  Shields are placed side-
by-side in a row so that they form a protective canopy along the entire length of
the working face.  Coal is removed from the face by a rotary drum shearing
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machine or "shearer."  This shearer rides on top of a flexible, segmented con-
veyor ("pan line") that runs along the face.  It is attached to the front of the
shields by hydraulic jacks.  The shearer has circular cutting heads mounted on
long arms that are affixed to each end of its main body frame.  A cutting head
is equipped with carbide bits arranged in a spiral formation.  The head rotates
to cut a strip of coal 30 to 40 inches deep from the longwall face as it is moved
across the panel.  This extracted coal falls onto the pan line for transportation
across the face to the panel's belt conveyor.  The panel conveyor then moves the
coal to the mine's main haulage belt for transport outside.
Fresh air must be supplied to all working areas of a mine.  Air is drawn into
a mine from the outside by one or more propeller-type, axial-vane fans that may
be as large as 8 ft in diameter.  These fans can move several hundred thousand
cubic feet of air per minute.  Entries serve as "intake" (fresh) and "return" (con-
taminated) aircourses that channel the air through a mine.  Intake and return
aircourses are separated by concrete block walls ("stoppings") that are built in
the crosscuts between entries.  Where intake and return aircourses must cross
each other, air bridges ("overcasts") are used.  Air moving through the mine and
sweeping across its working faces carries away smoke, dust, and accumulations
of methane gas.  The intake and return aircourses also function as escapeways
for miners should a fire or other type of emergency occur.  Federal mining law
requires that underground mines must maintain two separate and distinct
travelable passageways designated as escapeways from each working section.
At least one of these two escapeways has to be located in fresh air.
While an underground coal mine is in some respects like a factory, the work-
ing environment is very different.  The only lighting, for instance, comes from
miners' battery-operated cap lamps or from localized sources on various equip-
ment.  At the face, production crews must contend with work areas that can be
dusty, or wet and muddy depending on the amount of water that may be present.
These places can also be extremely confined, especially in mines where the seam
thickness is not great.  To extract coal, miners must operate large machines under
such conditions.  Outby1 support personnel are scattered through the labyrinth of
underground entries.  They are needed to help maintain the many auxiliary sub-
systems found in the mine.  Work done by these miners includes building and
maintaining air stoppings, installing supplemental roof supports, cleaning coal
spills around or under conveyor haulage belts, moving supplies, maintaining
electrical installations, and conducting hazard inspections.  Generally, these sup-
port workers do their tasks singly or in small crews, usually without direct contact
with other miners, supervisors, or the outside world.  They also have to deal with
poor footing due to uneven or muddy bottom.  In sum, all miners must do their jobs
in an environment that is harsh and potentially dangerous.




No matter which technical division of labor is being used, miners create a
void under the Earth's surface—a void that is potentially deadly, as Palowitch
[1982] has illustrated.  To reduce the risks associated with mining, all face
equipment must meet permissibility standards set forth by MSHA.  In addition,
all sources of open flame such as matches and cigarette lighters, welding equip-
ment (except in designated areas), and unsealed lights are strictly prohibited.
Even in mines where these regulations are rigidly enforced, however, there is
still the danger of ignition from steel bits striking rock or pyrites, from sparks
caused by slabs of roof falling against metallic surfaces, or from willful violation
of the standards and prohibitions.
Increased mechanization and the introduction of greater numbers of
electrical machines have resulted in mine fires being ranked just behind ex-
plosions as a major cause of mine disasters.  Of 877 mine fires that occurred
between 1952 and 1970, 351 happened at or near the working face, and the re-
maining 526 were at various spots throughout the mine.  Sixty-nine percent of
the fires at or near the face were determined to have had an electrical source
[Palowitch 1982].  The origin of fires outby the face were most often frictional
ignition of conveyor belts, or spontaneous combustion in abandoned sections of
the mine [Kutchta 1978].  A survey of coal mine fire reports conducted by Allen
Corp. [1978] showed that the number of fires increased from 28 in 1951 to 184
in 1960, then decreased to 25 in 1977.
However, mine fires are still occurring, sometimes with disastrous con-
sequences.  An example is the fire disaster that took place at Emery Mining Co.'s
Wilberg operation on December 19, 1984.  On that date, company officials in-
formed miners on the Fifth Right longwall panel that the mine would attempt to
break a world record for 24-hour longwall production.  On second shift, with the
record within reach, nine extra workers were sent to the section and eight
management people accompanied them to see the record broken.  When fire
(ignited by a faulty compressor near the intake of Fifth Right) broke out, smoke
and carbon monoxide poured in on the 28 people on the section.  Unable to don
their self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs), evidently because of lack of adequate
training, most of the miners attempted to escape barefaced down either the
intake or belt entry.  They were quickly overcome, and died.  Three miners tried
to get out through the tailgate return entry.  That entry had been allowed to col-
lapse several weeks before, and the cave-in made it impassable.  The miners'
bodies were found at the blockage.  The last survivor wriggled through a
"squeeze" in the bleeders where the roof had caved in and the floor had
heaved up.  He made it into the clear and walked several hundred feet before
being overcome by carbon monoxide poisoning and dying, with an unopened
self-contained self-rescuer around his neck [Moore 1987].
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There are several system failures implicit in the Wilberg disaster:  (1) non-
essential personnel were in attendance at a time when workers and equipment
were being pushed to break a production record; (2)  the faulty air compressor
was allowed to run unattended in a nonfireproofed area; (3) at least some of the
miners died, not necessarily because there was a fire, but because entries running
off the tailgate of the longwall were blocked by a cave-in; (4) firefighting
preparedness was inadequate; and (5) the miners were not adequately trained in
how, and under what conditions, to employ nonroutine safety skills such as the
use of their emergency breathing apparatus.
The Training Process
All persons entering an underground coal mine must be trained.  The type
of training required, and the amount individuals receive, depends on their status
and function in the mining environment.  30 CFR 48 stipulates that each operator
of an underground mine must file, for approval by MSHA, a plan that contains
programs for (1) training new miners, newly-employed experienced miners,
experienced miners assigned to new tasks, (2) annual refresher training, and
(3) hazard training for miners and visitors.  The course content and minimum
hours of instruction for each of these programs vary.  It has been argued that
U.S. miners may be comparatively poorly trained for many nonroutine events
they are likely to encounter.  McAteer and Galloway [1980] summed this notion
up in a report comparing training in the United Kingdom, West Germany,
Poland, Romania, France, Australia, and the United States:  "Training and su-
pervisory certification requirements in the United States are less thorough than
those of any other nation studied."
New miner training, which is what people receive before reporting to work,
prescribes at least 40 hours of instruction in miners' rights under the law, the use
of self-rescue and respiratory apparatus, procedures for entering and leaving the
mine, transportation and communication, emergency evacuation and barricading,
roof and ground control, rock dusting program, hazard recognition, electrical
hazards, mine gases, health and safety aspects of assigned tasks, miner health,
and an introduction to the specific work environment.  Each year, all miners
working underground must receive a minimum of 8 hours of annual refresher
training that covers many of the topics just listed.  All training, in order to com-
ply with 30 CFR, must be given by instructors who have been approved by the
Mine Safety and Health Administration, and is expected to be adapted to the
mining operations and practices in existence at the company whose workers are
being trained.
There is much technical information miners need, not only because of the
hostile physical environment they face, but because continuing technological and
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organizational changes cause new problems in the workplace.  An example may
be gotten from the use of longwall technology in this country.  Wala and Cole
[1987] incorporated choices about where to place brattice curtains and take airflow
readings into paper-and-pencil simulations of longwall operations.  The researchers
then administered the simulations to 90 mine workers responsible for making
ventilation arrangements during cut-throughs at their respective operations.  Nearly
one-half of the respondents were shown to have potentially fatal misconceptions
about the behavior of airflow during longwall setup procedures.
A factor in miners' lack of proficiency regarding some aspects of their work
environment is that instructors often draw upon their stock of knowledge and
present discrete bits of information unconnected to any grounding that would
make them useful [Briggs and Digman 1980].  At times the training delivered
this way may not be very well thought out.  An example of this is provided by
a segment of the hazard training offered to mine visitors under 30 CFR 48.11.
The self-contained self-rescuer (SCSR) instruction traditionally consisted of an
SCSR being shown by the mine's safety instructor, who would explain the
procedure for putting it on "at the first sign of smoke."
The weakness of this demonstration is apparent, especially when one stops
to consider the nature of SCSRs.  First, SCSRs are complex closed-circuit
breathing devices.  Improper use of compressed oxygen rebreathers (one type
operates on this principle) can lead to hypoxia and death.  SCSRs that generate
oxygen chemically are more fool-proof, but still must be handled correctly to be
of any benefit in an unbreathable atmosphere.  Second, unlike firefighting ap-
paratus or mine rescue gear, which is donned and activated before the wearer
goes into danger, an SCSR is meant to be put on under extreme conditions such
as fires.  From this perspective, it requires little imagination to understand that
the intended user should be thoroughly task trained.  Yet, it was not until Sep-
tember 1987 that MSHA, citing research begun shortly after the Wilberg disaster
[Cole and Vaught 1987; Vaught and Cole 1987], promulgated regulations at
30 CFR 48 and 75 requiring hands-on instruction in the use of self-contained
self-rescuers.
Cole et al. [1986], after observing and participating in many training ses-
sions, made several generalizations about how classes are conducted:  (1) The
most commonly used technique of mine trainers is instruction for the rote
learning of information.  (2) There is a heavy reliance on the same sets of train-
ing films and procedures from year to year.  (3) Trainees frequently fail to pay
attention to the instruction, devoting their attention to what is going on around
them instead.  (4) When games are used as teaching devices, they usually focus
only on factual recall of information and commonly detract from the content of
what is being taught.  (5) In many classes, great amounts of time are wasted, in
the sense that it is not spent in instruction.  (6) Segments of the day's program
may degenerate into gripe sessions, with little of a substantive nature being
accomplished.  In short, the typical miner training class is not always effective.
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Outside Organizations and the Mine
The U.S. Department of Interior's Bureau of Mines (USBM)2 was created in
1910 as a legislative response to a seemingly interminable series of fires and
other disasters that touched communities from Franklin, WA, to Belle Ellen, AL,
to Wilkes-Barre, PA [Keenan 1963].  Although this was the Federal Govern-
ment's first venture into mining regulation, it followed legislation enacted by the
various coal-producing States by 20 to 30 years [Palowitch 1982].  Moreover,
the USBM had no sanctifying authority.  Its primary function was to conduct
mine safety research and issue reports.  Mine disasters have historically driven
legislation, however, and following a rash of these disasters in 1940, the
U.S. Congress passed the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act, which granted the
USBM inspection authority, but only in order to gather and publish information
on safety conditions.  After a further string of incidents, the U.S. Congress took
the next step:  in the summer of 1952, the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952
(Public Law 82-552) was enacted.  It contained section 209, which stipulated
that USBM inspectors could issue an order of withdrawal from portions of a
mine faced with imminent danger [National Research Council 1982].
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Public Law 91-173)
was the first comprehensive plan to protect "the health and safety of persons
working in the coal mining industry of the United States."  The Act provided for
each underground coal mine to be inspected four times per year.  It also set forth
an array of interim mandatory safety standards covering roof support, ven-
tilation, combustible materials, electrical equipment, blasting, transportation, and
communication, among others.  It also set forth a hierarchy of penalties for in-
dividual and corporate violations of these standards.  On July 1, 1973, the Min-
ing Enforcement and Safety Administration was formed within the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior, but separate from the USBM.  The USBM's inspection func-
tions were vested in this new agency.
Federal regulations governing the mining of coal are currently contained in
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-164).  This act
was promulgated in the wake of yet another round of disasters including the
Sunshine silver mine fire.  Perhaps the most significant innovation of the 1977
Act, besides the creation of an enforcement arm with enhanced rule-making and
sanctioning capabilities, was the establishment of mandatory health and safety
training.  For the first time, the Federal Government was taking a proactive ap-
proach to removing "acts of God" as explanations of workplace accidents.  There
has existed, since 1977, a total package of administrative rules, periodic inspec-
tions, workforce preparation, and technical assistance.  This comprehensive
2The safety and health research functions of the former U.S. Bureau of Mines were transferred
to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health in 1996.
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package is aimed at not only correcting, but also preventing health and safety
hazards in the Nation's mines.
There is a second level of oversight at underground coal mines.  State en-
forcement agencies station inspectors in districts around the coalfields.  Beyond
writing citations, some States also provide technical support for mines needing
help in achieving and maintaining compliance.  Finally, there may be a training
and education division whose staff conducts various training and certification
programs in the State.  West Virginia and Kentucky have the most extensive ed-
ucation and certification programs for rank-and-file miners.  For instance, all
new miners are required to complete a course of formal instruction followed by
an underground orientation, serve an apprenticeship, and pass an examination
(oral and/or written) to receive his or her "miner's papers" [McAteer and
Galloway 1980].  In essence, State and Federal regulations ensure a regular
presence by government officials at an underground mine.
After the National Recovery Act, the United Mine Workers of America
managed to insert safety and health provisions into the next several contracts.
These included "reasonable" rules for safety and health (1937), union inspection
of the mine (1939), establishment of safety committees (1941), clean working
conditions (1943), a protective clothing allowance (1945), benefits for long-term
injuries (1946), and the right to withdraw for safety and health reasons (1947).
During the period of rationalization, however, no new provisions were ne-
gotiated.  It was not until the 1971 contract that safety and health clauses were
again added, largely as a response to specific sections of the 1969 Act [Short
1982].  Generally, there are now contractual provisions stipulating that at each
union mine there must be a Mine Health and Safety Committee and a Mine
(grievance) Committee.
The United Mine Workers of America has traditionally been a high-profile
entity at operations it has organized.  Rank-and-file employees at the three mines
in this study were all members of the UMWA.  Thus, the union was an or-
ganizational component that, along with Federal and State bodies, helped to
shape the nature of workplaces at these sites.  The following section describes
each setting in turn, paying special attention to such things as personnel num-
bers, production figures, and technical layout.  These sketches will provide read-
ers a better understanding of the underground environments from which the
miners were required to escape.
The Study Settings
Adelaide Mine
Adelaide Mine was an underground operation established in 1903.  This
mine was opened by six air shafts into the Pittsburgh Coal Seam, which had an
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average thickness of 72 inches.  A total of 327 workers were employed at the
operation; 278 worked underground and 49 had jobs on the surface.  Coal was
mined on five production sections.  Three of these conducted development
mining and two were on retreat.  All working sections used continuous mining
technology and the room-and-pillar mining method.  Entries were on centers of
approximately 70 ft with crosscuts on centers of approximately 90 ft.  The
mining company ran two production shifts per day, 5 days per week.  Average
coal output at this operation was just over 4,100 tons per day.
Coal was transported from the sections by 36- and 42-inch belts to an
underground storage bunker.  It was then loaded into 10-ton mine cars for trans-
portation to a skip hoist.  A 10-ton capacity skip hoist was used to raise coal to
the surface.  There, it was deposited into a raw coal silo to await processing at
the mine's preparation plant.  Supplies and machinery were lowered into the
mine by an equipment hoist.  Trolley locomotives were used to haul coal, sup-
plies, and implements inside the mine.  Trolley mantrips were used to transport
miners to and from the working sections.  Three exhausting axial-vane mine fans
located on the surface provided ventilation to the workings.  Permanent stop-
pings, overcasts, check curtains, and line brattices were used to control air flow
throughout the mine.
Three working sections were located inby the source of combustion at
Adelaide Mine.  These are shown in figure 2.1.
2 Northwest
The 2 Northwest submains, where the fire occurred, was developed from the
Southwest Mains.  As development of this section progressed, panels were driv-
en off to the left and connected at the back end of the section with bleeder en-
tries.  At the time this fire occurred, mining in 2 Northwest and the two panels
driving off it was being done with two sets of face equipment.  Machinery in-
cluded continuous miners, shuttle cars, roof bolting machines, and battery-
powered scoop tractors.  An axial-vane exhausting mine fan located on the sur-
face at Peterson shaft provided ventilation for all three sections in the
2 Northwest submains area of the mine.
At the mouth of 2 Northwest submains, entries were identified by numbers
1 through 8 (from left to right facing inby).  Entries 1, 2, and 8 served as return
aircourses, with entries 2 and 8 designated as alternate escapeways.  Entries 3,
4, 5, and 7 functioned as intake aircourses, with entry 7 designated as an intake
escapeway.  The trolley haulage was located in No. 4 entry, with the conveyor
belt located in entry No. 6.  As the section advanced from Southwest Mains,
a ninth entry was added at approximately 2,300 ft inby Southwest Mains.  Entry
9 served as a return aircourse and became a designated alternate escapeway.
A 10th entry was added to the section at about 4,200 ft inby Southwest Mains.
This entry also became a return aircourse and designated alternate escapeway.
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Figure 2.1–The three sections affected by fire at Adelaide Mine.
Because of a limited number of intake aircourses at the mouth of
2 Northwest, and since working sections were being advanced to greater
distances from the main ventilating fan at Peterson shaft, mine management
requested and received permission to use air from their belt entry also to
ventilate the active working places.  As part of their approval plan to use belt air
for ventilation, the mine was required by MSHA to install a carbon monoxide
(CO) monitoring system.  This system had to be capable of detecting CO at a
level of 1 ppm, using sensors installed in the belt entry every 1,000 to 2,000 ft
(depending on air velocity).  The system also had to be equipped with audible
and visual alarms that activated automatically in the dispatcher's office and at the
underground dumper's shanty when one or more sensors detected CO
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concentrations of 10 ppm or greater.  Finally, the approval plan included a
provision for elimination of a requirement that the belt and trolley entries be
separated with stoppings.  Separation of belt and trolley entries was continued
in the 2 Northwest and 1 Right sections but was discontinued on 3 Left.
3 Left
At the time of the fire, 3 Left was a retreat section.  This panel, consisting
of nine entries, had been turned off 2 Northwest and driven approximately
3,500 ft to a point where the section connected with a set of bleeder entries.
After all entries had been connected with the bleeders, pillar extraction was
started.  The section had retreated about 500 ft outby.  Entries on this section
were numbered 1 through 9, left to right facing inby.  Entries 1 and 9 served as
return aircourses, with No. 9 entry designated as the alternate escapeway.
Entries 2 through 8 functioned as intake aircourses.  No. 8 entry was designated
as the primary escapeway and was separated from entries 7 and 9 by stoppings.
The belt conveyor was located in entry 5, and the trolley haulage was in entry
7.  As mentioned earlier, the belt and trolley haulage entries on 3 Left were not
separated by stoppings.
1 Right
1 Right off 8 Left was a nine-entry development section that also turned off
2 Northwest submains.  The section had been driven approximately 4,800 ft
before it was turned 90E to the right.  Entries on this section were numbered 1
through 9, left to right facing inby.  Entries 1 and 9 served as return aircourses,
with No. 9 also serving as the alternate escapeway.  Entries 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8
functioned as intake aircourses, with No. 6 designated as the primary escapeway.
Trolley haulage was located in No. 3, and the belt conveyor was located in
entry 5.
Brownfield Mine
Brownfield  Mine was opened by one slope and eight shafts into two un-
derground coal seams, one above the other.  Both the Upper Kittanning (or CN)
and Lower Kittanning (or B) Seam average 48 to 54 inches thick.  At the time
of the fire, Brownfield Mine employed 869 workers.  Of this number, 804
individuals worked underground and 65 worked at various locations on the
surface.  There were 17 continuous mining units and 3 longwall sections that
produced an average 7,000 tons of coal each day during 3 production shifts.
Entries and crosscuts were developed 18 to 20 ft wide and were on centers of
from 60 to 120 ft.  This operation was ventilated by six axial-vane, exhausting
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mine fans located on the surface.  Underground ventilation was controlled by
permanent stoppings, overcasts, regulators, check curtains, and line brattices.
Coal from the faces of working sections was transported by shuttle cars and
discharged onto conveyor haulage belts.  A series of conveyor belts transported
coal from each section to a loading area where it was dumped into mine cars.
From this load point, coal was hauled in mine cars to a main rotary dump area
underground.  From the dump area, coal was taken via conveyor belt out of the
mine to a cleaning plant for processing.  Supplies and equipment were moved with-
in the mine by rail using trolley locomotives.  Trolley mantrips were used to trans-
port miners to and from the working sections.  On longwall panel development
sections, miners would dismount their rail mantrips at the mouth of the section.
They would then board rubber-tired personnel carriers and go to the faces.
6 West Mains
6 West Mains, where the fire occurred, had developed eight entries using
continuous mining technology and the room-and-pillar mining method.  Entries
on 6 West Mains were numbered 1 through 8, left to right facing inby (figure
2.2).  Entries 1, 2, and 3 served as return aircourses, with entry 3 designated as
the alternate escapeway.  Entries 4, 6, 7, and 8 functioned as intake aircourses,
with entry No. 4 designated as the primary escapeway.  Trolley haulage was
located in No. 6, and the conveyor belt was located in No. 5.  As coal extraction
progressed in this area, longwall development panels were driven off to both the
left and right of 6 West.  Two of these were situated inby the fire's location.
4 South
The 4 South section was a three-entry longwall development panel that had
been advanced approximately 2,000 ft from 6 West Mains.  Entry 1 served as the
return aircourse for this section and was designated as their alternate escapeway.
No. 2 entry was the intake aircourse and functioned as a primary escapeway for the
section.  A conveyor haulage belt, located in entry 3, was ventilated by a separate
split of intake air that moved from the section mouth inby to the belt tailpiece.
5 South
The 5 South section was also a three-entry longwall development panel that
had been advanced about 1,000 ft inby from 6 West Mains.  On this section, en-
try 1 served as the intake aircourse and was also the primary escapeway.  The
conveyor belt was located in entry 2 and was ventilated by a separate split of
intake air that moved from the mouth of the section inby to the tailpiece.  Entry 3
was the return aircourse and served as a designated alternate escapeway for this
section.
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Figure 2.2–Area affected by fire at Brownfield Mine.
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Cokedale Mine
Cokedale Mine was originally started in 1944.  At the time the Cokedale
Mine fire occurred, this operation was opened by one drift and eight shafts into
the Pittsburgh Coal Seam.  Here, the Pittsburgh Seam averaged 66 inches thick.
A total of 408 persons were employed at the mine, 319 working underground on
2 production shifts and 1 maintenance shift per day, 5 days per week.  The mine
operated seven active sections and had three spare sections.  Workers produced
an average of 6,500 tons of coal per day.  All sections were mined using the
room-and-pillar method, with coal extraction being done by continuous miners.
Entries and crosscuts were mined to a width of 16 ft.  Entries were normally
developed on centers of 64 ft, with crosscuts mined on centers of 96 ft.
Coal was transported from the faces by shuttle cars and dumped onto belt
conveyors.  These conveyor belts transported coal from the sections to under-
ground loading tipples, where the coal was loaded into mine cars.  From the
tipples, 37- and 50-ton track locomotives transported trips of loaded mine cars to
the surface, where coal was then processed at the mine's cleaning plant.
Ventilation to the mine was provided by six exhausting axial-vane mine fans
located on the surface.  Intake air entered at the drift entrance and at seven intake
air shafts.  Permanent stoppings, overcasts, and undercasts were used to control air
flow and provide the required separation between various aircourses.  Permanent
stoppings were constructed of concrete blocks with mortared joints or blocks
plastered on one side.  In areas of short production duration, steel panel stoppings
were used.  Face ventilation was accomplished using auxiliary fans and tubing.
From Cokedale Mine's drift opening (pit mouth), a series of seven or eight
entries (main headings) were driven in a westerly direction.  The fire at this mine
originated in the loaded track entry of these mains (figure 2.3).  It started at a
point about 6 miles inby the pit mouth and 1,000 ft outby Steiner portal.  At the
time, entries 1, 2, and 3 were functioning as return aircourses, while entries 6,
7, and 8 served as intakes.  Near the fire, entries 4 and 5 were track entries and
accommodated Cokedale Mine's main trolley haulage from working sections to
the pit mouth.  Entries 4 and 5 also served as intake aircourses, and air velocity
in these entries exceeded 250 fpm.  They were developed before the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, which limited air velocity around
trolley haulage systems to 250 fpm.
8 Face
 The 8 Face section consisted of nine entries and had been developed in the
mid-1950s to the left off the main headings.  Entries 1 through 4 were intake air-
ways, while entries 5 through 8 served as return aircourses.  A series of eight-
entry panels were developed to the right of 8 Face.  After development, these






































In the late 1980s, a new series of nine entries, known as 7 Butt, were
developed to the left of 8 Face about 1,000 ft inby the main headings.  These
entries were driven some 3,200 ft before the section was turned to the left.  In
this section, entries 1, 8, and 9 were designated return aircourses, while entries 2
through 7 served as intake aircourses.  After 7 Butt had been advanced approxi-
mately 1,000 ft, a set of seven entries, known as the 1 Left "free" entries, were
driven 90E off 7 Butt and connected with the haulage mains.  The purpose for
driving this set of entries was to provide more air to the developing sections.
8 Face Parallels
Just outby the 1 Left "free" entries along 7 Butt, a series of nine entries were
developed 90E to the right.  These entries, known as 8 Face Parallels, were being
driven parallel to the old 8 Face entries.  For 8 Face Parallels section, the pri-
mary (intake) escapeway followed No. 7 entry to its intersection with 7 Butt.
The primary escapeway coming out of 7 Butt followed No. 8 entry out to the
intersection of  7 Butt and old 8 Face.  The old 8 Face entries were developed
before the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969; as a result, the
intake escapeway from old 8 Face was routed onto the track entry.  The alternate
(return) escapeway off 8 Face Parallels followed No. 9 entry to the intersection
with 7 Butt.  The alternate escapeway off 7 Butt followed No. 9 entry to the
intersection with old 8 Face.  At this point, the return escapeway crossed over
old 8 Face to the right-side return (No. 7 entry) of old 8 Face.  The secondary
escapeway in old 8 Face followed No. 7 entry to the section mouth.  From there,
the secondary escapeway followed the left-side return (No. 3 entry) of the main
headings to Crystal air shaft.
Discussion
This chapter has depicted an underground coal mine as a well-planned,
complex, and regulated system operating in a harsh environment.  Additionally,
it profiled the three fire settings to be discussed later.  Since mines contain nu-
merous pieces of electrical equipment, have various friction sources, and possess
an almost inexhaustible supply of fuel, it is not surprising that they sometimes
catch fire.  Actually, small fires are somewhat common.  Those that force an
evacuation, however, are nonroutine events.  While miners may be highly skilled
at their jobs, the task of responding to this type of emergency requires a different
set of proficiencies.
Earlier, it was suggested that safety training classes may not always give
miners competencies they need to face contingencies in their workplaces.  This
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brings up an interesting point as it relates to fire.  Even though mines are
potentially dangerous, they are not emergency organizations.  Their goal is to
extract a product—coal—and to do it profitably.  Preparation for an event that
may never occur will obviously not  be given the same priority in a mine that it
would merit on a naval combat vessel, for instance.  What, then, is the
appropriate way to view behaviors that will be reported in the chapters to
follow?  Workers at these operations did not display the discipline that well-
drilled mine rescue teams would have, but is such an expectation realistic?
Perhaps the best way to approach this analysis is to note that some groups
responded much more effectively than others and to explore what factors led to
such variation.  That way, any recommendations for improvement are likely to
remain in context, recognizing that mines are not emergency organizations.
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CHAPTER 3.—RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE PROFILE
Homans [1950] offered a working definition of group that is useful for this
research:  "We mean by a group a number of persons who communicate with one
another often over a span of time, and who are few enough so that each person
is able to communicate with all the others, not at secondhand, through other
people, but face-to-face."  This chapter begins with a discussion of the group
concept in reference to the hypothesized escape groups mentioned earlier.  It
then moves to an examination of analysis techniques used by the authors.
Finally, the subjects themselves are profiled according to their demographic
characteristics.
The Nature of Groups
Warriner [1956] took a realist approach to understanding groups:  "(1) the
group is just as real as the person, but (2) both are abstract, analytical units, not
concrete entities, and (3) the group is understandable and explicable solely in
terms of distinctly social processes and factors, not by reference to individual
psychology."  Warriner's realist position merely holds that "group" occupies a
different domain in which it is no more or less concrete than "person."  At this
group level the unit of analysis will be those relations that indicate social rather
than individual behavior.  It is possible to investigate these group properties em-
pirically—if a researcher avoids confusing conceptual entities with concrete
ones.  Most people seem to accept that group attributes must somehow be
inferred, but think personal attributes will be directly manifested, requiring little
or no interpretation [Snizek 1979].  In other words, nobody would equate phys-
ical components of an underground working section with the actual work group,
yet social scientists (as well as laypeople) very often confuse real individuals
with notions of the person.  In actuality, neither groups nor persons are directly
disclosed to the senses; both are inferred by experience and observation.  One
can "see" a group just as clearly as one can "see" a person, given the proper per-
spective from which to do so.  It is necessary, in developing this perspective, to
begin with a sound definition of the thing being examined.
Besides communication, or more generally, social interaction, Homans
[1950] included three other components of group makeup.  "Sentiment" is char-
acterized as the feelings people tend to form about one another when they
interact often.  These feelings include not only friendliness and dislike, but at-
titudes such as approval or disapproval.  A "norm" is an idea, held in common
by group members, that specifies how people ought to behave in given cir-
cumstances.  In lay terms, norms are simply those informal rules individuals
abide by in order to get along together in social situations.  Finally, "activity"
refers to those things persons do with others.  In work groups, as an example,
many of the activities are cooperative and goal-directed.
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Most underground mining activities are carried out as team work.  Workers
at the face interact routinely to coordinate various tasks in the extraction cycle.
Crews that work outby also communicate and assist each other in order to do
their jobs.  These reciprocal relations exist in a daily context of danger.
A mistake on one worker's part could injure or kill others.  The need to deal with
this danger and predict what one's coworkers are likely to do in a given situation
has resulted in a complex of sentiments and rules governing individual behavior.
Simply stated, miners pressure each other to behave in terms of collective ex-
pectations and use a range of sanctions to ensure conformity [Smith and Vaught
1988].  A result is what Lee [1970] termed the "illusion of universality."  This
is a general feeling that group members have the same outlook and tend to define
things similarly [Shibutani 1955].  Thus, a miner's attraction to his or her "bud-
dies" is seen as right and proper, where "one's very self, for many purposes at
least, is the common life and purpose of the group...the simplest way of
describing this wholeness is by saying that it...involves the sort of sympathy and
mutual identification for which 'we' is the natural expression" [Cooley 1909].
For underground miners, the sentiment that "we must stick together" may be
a "sacred code" [Lucas 1969] so strong it has a bearing upon how individuals
behave toward each other during a fire.  Johnston and Johnson [1988] noted that
an emergency does not necessarily signal the breakdown of social organization.
Rather, functional roles that already exist are merely adapted and extended into
the crisis.  In a mine, where workers feel that survival under ordinary circum-
stances may well depend on "having a good buddy who watches out for you"
[Wardell et al. 1985], it is almost certain they will be trying to help each other
escape.  How and under what circumstances this helping behavior occurs is a
concern of the research team.  Since the literature reviewed in chapter 1 suggests
that group escape attempts may actually increase an individual's survival
chances, what then makes an effective escape group?  At what point does a situ-
ation dictate that "it's every man for himself," as one respondent reported, and
how might this sentiment be avoided?  To answer these and other questions
about escape behavior, it is necessary to explore the nature of those groups that
evacuated the three fires reported in this study.
Research Strategy and Method
A general case study strategy has been used in this research and the design
should not be confused with any particular method of data collection and
analysis.  Nevertheless, such misunderstanding occurs frequently and tends to
cloud discussion [Platt 1988].  This issue can be clarified succinctly.  Case stud-
ies are nothing other than a way to "explain wholistically the dynamics of a
certain historical period of a particular social unit" [Stoecker 1991].  In other
words, they set the boundaries of a research effort rather than determine how it
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will be carried out.  For the present study, each of the eight escaping groups is
treated as a separate case having unique aspects as well as certain com-
monalities.  The time periods are well-defined, beginning with a warning and
ending when group members reached safety.  Likewise, each social unit is
clearly identifiable:  those miners who came out of their operation together.  The
research task is to explain the dynamics of these different groups.
Analysis of each subject of interest was first done within the escape group.
"A single case can undoubtedly demonstrate that its features are possible and,
hence may also exist in other cases and, even if they do not, must be taken into
account in the formulation of general propositions" [Platt 1988].  A multiple-
case design was used so that variations across cases could also be examined.  "In
a multiple-case study, one goal is to build a general explanation that fits each of
the individual cases, even though the cases will vary in their details." [Yin
1984].  Multiple cases are not used as a sample of the population, but as repli-
cation of an analysis.  Each case "(a) predicts similar results (a literal replica-
tion) or (b) produces contrary results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical
replication)" [Yin 1984].  In this study, the resulting explanations were based on
what was learned about each group, as an individual case, and about subjects of
interest as they were exhibited (or not exhibited) across the eight groups.
Information for the present study has been taken from various sources.
Existing literature was used to provide a theoretical notion of how escape groups
might be expected to function.  Mine Safety and Health Administration investi-
gative reports helped researchers build pictures of each fire situation.  These nar-
ratives also provided insights about the efficiency of given escape efforts.  The
main data source, however, is a set of open-ended responses collected during
interviews with workers who escaped through smoke in the three mines.  Forty-
eight miners, supervisors, and State or Federal inspectors gave accounts of their
experiences.  "An account is the personal record of an event by the individual
experiencing it, told from his point of view " [Brown and Sime 1981].  Thus, the
focus of analysis are these qualitative data.  Further, while some responses in the
database refer to individuals, only data that lead to a better understanding of the
group will be considered here.  Each escape group will be portrayed through the
accounts of its members.
Quantitative methodologists often profess difficulty understanding how a
qualitative strategy and its related activities can be made legitimate.  The use of
open-ended data, such as personal accounts, is frequently criticized by those who
are more familiar with experimental or quasi-experimental quantitative methods.
These scientists usually raise issues of reliability and validity when questioning
the soundness of qualitative research.  In general, reliability denotes the tenden-
cy of a measuring procedure to behave in a constant manner each time it is
applied.  The concept of validity is not quite so intuitive.  Essentially, however,
a valid procedure is one that measures what it is supposed to measure.  From a
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traditional (or empirical) frame of reference, the type of information-gathering
that depends on subjective responses has some major flaws.
First, independent and dependent variables may not be well specified and
probably could not be measured accurately even if they were [Stoecker 1991].
Since reliability depends on the degree to which a finding "is independent of
accidental circumstances" [Kirk and Miller 1990], it is vital that any variable of
interest can be linked with an empirical indicator.  It will then be possible,
through repeated trials, to determine the constancy of this indicator as a meas-
urement tool.  Consistent measurement is necessary if researchers are to separate
legitimate findings from accidental factors that introduce error [Carmines and
Zeller 1987].  Without this type of rigor, empiricists argue, potential bias would
be obscured and hence undetected.  Thus, there could be no guarantee of internal
validity.  Internal validity allows the researcher to conclude that it was a
specified independent variable, rather than some third factor, which caused
change in a dependent variable [Yin 1984].  Because it is very difficult to es-
tablish the reliability and internal validity of open-ended responses in a tradi-
tional sense, such data get labeled as "impressionistic" and unusable for causal
analysis.
A second shortcoming of qualitative research, according to quantitative
methodologists, is that data obtained under uncontrolled conditions do not allow
the use of probability statistics and therefore are not generalizable.  This ques-
tion of representativeness involves the problem of external validity:  "To what
populations [and] settings...can this effect be generalized?" [Campbell and
Stanley 1966].  In situations where a proper sample has been taken, it is possible
to control statistically for interactions of factors that may have an impact on the
dependent variable.  A researcher can then draw conclusions about some meas-
ured observation and infer how it will impact infinite similar circumstances.
Since the qualitative methodologist neither takes broad and random samples nor
calibrates responses, it is deemed there is no way to answer the question of
"whether the researcher sees what he or she thinks he or she sees" [Kirk and
Miller 1990].  This "nonquantitative" scholar is also viewed as being unable to
make any empirical leap from particular events to those universal axioms that
are the ultimate goals of science.
Yet qualitative methods, which became virtually ignored in most disciplines
following the rise of computer analysis and sophisticated statistical techniques,
have had a phenomenal resurgence in the past decade [Miles and Huberman
1994].  Perhaps the chief reason for this renewed interest in, and use of, open-
ended data has been the growing recognition that quantitative science leaves
gaps in our attempts to answer "how" and "why" questions.  Stoecker [1991]
listed three basic responses to the proponents of experimental or quasi-
experimental research that suggest what some of the foibles are:  "First,
probability samples and significance tests do not insure accurate explanation.
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Second, the scientific method does not control for researcher bias.  Third, the
survey research preferred by scientific method advocates is not useful for
applied questions."  No matter how well a study is controlled, a scientist who
wishes to go beyond the immediate evidence and make statements about some
population or universe must assume he or she "knows the relevant laws"
[Campbell and Stanley 1966].  The strength of one's assumptions rests upon
knowledge, experience and creativity, i.e., any type of science is only as good
as its practitioners.
If there is a place in science for nonquantitative research, what might that
place be?  Insofar as case studies are concerned, they usually are thought of as
exploratory or descriptive in nature.  This is especially so for work that relies on
qualitative analysis (such as the present research).  The appropriateness of a
particular strategy, however, should be decided not by its nature but by the
purpose for which it is being used.  Yin [1984] listed three conditions that need
to be considered before choosing a research strategy:  (1) the type of research
question being posed, (2) an investigator's extent of control over actual events,
and (3) whether the events being focused on are current or historical.  Questions
that consider how or why certain contemporary events occur, but over which the
researcher has no control, are particularly amenable to a case analysis.  Fur-
thermore, a qualitative case study, used as an explanatory mechanism, "provides
evidence to show how both the rule, and its exceptions, operate" [Stoecker
1991].
The present qualitative research makes no effort to count something or
measure a quantity.  Instead, team members have attempted to determine the
presence or absence of group behavior in a fire setting and then explain its
variability in those instances where it is seen to exist.  The question relevant to
reliability, in this case, is whether group behavior was studied by the researchers
in a way that created a false reflection of it.  Kirk and Miller [1990] suggested
the proper response to that question:  "For reliability to be calculated, it is in-
cumbent on the scientific investigator to document his or her procedure."  As in
reports of quantitative research, the qualitative methodologist must make explicit
the way the study was designed and carried out.  In so doing, he or she guar-
antees that other scientists can determine whether or not the methodology is
sound.  They then have an occasion to replicate the techniques, if appropriate,
in other settings.
Validity, in the case of these three fires, involves an assumption that USBM
researchers did, in fact, observe or detect what they were attempting to in-
vestigate.  In qualitative studies, the fundamental tools used are a researcher's
powers of observation or an ability to ask appropriate questions at the right time.
A qualitative researcher often gains confidence in findings by using a structured
instrument to examine an issue or variable of concern.  The primary instrument
used to gather data during this research was an interview guide (see appendix B).
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This guide requested individuals to provide an account of their personal
experiences in the fire from which they escaped.  Brown and Sime [1981] ad-
dressed the appropriateness of such an approach:  "Fundamental to the phi-
losophy of an account methodology is the recognition that people can and do
comment on their experiences, and that these commentaries are acceptable as
scientific data."  If a person making an observation is skilled and his or her in-
struments properly constructed, then any subsequent conclusions ought to be
considered valid.  In reporting these results, of course, it is important to recount
the methods that were used.  Their appropriateness and proper use can then be
evaluated by other researchers.  Each of these scientists will ultimately decide
if the instrument was constructed correctly and if the researchers were skilled in
its use.
In each case, after hearing about an event, researchers involved in this study
contacted officials from both the affected company and the United Mine
Workers of America (the labor union that represented rank-and-file employees
at all three sites).  Investigators requested management and labor's cooperation
with an ongoing study of miners' responses to underground mine fires.  At
mines A and B, union officials agreed to set up interviews with miners who had
escaped their fires.  One union and one management official set up the in-
terviews that were conducted with those individuals who escaped the fire in
mine C.  Worker accounts were gathered at locations convenient for the par-
ticipating miners.  Interviews of mine A workers were conducted in a room at
the local union hall.  Individuals who escaped mine B were interviewed at a
motel close to the mine where they worked.  The interviews at mine C were con-
ducted in offices on mine property.
Nobody except one subject and two research scientists was permitted in the
room during an interview.  The miner was first asked for permission to tape re-
cord his account.  All subjects agreed to be taped.  A written schedule (men-
tioned previously and shown in appendix B) with a series of open-ended
questions and related probes was used to guide every account.  Each interview
began with an investigator reiterating that participation in the study was
voluntary and that the miner had an option of not answering any particular
question.
After obtaining general demographic information, an interviewer next asked
the miner to tell, without interruption, his story about escaping the fire.  Fol-
lowup questions were then used so that specific details about each escape could
be included.  The sessions, which were 30 to 90 minutes long, ended when a
researcher had asked all questions on the interview guide and a miner did not
have any additional comments.  These interviews were completed 1 to 6 months
after each fire had occurred.
The audiotapes were transcribed and stored on computer disks as text-based
data.  This data set has been analyzed with the assistance of a program that acts,
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in effect, as an electronic substitute for scissors and paste [Seidel et al. 1988].
The computer application allows files to be sorted by category and cross-
referenced according to some predetermined coding scheme.  This feature en-
ables the easy retrieval and juxtaposition of specific categories during analysis.
Analysis can then begin with a series of coding passes.  The first pass might
simply identify instances of situations in which a group property either exists or
explicitly does not exist.  The next level of coding could include concepts such
as composition, stability, or interactions.  The coding scheme can be further de-
fined during this process and coding continued as needed.  Findings may then
be used to create a group behavior model.
After the accounts were gathered, a comparative method of qualitative
analysis was employed [Glaser and Strauss 1967].  In the comparative approach,
a researcher develops as many categories as will clarify the problem.  Next, he
or she starts integrating categories and the properties that make them up, be-
ginning to connect concepts with their indicators [Claster and Schwartz 1972].
After integrating categories and properties, the researcher is then ready to move
toward simplicity and a broader scope [Glaser and Strauss 1967].  Over time,
a theory of the event under investigation will emerge and be modified as more
data are added.  As the theory is streamlined, researchers are able to arrive at an
assessment of how typical those occurrences that went into its construction are
likely to be [Becker 1970].  The logic underlying this assessment is the same as
that which supports probability:  instead of adopting an either/or stance about the
accuracy of particular assertions, one addresses the likelihood that his or her
conclusions are correct.  The magnitude of evidence from various data sources
enables an observer to advance a particular conclusion with a greater or lesser
degree of confidence.
Profile of the Sample
Across the 3 mines and 48 subjects, 8 separate groups of workers escaped
through smoke.  Table 3.1 shows the number of miners in each escape group and the
number who were actually interviewed.  The sample includes workers from various
job categories.  Forty-two of these individuals were rank-and-file miners who worked
throughout the mines.  One mine inspector and five supervisors were interviewed.
These workers were 41.7 years old on average.  They had a mean of 16.8 years of
experience in mining with about 15 years at the operation where they were working
at the time of their fire.  The average age and number of years of experience for each
group are shown in table 3.2.  All of the miners included in this sample were male.
One female did escape with a group from Adelaide, but she chose not to participate
in the study.  To further define the context within which these people were required
to act, each escape group and its situation will be discussed briefly below.
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Table 3.1.—Number of miners in each escape group
 and number in sample




1 . . . . . . . . . . A 10 8
2 . . . . . . . . . . A 8 6
3 . . . . . . . . . . A 10 7
NAp . . . . . . . . A NAp 1
4 . . . . . . . . . . B 8 7
5 . . . . . . . . . . B 9 7
6 . . . . . . . . . . B 3 1
NAp . . . . . . . . B NAp 1
7 . . . . . . . . . . C 8 5
8 . . . . . . . . . . C 9 5
NAp   Not applicable.











1 . . . . . . . . . A 41.8 17.1 17.1
2 . . . . . . . . . A 39.3 14.3 14.0
3 . . . . . . . . . A 39.7 17.6 15.0
4 . . . . . . . . . B 41.7 17.2 16.7
5 . . . . . . . . . B 40.3 17.6 14.4
6 . . . . . . . . . B 56 25 15
7 . . . . . . . . . C 38.8 13.9 13.9
8 . . . . . . . . . C 40.0 14.7 13.9
   Total . . . . . — 41.8 16.8 15.2
Escape Profiles
Group 1 (1 Right - Adelaide) was a production crew.  This group had a new
section foreman who was working his first shift in the mine after a 5-year
absence.  He was not familiar with the affected area; As one worker put it:  "The
boss, I can't blame the boss.  This was the first time he was on the section in
5 years."  Additionally, the crew had recently been "split up," and some regular
workers had been replaced with experienced miners from other sections.  As a
result, at least three group members besides the foreman were unfamiliar with
this part of the mine.  Group 1 started the evacuation riding their mantrip.  This
mode of travel continued until the crew encountered heavy smoke.  At that point
the driver stopped the vehicle and everyone got out:  "We had two or three
running—everybody was panicked." After some initial confusion, the group
members gathered and started walking together out their intake escapeway.
They soon hit smoke in this entry as well.  Group 1 moved into a return airway
and continued walking.  Shortly thereafter, the group members encountered
smoke again.  At this point, they donned their self-contained self-rescuers and
walked through smoke to safety.
Group 2 (2 Northwest - Adelaide) was also a production crew.  These
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workers had all been together for a significant amount of time.  They had a sec-
tion foreman who was very familiar with the affected area.  One other resource
in this group was an individual who had been a mine rescue team member for
many years.  "We had the boss and the mine rescue man set it up, the boss in
front, he was in the rear."  Group 2 started to leave the mine on a mantrip.  The
group members had only gone a short distance when they encountered smoke.
They did not leave the mantrip at this point, however.  Instead, they rode back
up into the section to where they had started.  They then got off the vehicle and
started walking down their intake escapeway until they encountered smoke.
Group 2 next moved into the  return to avoid the smoke and continued walking.
When smoke was found in the return, this group donned the self-contained self-
rescuers and proceeded for about 1 mile to reach safety:  "We were about as
organized as you're going to get.  We did real good."  "We all stuck together real
well."
As with group 1, miners in group 3 (3 Left - Adelaide) had some new
members the night of their fire.  Most, however, had worked together for several
years.  At the beginning, everyone rode together until they encountered smoke.
As in the first group, they next started walking down their intake escapeway and
hit more smoke.  They then moved into a return and walked until they got into
smoke, at which point they decided to don their self-contained self-rescuers.
The next phase of their escape, however, differs from group 1.  They did not es-
cape as a cohesive unit, instead spreading out to form three subgroups.  While
walking through smoke, this crew became lost and was actually moving deeper
into the mine:  "We went in a little circle and come back around."  They had
gone approximately 200 ft when one of the miners recognized their mistake.  At
that point, everyone turned around and this time successfully found their way out
of the mine.
When group 4 (4 South - Brownfield) gathered, smoke was already visible
in the intake entry.  In addition to the section foreman and regular crew, group 4
contained a Federal mine inspector who had been on the section.  This group,
unlike the others, did not choose the return as a second option.  The group
thought that smoke would also be found in that entry:  "The boss and the in-
spector was there, and they were discussing which way to go—which would be
the best way to get out.  So they decided it would be down the belt.  We all went
down the belt."  However, the belt was not clear.  Like group 3, group 4 spread
out, with some slower workers lagging behind, accompanied by the inspector.
They completed the escape in the belt entry through the smoke.
Group 5 (5 South - Brownfield), a production crew, was led out by its
section foreman with help from a rank-and-file miner who knew the affected
area well:  "[The foreman] is our boss.  He...done right.  He got us on the right
track and kept us on the right track.  Between him and [the other guy]."  After
group 5 assembled, the group members walked down the intake entry until they
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encountered smoke.  Like group 4, they tried the belt entry next.  The smoke
there was not as heavy at first.  When it became heavy, they moved to the return.
The return was also smoke-filled, but they traveled on through the smoke.  Some
of the workers had difficulty due to age or physical problems and slowed down.
The section foreman stayed with these people to make sure that everyone
reached safety.
Members of group 6 (6 West - Brownfield) included three individuals.
These were a maintenance foreman and a mechanic (who worked together
regularly) plus a State mine inspector.  All three donned their self-contained self-
rescuers as soon as they assembled at the intake escapeway.  Even though their
haulage was clear initially, this group, influenced by input from the State mine
inspector, decided against attempting to travel in a vehicle.  They started their
escape walking down the intake entry.  When they reached heavy smoke, they
retreated and moved into a return:  "I mean, the inspector, when I turned around
and said we got to go back, he says no, and I says, you can do what you want to
do, I'm going back."  The men made a couple of turns, but basically followed the
return out of the smoke to clear air:  "The markers (reflectors) were there.
I mean, I really wasn't looking for them...the return is double-timbered.  I just
stayed between the props and went."
Group 7 (7 Butt - Cokedale) was a collection of individuals working in an
area on midnights, which was a maintenance shift at their mine.  Here,
a construction foreman took charge and led them out of the mine:  "I was a
foreman in charge of that area, and when I said to these people what we had to
do, there was no second guessing my decision."  As with groups 1, 2, and 3,
these miners also started their escape by attempting to leave the section on
vehicles.  When they judged the smoke to be too heavy for continuing safely,
everyone started walking in a return entry:  "I felt pretty confident...because
I knew [the foreman] had been up there for a long time walking returns and...he
was real familiar with the area."  In all, they walked through smoke for about
1.5 miles.  Throughout their escape, respondents recalled, the construction
foreman displayed knowledgeable, decisive, and confident leadership.
 None of the individuals in group 8 (8 Face Parallels) were engaged in coal
production, because they were also working the maintenance shift at their
operation.  Most of them were involved in such support work as construction and
supply activities.  Additionally, two motormen were in the section when fire was
discovered.  Everyone gathered and began their escape on foot.  Like all of the
groups except 5 and 6, they started out in their primary intake escapeway:
"There was a lot of confusion...the boss couldn't figure out how to get into the
intake escapeway."  When they encountered smoke there, the men turned around
and returned to the section, as group 2 did.  They then attempted to travel down
a return entry.  After walking about 0.25 miles, someone realized that they were
not in a designated escapeway:  "The guys were more or less talking amongst
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themselves and I said, you know, this is real serious and this boss if we're not
careful, he's going to get us killed."  At this point, everyone returned to the
section for a second time.  They then found a designated alternate escapeway
and followed it through smoke to safety.
Discussion
All eight of the escapes took place under potentially deadly conditions.  The
miners traveled in smoke for thousands of feet.  Individuals had to use self-
contained self-rescuers to protect their lungs as they moved through this smoke.
Some of the escape routes were objectively more complicated than others, but
all were difficult to traverse.
The summaries above give very general overviews of each escape in order
to suggest some of that associated complexity and difficulty.  This is done to
help readers more fully identify with the study's context.  In the chapters that
follow we will discuss at length details of each group and the area from which
it escaped.  Subjective analyses of danger and the effects of those perceptions
on group behavior will be a large part of that discussion.
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CHAPTER 4.—EXAMINATION OF GROUP BEHAVIOR
DURING MINE FIRE ESCAPES
It is suggested in chapter 1 that emergency activities (including escape) are
not individualistic.  They tend to be group responses.  If escapes from mine fires
are group activities, then preparation for such events must take group behavior
into account.  This chapter explores the hypothesis that the miners who escaped
from the three mines under study did so as members of groups.  For development
of this chapter, the database was examined for evidence of the existence of
escape groups and for instances when individualistic behavior was paramount.
Illustrations of group and/or individualistic behavior were analyzed and
representative examples are provided in the following discussion.
The nature of groups was discussed in chapter 3 and the following working
definition was offered:  "We mean by a group a number of persons who com-
municate with one another often over a span of time, and who are few enough
so that each person is able to communicate with all the others, not at second-
hand, through other people, but face-to-face" [Homans 1950].  To determine
whether or not groups existed during the fire evacuations, it is important that the
concept of group be clearly defined.  Therefore, the discussion started in chapter
3 will be elaborated here.  The defining characteristics of group given in chapter
3 were taken from Homans [1950].  They include size, person-to-person com-
munication, feelings that members have for each other, explicit and implicit
rules for behavior, and common activities.
An additional characteristic that is sometimes used to define groups is co-
hesiveness.  Kiesler and Kiesler [1970] state, "Cohesiveness would include not
only the attraction that the group holds for its members but also any other force
operating on the individual to stay in the group."  Variables said to contribute to
cohesiveness include  "(1) the attractiveness of a group for its members," and
"(2) the coordination of the efforts of the members" [Keisler 1970].  One source
of the attraction to a group occurs when "the goals or exterior tasks confronting
the group are consistent with those of the individual person, and can best be
handled by group action" [Cartwright and Zander 1968, in Davis 1969].  In other
words, a common goal and a coordinated effort mounted to achieve that goal
contributes toward the creation of a cohesive group.
As discussed in the earlier review of research (chapter 1), groups have
frequently been studied in laboratory or simulation settings.  These methods al-
lowed control over variables of interest. Kiesler and Kiesler [1970] state,
however, that they "find group variables conceptually imprecise and experi-
mentally difficult to work with."  Experimental control, in other words, is
difficult to achieve in the study of groups. The richness of the naturalistic mine
fire data may provide an opportunity for an examination of groups that cannot
be found in laboratories or simulations because this environment was not
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contrived and the groups were not artificially created.  While there are limita-
tions in the data set, it provides an opportunity for examining naturally occurring
groups experiencing an extremely stressful situation.  Furthermore, it offers
views of those groups developed from the perspective of potential group
members.
The remainder of this chapter will be organized into four sections. The first
section will focus on characteristics of the groups.  The beginning of group
formation for each work crew will be examined in section two.  The third section
will explore counterexamples or cases when individualistic behavior took prec-
edence over group actions.  The last section will be a discussion of the rami-
fications of the findings for mine evacuation preparedness.
Group Characteristics
To document the existence of the escape groups, group characteristics that
were defined earlier in this chapter will be considered.  The most objective
measure is group size.  All except one of the groups studied had 8-10 members.
The one outlier had only three members.  These sizes would meet Homan's
[1950] criteria of being, "few enough that each person is able to communicate
with all the others, not secondhand, through other people, but face-to-face."  The
following discussion will address each group in terms of its make-up and the
more subjective criteria.
The groups that were formed on each section varied in composition.  Five
of the eight groups were made up of production crews.  In two of these cases, the
crews from 2 Northwest at Adelaide and 5 South at Brownfield, stable work
groups had existed for quite some time and included a section foreman or
another miner with leadership capabilities.  The 4 South crew at Brownfield
Mine was composed of a stable work group and a mine inspector who happened
to be on the section at the time of the fire.  The inspector was, however, well-
known to the section foreman and was trusted as a capable individual. The
production crews from Adelaide Mine's 1 Right and 3 Left sections were
composed of new miners and/or supervisors.  While these individuals were not
new to mining and the roles they assumed, neither were they familiar with each
other.  The smallest group, which escaped from the 6 West section at
Brownfield, consisted of three individuals who were involved in the repair of a
piece of equipment.  Two of them were well-known to each other and routinely
worked together.  The third was a mine inspector who was conducting an in-
spection in that area.  Two of the groups, from Cokedale Mine's 7 Butt and
8 Face Parallels, were formed during a maintenance shift.  These groups con-
tained collections of individuals who were performing construction and supply
activities on these sections.  In both of these groups, foremen were present.
Some of the individuals in each group were familiar with each other, but others
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were not.  Similarly, some miners were familiar with the sections from which
they were required to escape while others were not.  In all eight cases, regardless
of the prior affiliation between the people on each section or familiarity with the
work area, the first action taken when warning of an emergency was received
was to warn others on the section and for everyone to gather in one location.
It is not surprising that miners on a section would come together under some
conditions.  Coal miners typically work in groups.  Each production crew conducts
activities in the section with individuals filling various roles and being assigned to
certain jobs.  During the accomplishment of those jobs, however, the members of
the crew may be dispersed throughout the section.  For example, on a continuous
mining section, the miner operator and helper will be in one entry while the roof
bolter operator and helper are in another.  The miners who are responsible for
transporting coal from the face to the section's dump point for haulage to the
outside will travel between the continuous miner and the dump point.  Therefore,
while a person can think of a section as having one work group that together
complete the tasks necessary to mine coal, these miners are also doing discrete
tasks within a system that may or may not allow them to be in direct
communication with each other at any given time during the work shift.  Casual
workers and visitors such as mechanics, bratticemen, supplymen, surveyors,
inspectors, and others may also be on the section.  Workers were dispersed in this
way on each section when the mine fire threat began at each of the mines.
Regardless of their particular location on the section, miners have certain
understandings of their roles and expectations of other miners. In other words,
they have what was earlier termed "explicit and implicit rules for behavior."
Under these "rules," a miner is expected to come to the assistance of another
during a mine emergency if at all possible.  When conducting a study in a com-
munity where a major mine emergency had occurred, Beach and Lucas [1960]
determined that:
In common with many mining communities, the norms shared by all
individuals guaranteed mutual help.  The miners' code of rescue meant
that each trapped miner had the knowledge that he would never be
buried alive if it were humanly possible for his friends to reach him.
This code was so widely understood and unconsciously accepted that no
miner-rescuer was faced with serious role conflict.  At the same time,
the code was not rigid enough to ostracize those who could not face the
rescue role.
These rules also include strong ties between a miner and a "buddy."  It is
understood that these two workers hold a special relationship and are expected
to come to each other's aid.  These implicit rules and role definitions existed at
the study mines.
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When asked how concerned the workers on one section were when they first
gathered together, one miner explained that most were calm but one miner was
upset.  "We had trouble with really only one guy on our crew, [he] just left his
buddy."  Saying that the miner "left his buddy" was intended to show that this
individual was extremely upset.  The miner's actions were explained by the
coworker's comment, "He's a nervous person."  As Beach and Lucas found, the
expectation is that a miner will help other miners, especially a buddy, but it will
not be held against an individual who is not up to the task.
The excerpts presented throughout this book offer, again and again, ex-
amples of miners expressing versions of this code and discussing attempts to live
by it.  It is within the context of such a code that the actions of individuals and
groups must be understood.  Miners living by this code would therefore set goals
of not only self-protection during emergency situations, but also protecting other
miners whenever possible.  Potential escape group members therefore, would
have an obvious common goal during the threatening situation of a mine fire.
Escape Group Formation
As mentioned earlier, production workers and other miners were scattered
throughout their sections in groups of two to four individuals when they
determined, by receiving warning or by their senses, that something was wrong
and some action should be taken.  Details about the discovery of the fires and
how warnings were communicated will be discussed in chapter 6.  For the
purposes of this chapter, however, it is important to note that upon learning some
kind of nonroutine problem existed, each miner was typically with only one or
two others.
The first thing that happened after the individuals or small groups learned
of a problem was the gathering of everyone in each section at one location.  This
group formation occurred on all eight of the affected sections.  The behavior was
displayed regardless of the form or content of the warning and across all job
titles and individual situations.  This point, which will be expanded below, is of
consequence because it provides the foundation for the argument to be made that
evacuation procedures and related training should focus on group action and
interaction, as individual miners will naturally form such groups during
emergency escape attempts.
Providing warning to the other miners on the section was the initial priority
of those workers who first received word of a fire or who observed and
recognized the signs of a serious fire.  In some cases the supervisor, usually a
section foreman, received a call or spotted smoke.  It is not surprising, given the
responsibilities of their positions, that these individuals instructed the miners on
their sections to meet at a given location to begin evacuation.  The foreman with
the crew from 7 Butt at Cokedale asked a miner to help give warning to the other
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miners.  He directed the miner to "just make sure everybody meets up here at the
[track] switch."  It could be suggested that the supervisor in these situations has
responsibility for the other employees and is motivated by that responsibility to
warn them and to gather them together where they can be given any assistance
needed during the evacuation.
While it may be true that supervisors feel responsible for the safety of
miners during an emergency, this is not a complete explanation for the behavior
of gathering everyone in the section together before taking other actions.  This
same behavior was exhibited by everyone who had earlier knowledge of the
problem regardless of that person's position or job title.  When a roof bolter
operator answered a phone call and was told of the fire, he asked other miners
nearby to help him spread the word:
I said, "I'll go to the left side. You get the guys on the right side."  So
I went up and told them, and we came down and the guys from the right
side came down...[to the load center].
In giving warning, it was assumed that everyone would meet somewhere on the
section before starting out of the mine.  A shuttle car operator reported his
actions upon learning of the fire in his mine as follows:
I stopped at the bolters first and I told them that there's heavy smoke
coming up the intake and we're supposed to get out of here right away.
See you back at the power center. That's where the rescuers were.
When hearing of the potential danger, no one started his or her evacuation alone.
In every case, warning of the situation was given and instructions to join the
other miners at a specific location were given.
It should also be considered that miners routinely enter and leave their
working section as a group. Frequently their transportation to and from work
areas is via a mantrip, which workers ride into and out of the mine with the
others who work in that section.  It is not remarkable, therefore, that miners went
to a given location to begin the process of leaving the mine.  What is of interest,
however, is that in these far from routine situations, miners still adhered to this
pattern of leaving together.  In fact, none of the miners interviewed gave any
indication that they considered starting their evacuations without the entire
group.  They often spoke of the actions of the groups, at this early point, as if
they were of one mind:
We met at the dinner hole and all of us just went down to the mantrip
and all in a single file line and we got in the mantrip and we started out.
We all met down at the tool boxes.  From there we walked down to the
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self-rescuers and everything.  Everybody picked up a self-rescuer.  We
had a full crew.  Everybody got a self-rescuer, and we checked to make
sure they were all good.  We turned around and we were going to go
down the intake.
In most cases, the miners interviewed seemed not to question whether or not the
person notified of a danger would spread the warning throughout the section and
then wait at a given location, (formally or informally designated) for the rest of
the section members to arrive before proceeding out of the mine.
It is also interesting to note that miners at this early stage of group formation
remained with the group regardless of their personal opinions about the safety
of the groups' behavior.  A utilityman told of beginning his escape riding a ve-
hicle even though he did not think that was the best method.
[The boss] came back up and said, "Get all the fire extinguishers and
let's go. We'll get in the mantrip."  I went down there.  I really wanted
to go to the intake escapeway or something like that when he said there
was a fire.  I'm going to go the other way.  I don't want to go that way.
So we got in there and, gee, we only went a couple blocks.
The authority of the boss was not questioned, even in this potentially life and
death situation.  The utilityman remained a part of the group, under the boss's
leadership.  In another case, a similar situation arose for a miner who did not ride
a jitney even though he thought that was the best way to reach safety.  In this
case, a mine inspector, who happened to be on that section, was the authority
figure to whom he deferred the decision.
[The fire boss] said there was a mine fire and I says okay, and then I run
and get my buddy and we went up the track entry.  [There is no track
there at that point.]  We went up and around, and I had to go over in the
belt entry to get the inspector.  We got on our rescuers right there.  And
we also took a spare rescuer with us.  I was going to ride the jitney out
of there, but he [the inspector] wouldn't let us, so we went on foot.
What these actions say about leadership is discussed in chapter 9.  However,
note that once the groups gathered together, individuals started their escapes
with those groups even when they felt the initial actions being taken were not the
best choices given the situations at hand.
Counterexamples to Escape Group Behavior
While each of the miners started evacuation with a group made up of
individuals who had been on the section at the time of warning, at times there
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were situations when individualistic behavior took precedence over group
actions.  As mentioned previously, miners accept the role of assisting others in
emergency situations, but also pardon those who cannot offer that assistance.
Instances of individualistic activities and of excusing others for lack of
assistance were recounted in the accounts of the mine fire escapes.
Individual decisions seemed to outweigh group behavior when the individual
was convinced that there was real danger and that the group's activities were not
the best response to the threat.  An example is provided by the 6 West group at
Brownfield Mine.  The group from this mine was composed of three individuals:
a maintenance foreman, a mechanic, and a mine inspector.  The group started
together and even remained together when the maintenance foreman was not
convinced that the group's response was the best.  However, as the maintenance
foreman perceived an increase in the danger of the situation, he decided to act
as an individual regardless of the choices made by the other group members:
When I turned around and said we got to go back, [the inspector] says
no.  And I says, "You can do what you want to do, I'm going back."
I said, "You can follow me or do what you want."  At that point I didn't
give a damn who followed me or who didn't.  I was getting out of a
heavy concentration [of smoke].
The maintenance foreman affirmed his belief in the code of assistance, while at
the same time justifying his attitude regarding acting alone if necessary:
The only way I wouldn't stay with somebody was if they disagreed with
me and I knowed I had the right decision made; I mean the right escape
road or something.  Then if they would give me any trouble, I would go.
The maintenance foreman suggested that the other group members should
follow his lead, but if they did not follow, then he would have no choice but to
act alone.  In this case, he was not acting for self-interest at the expense of the
group good.  Instead, the maintenance foreman was convinced that acting based
on his decision would be best for each member of the group, but if group
members chose not to follow his lead he was willing to act as an individual.
There is no evidence regarding whether or not the maintenance foreman would
have followed through with this behavior, because the other group members did
follow him at this point.
A more extreme example of group breakdown occurred in the group that
escaped from 4 South at Brownfield.  At one point the group broke roughly into
two smaller groups.  Later, one individual was left behind under life-threatening
circumstances.  There was much information regarding these actions and the rea-
sons for them volunteered during data-gathering interviews.  These discussions
suggest a high level of concern  regarding roles and the appropriateness of the
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actions of the group members.  The members of the 4 South group started their
evacuation together:
Then, like I said, they started separating from the pack, not waiting for
the pack, the faster ones.  The slower guys, some were stopping 'cause
they just didn't have the wind.  They were out of shape or whatever, and
they just wanted to stop and take a rest.
At that point, the section supervisor went ahead with the faster subgroup and a
mine inspector stayed back with the slower subgroup.  There was also one
individual who was not clearly a part of either group.
I said, "Let's try to stay together," and the older man, I recall him saying
that he has to go at a steady pace, that he can't go fast, that he's just
going to stay out ahead of us [the slower subgroup] and try to hold a
slow place.
[A faster miner] comes by and says, "What's the matter old man, can't
you take it?"  I says, "Hey, you just go ahead, you save your own ass,
don't worry about me."  And that's just the way it was from there on out.
This miner remained in his position between the faster and slower subgroups and
safely escaped.
The event most distressing to group members occurred when an individual
in the group from 4 South became unable to continue his escape and was left
behind.  The actions surrounding this situation exemplify the implicit rules
regarding miners' responsibilities to each other.  At this point in the escape, three
miners (the miner operator, the mine inspector, and a mechanic) had formed the
slower subgroup and they were too far behind to communicate with the other
members of the 4 South group.  The continuous miner operator found it in-
creasingly difficult to continue, and the other two miners were trying to assist
him down the belt entry.  "[The miner operator] said, 'I can't go no more.'"  He
said, 'I'm just going to stay here.'"  The mine inspector felt he should stay and
help, but perceived that the oxygen supply from his SCSR was becoming
dangerously low. He decided to leave the other two miners behind:
I looked at the mechanic and I said, "I got to go."  I said, "There is no
sense in me staying."  I don't know if I said that or not, but I thought
about it.  I know I talked to myself, "There's no sense in me staying."
I said, "I can't breathe now."  I said, "I know where I'm at.  I can send
somebody back.  I'll go out and get somebody."
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As can be seen in his comments, the inspector stayed to help as long as he
thought was possible and then reasoned that he had to leave.  He did not stop his
explanation there, however, and pointed out that he could offer further assistance
to the struggling miner by going for outside help.  Eventually the mechanic also
made this decision and left the miner operator alone.
I felt so sorry for [the miner operator], and he was struggling too hard,
and I guess I made a decision there that he wasn't going to make it and
that you might as well leave him and you might make it.
The miner operator was eventually helped to safety by the mechanic and the
foreman who returned after they had reached fresh air.
All of the group members who knew about the miner operator's difficulties
did everything they thought possible to assist him.  Two even went back into the
smoke after they had reached a safe area.  The miner operator was asked about
that point during the escape when he was left alone.  His response confirms that
the code allows reprieve for miners who cannot help others in need.
It don't bother me.  I didn't expect—I kept telling the mechanic to keep
going, don't wait for me.  I didn't expect anybody to stay behind for me.
I don't hold nothing against anybody.
In summary, the members of the 4 South group started their evacuation
together, but as environmental conditions deteriorated, the group split.
Eventually, one miner was even left to die.  On the other hand, group members
returned and helped this individual to safety and he held no hard feelings about
the experience. This example of group behavior upholds the code of helping
each other whenever possible, but of releasing others from this obligation when
it cannot be fulfilled.
Emergency Evacuation Ramifications of Group Behavior
The findings reported in this chapter suggest that individuals will form a
group during an emergency situation and will often act with the group regardless
of personal opinions regarding the  optimum response to the event.  Furthermore,
miners will assist each other during emergency events whenever possible.  This
assistance can take such forms as delaying the group's evacuation to wait for a
slower group member or individuals returning to a hostile environment after
reaching safety to search for a missing coworker.  This does not mean, however,
that no individual action takes place.  Sometimes individual safety does take
precedence over group safety.  The individual seems to be more likely to act
outside of group behavior as the perceived danger increases and as options for
group action become limited.
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In planning for emergency mine evacuation, group behavior should always
be considered.  Since miners will probably gather as a group before beginning
their evacuation, issues such as time allotments for such activities, strategic
locations for gathering, and appropriate leadership should be examined.  It is
also important to realize that miners will attempt to assist other miners who they
perceive to be in danger. Awareness of this response is especially relevant for
those who are trying to determine the location of  missing miners during a rescue
attempt.  In these situations, miners may not choose the most direct route out of
the mine, but may instead go toward an area where they think they may find a
fellow miner needing their assistance.  In training miners for escape, it may be
appropriate to discuss the issues related to groups staying together versus
individuals and/or subgroups splitting from the main group.  It is not clear that
either situation is always correct.  It is clear, however,  that both happen during
real events.  It would be helpful if discussions of when each might be fitting
were conducted in a classroom setting.
In summary, emergency response planners must take into account that
miners will attempt to evacuate in groups when threatened by a mine fire.
Training for evacuations should take this fact into account and include the likely
group-related responses in any escape  procedures.
References
Beach HD, Lucas RA, eds. [1960].  Individual and group behavior in a coal mine disaster.
National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, publication 834, p. 32.
Davis JH [1969].  Group performance.  Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
p. 78.
Homans GC [1950].  The human group.  New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, p. 1.
Kiesler CA, Kiesler SB [1970].  Conformity.  Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, p. 65.
60
CHAPTER 5.—A MODEL OF THE JUDGMENT AND
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN MINE FIRES
Various aspects of judgment and decision-making are key themes in this book.
The model  presented here serves as a loose structure for the chapters that follow this
one.  The notion of a model is introduced because growing research interest in the
subjective aspects of group and individual behavior has led to a debate over whether
judgment is a skill that can be understood scientifically.  A related point of
contention is whether such an understanding could lead to the development of
methods for estimating people's ability to make good decisions during an emergency.
There is some literature that supports the potential usefulness of this approach.
However, little agreement seems to have been reached on how to define and
operationalize even those basic concepts necessary to assess the soundness of
decisions from within their environmental and group contexts [Jensen and Benel
1977; Godden and Baddeley 1979; Baumann and Bourbonnais 1982; Brecke 1982;
Stone et al. 1985].  A look at the real-world process is clearly needed.
The need to attempt a better understanding of judgment and decision-making
properties stems from those occasions in the existence of an organization when
there is a lot at stake.  The process of decision-making (which is part of the ex-
ercise of judgment) has been analyzed in situations such as corporate takeovers
[Janis and Mann1977], military combat [Begland1979], clinical emergencies
[Baumann and Bourbonnais 1982], and aviation events [Billings and Rey-
nard1984].  The fundamental assumption of these analyses is that, while there
are untold successes, there are also notable numbers of failures resulting from
decisions that can be ascribed to one or more errors in judgment.  From a cog-
nitive perspective, any person engaged in decision-making (either alone or in a
group) is actively involved in a process characterized by certain elements.  These
were mentioned in chapter 1, but are reiterated briefly at this point:  (1) detection
of a problem, (2) definition or diagnosis, (3) consideration of available options,
(4) choice of what is perceived as the best option given recognized needs, and
(5) execution of the choice based on what has transpired [Flathers et al. 1982;
Baumann and Bourbonnais 1982].  At any moment in this process, there are
factors at play that have a large impact on one's ability to solve complex
problems in a limited time:  (1) an internal state [Hedge and Lawson 1979] is the
sum of a person's psychomotor skills, knowledge, attitudes, etc.; (2) uncertainty
[Brecke 1982] is caused by faulty or incomplete information received from the
external environment; (3) stress [Biggs 1968; Jensen and Benel 1977] is
generated both by the problem at hand and any background problem that may
exist; and (4) complexity, as it is used here, refers to the number of elements
involved that must be attended to.  These variables are depicted in figure 5.1,
and their relationship to each other and to an outcome is indicated.  This schema
is designed to suggest interaction, because while the judgment and decision-
making process may be conceptualized as discrete stages, experience tells us that
this is not the way people function in real-world situations.
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Figure 5.1.–A model of judgment and decision-making.
The interactive model reflects underlying demands on decision-makers in
most life or death situations.  Whether the individual is an airline pilot, a fire-
fighter, a nurse, or an industrial worker, an emergency makes it necessary to deal
with an enormous amount of sometimes faulty information in a rather short time-
frame.  While (ideally) an understanding of judgment in the context of one event
should be generalizable to comparable circumstances in different environments
[Jensen and Benel 1977], judgment theorists have typically limited themselves
to more specific approaches.  The method they have most often used to examine
empirically a given aspect of judgment is usually some variation of the situ-
ational technique.  In situational exercises, the subject is presented with a prob-
lem taken from his or her area of competence (aviation, for example) and is
given the task of reaching a workable outcome.  A majority of existing exercises
appear to focus on either one of two elements represented in figure 5.1:  (1) an
individual's ability to reach a satisfactory diagnosis once he or she has become
aware that a problem exists, or (2) a person's choice response after a scenario has
been laid out and the diagnosis provided.
Using Judgment and Decision-Making Skills in a Mine Fire
This chapter, rather than reporting the results of subjects' performances on
a simulated problem, discusses instead how these eight case studies deal with the
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complete process of peoples' judgment and decision-making during an actual
event (group escapes from a mine fire).  Throughout each episode, workers en-
gaged in an ongoing series of activities, some of which seem to have been well
thought out and others that (in hindsight) do not seem so logical.  Yet, all the
while, they were attempting to solve the problem that confronted them.  Such
behavior is in line with much of the recent literature dealing with human actions
in fires, which advances the argument that people engage in adaptive behavior
based on choices made from among those perceived to be available at any
particular time during the occurrence [Sime 1980; Lerup et al. 1980].
People seem to exercise judgment and make decisions during a fire, although
they oftentimes fail to perceive the fundamental problem adequately.  This is
especially true if they are focused on a task, or are having some type of dif-
ficulty.  An act that appears irrational when viewed with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight, therefore, might have seemed, to the actor in that situation, the most
sensible thing to do.  Unfortunately for those interested in reaching a more ob-
jective understanding of the quality of those decisions, choices are usually
judged ex post facto depending on their outcomes.  Accordingly, if a person sur-
vives, he or she is credited with making sufficient correct decisions and little
attention is paid to poor choices; if a victim dies, most second-guessing focuses
on what he or she might have done wrong and there is not much analysis of any
good decisions that were made.
The settings of this study seem particularly appropriate for an examination
of topics such as the quality of thought that goes into choices made during an
emergency.  That is because mining lore is filled with accounts of tragic out-
comes that could have been avoided.  Many stories recount how escaping work-
ers advanced to within a few feet of smoke-free air, yet chose to turn back and
barricade, perishing in the end [Cole et al. 1988].  The real question then be-
comes not one of whether the instrumentally "correct" choice was made (it is
known in retrospect that this was not the case), but whether those miners made
the best use of all evidence available to them in reaching the decision they im-
plemented.  To put this another way, outcomes might not always be linked me-
chanically to the quality of choices.  This chapter will show how the qualitative
database is being used in the formation of a framework that ought to allow a
better understanding of miners' judgment and decision-making activities given
such a scenario.
Fire in the Mine as a Nominal Problem
In the model used here, a nominal problem is defined as an environmental
or system condition that can be characterized by the type of response it requires
[Pew 1994].  Fire is one of those events needing a high level of "situation
awareness."  Endsley [1988] has identified this concept in terms of its three main
components:  (1) perception of a situation's elements in time and space,
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(2) comprehension of their meaning, and (3) projection of a near future status for
the condition in question.  Endsley's notion of situation awareness closely paral-
lels two stages (problem perception and diagnosis) shown in figure 5.1 and is
discussed below as part of the judgment and decision-making process.  The
present section offers a brief description of the nominal problem at each study
site.
Adelaide Mine
At 9:08 p.m. during March 1988, Adelaide's second shift dispatcher was
alerted by a warning of 10.5 ppm on the mine's carbon monoxide monitoring
system.  This warning cleared almost immediately.  A few seconds later the
same sensor (at the end of 2 Northwest belt) registered a warning of 11.5, but
cleared in less than 30 seconds.  The dispatcher continued his normal duties.
Sometime after 10:00 p.m., a third-shift supply boss arrived at Adelaide's surface
facility:
I always go to work early, I did all my life.  I reported to the mine and
I put my dinner bucket down, and I went out to the lamp house to get a
cup of coffee.  When I entered the lamp house area I heard this beeping
sound.  It was coming out of the dispatcher's shanty...I walked in and
what it was was the CO monitor...I want to know what's goin' on.  And
they says the monitor's been goin' off and on, and we think we got a fire,
but we're not sure.  Well, I said, was the crews notified inby the fire
area?  No we didn't notify anybody yet 'cause nobody contacted us.  So
I said you better start calling these crews and get them out of the mine
whether you know it's a fire or not, you better get a hold of 'em.
At 10:30 I entered the mine.  We got up there and they were already
trying to fight the fire.  We fought it for a good while and we kept losing
ground continuously.  It just kept going way ahead of us.
Workers continued to fight the fire, which was reported to be in or near the drive
head of 2 Northwest's "mother" belt (see figure 2.1), with small foam generators,
fire extinguishers, water, and rock dust.  By that time, all section crews had been
notified to evacuate.
Brownfield Mine
Around 11:00 one summer morning in 1988, a "fire boss" (mine examiner)
was in the process of inspecting Brownfield's No. 38 belt conveyor.  This belt
receives coal from sections being developed off 6 West Mains section and also
transports coal from 6 West Mains itself (see figure 2.2).  He had arrived just
64
outby the "head drive" (terminus) of 5 South section's belt when he smelled smoke.
The fire boss first checked the 5 South belt head, and finding nothing wrong there,
walked approximately 600 ft along No. 38 belt to the 4 South head drive.  At this
point, he detected smoke farther down the 38 belt toward the 3 South head.
Continuing along the 38 belt, the fire boss walked another 200 ft to the worked-out
4 North drive area, at which point he encountered heavy white smoke.  Retreating
back along 38 belt to the 4 South head, the fire boss entered the track entry of
6 West Mains, where the smoke was somewhat less dense.  The fire boss hurried
along the track back to the old 4 North area, and stopped at its head:
I could hear...a rumbling like a—at first I thought it was the welder in
there burning something and something happened in there...I yelled
for...the welder...I yelled about two or three times for him and there was
no answer...I run back over and I went through the overcast to go over
to the intake...which would be the right side of the track...When I got in
there, the smoke was real thick in there too, and I couldn't see...So
I dropped down on my knees and I turned around to get my W65 [filter-
type self-rescuer] off of my belt...When I kneeled down, I could see the
yellow door...So I hurried up and went over to the door, opened that
door and got out through there and I was in the intake then...I was
coughing around and it really burned my chest at this time, so I probably
stayed there a couple minutes to get my bearings again and I went
down—I had to go to the intake to 3 South, so I run down the intake...
This is—we're talking 4½ feet, so when I say run—I went down the
intake to 3...and I came out onto the track and it was clear...So I run up
the track then to 4 South and there was...a high spot where they took
rock...The smoke was like hanging there and it was clear outby the high
spot...The smoke was real thick, but along the left rib, I could see where
there was no—it was clear...So I crawled up along the rib, stayed real
low, and I crawled up along the rib, cause I still thought [the welder]
was in there and...something had happened...I thought there was a man
in there...I went up along the rib and I got my head around the corner
and I looked in and I yelled...a couple more times and I could see the
flames coming off the top—I could see that there was a motor sitting
there...I saw the flames coming off the top of the motor.
After seeing these flames, the fire boss disengaged the trolley power by opening
a cutout blade.  He then called to warn his shift foreman and those miners
working in each of the three sections that would be affected by the fire.  The fire
boss was soon joined by the mine foreman and general assistant mine foreman,
who helped him fight the fire.  Meanwhile, the three affected section crews were
being warned to get out of the mine.
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Cokedale Mine
At some time during an early morning in October 1990, a roof fall occurred
on one of the haulage tracks at Cokedale Mine.  The operation differed from
most mines today because primary coal transport was still done by rail.  One set
of rails was used to move loaded cars and adjacent tracks in a parallel entry were
employed for empties.  Crossovers were located at intervals along the haulage
so that cars could be switched back and forth.  It was at one of these crossovers
that a lead motorman, bringing a trip of empties into the mine, saw smoke.  After
alerting his buddy in the trailing motor, this worker dismounted and went to find
what he believed was a burning trolley switch.  The lead motorman had walked
only a few feet into that crosscut where the crossover and trolley switch were
located when he encountered heavy smoke.
The lead motorman retreated to his locomotive and attempted to clear the
track.  Before he could push his 45-car train to the next crossover outby, power
went off and the motorman was forced to park his trip on the empty track.  At the
train's rear, the trailing motorman cut his locomotive loose and was able to coast
into the crossover and onto the loaded track.  As he drifted down this track, the
trailing motorman saw a roof fall with the trolley wire under it and flames
coming from the caved material (see figure 2.3).  After calling outside to report
his discovery to the dispatcher, the trailing motorman grabbed a fire extinguisher
from his locomotive and went back to the burning cave-in.  Near the fire site he
met the lead motorman and these two workers attempted to fight the blaze.
Meanwhile, the dispatcher was busy notifying those miners inby the source of
combustion that smoke was coming their way and relaying the fire's location to
them.  The affected miners began an immediate evacuation.
Perception of the Nominal Problem
There are two ways in which any warning about the existence of a problem
may be conveyed to an individual:  by means of some intermediary; or directly,
through the senses.  In the first instance, a person is faced with the task of
deciding whether to believe the messenger and/or how to interpret the message.
In the second instance, a person is faced with the necessity of drawing
implications from what his or her senses are revealing without benefit (in many
cases) of corroboration.  Under both of these conditions, perception is a process
that involves a varying degree of uncertainty.  The process also requires time,
during which a perceiver attempts to get a fix on the problem and begin his or
her diagnosis.  A lot depends on situational factors.  In the model depicted by
figure 5.1, these situational factors are shown as a context filter.  There were
aspects of the context at each operation that had a distorting effect on how the
nominal problem was perceived.
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At Adelaide, the nominal problem was a fire on the mother belt.  There were
two factors confounding a grasp of the true situation at this site.  First, on the
night the fire occurred, affected sections had been plagued all shift by belt
stoppages.  Second, recent technological developments at this mine caused the
initial message to be mishandled.  Several weeks prior to the fire, new sensors
had been installed near the mouth of 1 Right.  Maintenance people doing this
work drilled holes in the tops of the sensor boxes and secured them directly to
roof bolts.  That action seems to have established some sort of ground potential
which was keyed by signals from passing trolley motors.  This ground potential
in turn triggered alarms on the monitoring system outside.  When the problem
was fixed by rehanging the sensor boxes, another predicament appeared.  Some
sensors in the area were still giving false alarms.  Further investigation showed
that new 19 gauge wire connecting those field data stations was defective.  In
essence, because of technical problems, Adelaide's dispatcher had been
inundated with false alarms for some time preceding the event.
The nominal problem in Brownfield's case was the burning motor located
at 4 South, 6 West.  A compounding factor, which no one knew at the time, was
that a door had been left open in the supply chute where the motor was parked.
This open door affected ventilation inby the blaze, and caused the smoke to
behave in ways that the miners did not anticipate.  Because of their internal state,
made up in part by knowledge about how the ventilation system normally
functioned, these workers were led to misapply environmental elements in
making their diagnoses.  The result was that many of the miners came to view
the problem as far worse than it actually was.  Consequently, their decisions
were, in some instances, based on false assumptions and the resulting actions
were not as effective as they might otherwise have been.
At Cokedale, the nominal problem was a fire that started when fallen
material from the mine roof caused a trolley wire to arc.  Although the person
who discovered this blaze contacted Cokedale's dispatcher and reported what he
was seeing, initial communications were misconstrued.  The reason is that with
trolley haulage "hot hangers" occur fairly often.  A hanger is an insulated
support bracket that suspends the trolley wire from a mine's roof.  When an
insulator deteriorates, the support pipe that extends into the top will heat up.  If
there is head coal in the mine roof, this coal may start smoking.  In most
circumstances, a hot hanger will be dealt with by disconnecting the power,
prying down any head coal, and replacing the hanger assembly.  Thus, when the
dispatcher began contacting people inby the fire source and, according to several
respondents, initially spoke of "a hanger burning" no one was particularly
alarmed.
Thomas [1923] argued that people's actions generally depend on their
definition of the situation.  It has already been suggested that miners are
conditioned by both their physical and social environment to define situations
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in certain ways.  Danger is a taken-for-granted aspect of underground work-
places.  It is necessary, then, for workers in such a setting to draw a distinction
between routine hazards and life-threatening occurrences.  In other words, any
warning stimulus must make it through this sort of context filter in a manner
clear enough to cause a situation to be perceived as problematic.  Mallett et al.
[1993] listed five characteristics of an effective warning:  (1) it will be specific
about what the problem is (2) the warning's validity is acknowledged, (3) it gives
the nature and extent of danger to those who are threatened, (4) the warning will
be verifiable, and (5) it will contain some cues to help people prepare for further
action.  The paragraphs that follow will discuss how initial warnings were
received at the three study sites.
1 Right - Adelaide
On Adelaide's 1 Right section, the message that there was a problem came
by telephone.  Both shuttle car drivers were cleaning up around the feeder be-
cause their belt had been running erratically and finally went down entirely.
They first heard someone on a trolley pager trying repeatedly to contact another
section.  Then, the 1 Right telephone began ringing:
I said, "There's something wrong, buddy...I better answer the telephone."
So I went to the telephone, I picked it up and I said, "Hello."  Nobody
answered.  So we waited there again to about five till [eleven]; the tele-
phone rung again.  I picked it up and I said, "Hello...Who is this?" And
it must have been the dispatcher because he told us, he said, "You got
a fire on the belt, get the men out of the section." I said, "This is
1 Right." He said, "Go get your men out of the section. You got a fire on
the belt."
The shuttle car drivers, joined by a bratticeman who had been helping them at
the feeder, set out to warn those workers at the faces.  The bratticeman took the
left side, one driver went up the middle entries and the other took the right side
to warn 1 Right's miner operator and his helper.
The bratticeman found the two bolter operators in No. 3 entry.  Since the
bolter was running, they had difficulty communicating:
Well, first we shut the machine off, because we couldn't hear him, what
he was saying, and then after he told us...there was a fire—or they said
there was a fire on the belt; that everybody was supposed to leave...I just
pulled my boom back and stopped everything, shut the power off, got
my coat and bucket, and went down to the load center.
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The shuttle car driver who had taken the right side first approached his boss,
who was making a preshift face examination:
I told him the dispatcher said an alarm went off and there was a fire in
the mine and everybody had to get out.  And he said, "Well, tell the
operators." He went and kept walking along the face.  I think at this
time, we still didn't think it was a fire.  We thought it was just an alarm.
Whether this attitude affected the manner in which the shuttle car driver
approached the operators is somewhat unclear, because he recounted that "I told
the operator, 'There's a fire in here, just back up and go.'"  Both men on the
miner, however, remember this warning somewhat differently:
One of the buggymen come running out, and he was like three
breakthroughs behind us.  All he did, he just hollered up and said,
"Hey...back the miner up, we're going home."  I said, "What's the
matter?"  He says, "I don't know; all I know is we're going out."
The miner operator and his helper, oblivious to the fact that an emergency was
developing, went through normal shutdown procedures and retrieved their
personal articles at the load center.  They then strolled to the mantrip, where
everyone else was waiting impatiently to depart.
2 Northwest - Adelaide
Smoke, or the smell of smoke, arrived on 2 Northwest before the workers
could be contacted.  One of the shuttle car drivers, who had prior experience in
fire as a mine rescue team member, was the first to sense something wrong.  Like
the buggy operators on 1 Right, he and his buddy were not running because the
belt was down:
[While] we cleaned around the feeder, ...the other buggyman for that
night...was standing there with us talking and I told him, I says, "I smell
rubber."...I looked down the belt, and I...smelled the smoke then, and
I immediately went into, I think it was 4 or 5 [entry]...into the face...
That's where the boss was...and I told him..."We got a fire or something
went wrong with that belt again...Are you going to call?"...So he went
immediately to the phone and called, and he said..."We got a fire on the
belt."
Both shuttle car operators went to warn those workers still at the faces.  Their
boss remained by the telephone.  While the miner operator remembered only that
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a buggyman started flagging him and said "smoke," everyone else was clear that
they had been informed there was a fire on the belt.  All miners were also told,
they remembered, to gather fire extinguishers.  Most of them did so and headed
to their dinner hole.  From there, they boarded their personnel carrier for an
attempted trip out of the section.
3 Left - Adelaide
Workers on 3 Left reported that their section foreman was near the telephone
and, when it rang, started to answer.  It stopped ringing:
 Then they rang right back again and he said, "Come on, let's go."
Everybody said, "Aw, we got to go down and shovel the belt..."  So we
were moving kind of slow and disgusted.  And then he yelled again,
"Come on—there's a fire on the belt—let's go!"
The boss notified all face workers and told them to back their equipment out and
shut it down.  Power was knocked at the load center and everyone went to their
mantrip.
4 South - Brownfield
On 4 South, at Brownfield, one of the shuttle car drivers heard the pager as
he was dumping a load of coal on the feeder:
Fire boss was on the phone...He says,  "...There's heavy smoke coming
into the intake...get out of there as soon as you can—get those men
out..."  I didn't even finish unloading the buggy...I just turned around on
the seat and went back up to the miner...the bolters were in there and
I stopped at the bolters first and I told them that there's heavy smoke
coming up the intake and we're supposed to get out of here right away—
see you back at the power center—that's where the [self-contained self-
rescuers] were.
When the bolters heard this warning, both of them surmised that it was only a
drill.  They knew that a system for sensing fires was being installed and assumed
that fire drills would be planned to test the new system.  The bolters further
reasoned that the presence of an inspector on their section made a drill more
likely:  "We had that inspector in there and I thought it was like a fire drill, just
to see how long it took us to go to our meeting place...get our equipment and
stuff...I. wasn't that excited about it."  The shuttle car driver next went to tell the
miner operator and his helper, who "backed the miner back...[and] went back to
the power center."
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When the face workers arrived at their power center they found that the
section foreman, mechanic, and a Federal inspector had already gotten there.
These three were told about the fire boss's call.  The section foreman had
realized that there was some sort of problem.  He had accompanied the Federal
inspector and section mechanic to repair a scoop that was out of compliance and
parked in a crosscut outby the section's transformer:
I guess what was happening, smoke was coming up the intake and
everybody didn't realize it...it was going past us...we were so far back
into the crosscut...we were there working and I thought I smelled
something burning...I asked everybody if they smelled it and they said
yeah, they realized they did smell something...I went out to the
aircourse, No. 2 aircourse, and I could see the heavy smoke was already
up there, so I just told them there was a lot of smoke out there.
Thus, by the time the workers had assembled at the power center the section
foreman was able to corroborate the warning everyone else had gotten through
an intermediary.  What was lacking was any information about the location and
magnitude of the problem.
5 South - Brownfield
On 5 South also, the first warning was delivered by means of the mine page
phone.  The call to this section was taken by one of the shuttle car drivers:
I heard them calling 5 South on the phone, so I went and I answered the
phone...They asked if the boss was there...I said yeah...so they said tell
the boss to get everybody out of the section because they had heavy
smoke coming...I did get a little bit excited at first, and then I...called
back [to ask] them...where it was coming from...and didn't get no
answer.
The fire boss's message, already inadequate, was relayed by the shuttle car driver
to his section foreman:
The belt shut off...[the shuttle car driver] come over and said that [the
fire boss] called and said there's smoke coming up the belt line...[the
shuttle car driver] didn't wait...I asked him is it bad, and he said I don't
know...He just said we was supposed to get out.
The roof bolter operator and his helper, deciding to take a break while the belt
was down, were the next individuals to be informed:  "My buddy and I...were
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walking back to get a cup of coffee and the buggy runner [shuttle car driver]
hollered that there was smoke coming up."  By the time the other shuttle car
driver received word of the fire, he had already been alerted by the smell of
smoke.  He primarily wanted more information, which his fellow buggy runner
did not have:
We was loading in No. 2 entry...the belt went off...While [the shuttle car
driver] was answering the phone...I was over at the intake, and I could
smell the smoke coming in already...So then [the shuttle car driver]
come through the crosscut and told us things...[The fire boss] told him
there was going to be smoke coming and we better start out, but [the
shuttle car driver] didn't wait and see where the fire was and all that,
which he should have done.
It can be seen from these comments that the workers on 5 South, like those on
the other two sections, began their evacuation without an adequate perception
of the nominal problem upon which to base their diagnoses.
6 West Mains - Brownfield
On 6 West Mains section, where three people were working, the initial
warning came in the form of a page phone message taken by a maintenance
foreman.  This individual was accompanying a mechanic and a State mine
inspector on an inspection:
"I heard the fire boss...and I recognized from his voice that he was really
desperate to get somebody to answer, so I went to the phone...and he
said there was a mine fire at 4 South, 6 West."
At that point, although the maintenance foreman had been told the fire's location,
he had no notion about its severity.  Nor had the foreman gotten a chance to
reinforce the sense of desperation he detected in the fire boss's message through
the medium of his own senses.
Though he was predisposed to believe there really was an emergency and to
act upon that belief because of the urgency he discerned in the fire boss's voice,
the maintenance foreman still  "didn't really think....it was anything to...get
concerned about."  One reason he did not become concerned at the first warning
of fire was undoubtedly because of his internal state, which had been
conditioned by past experience with smoke in the mine.  The foreman had seen
"lots of mine fires, small mine fires...I've been in where...belts slipped and burnt
halfways off the roller and stuff like that."  Since smoke is fairly common in the
mining environment, miners do not always interpret its presence as an indication
that immediate action should be taken.
72
After hanging up the pager, the foreman first went to alert his mechanic.
This worker, because he was involved in the complex task that had made it
necessary for him to be on this section in the first place, was not paying attention
to what was going on around him:
I hollered to him from the phone and he didn't come...He said, "Wait a
minute..." and I went down to where he was and says, "Come on...
There's a fire in the mine down 4 South."...He said, "Just a minute."
Telling the mechanic not to wait any longer, the maintenance foreman then went
into the belt entry to inform the State inspector:  "He was over there at the
feeder, and that's the first sign of smoke that I seen was outby the check at the
belt entry."  Thus having the fire boss's warning substantiated, but still not know-
ing very many details, the men began their evacuation.
7 Butt - Cokedale
Initial warning came indirectly to 7 Butt when a construction foreman,
listening on his trolley phone, monitored talk between the lead motorman who
had been bringing in empties and Cokedale's haulage foreman:
I was sitting at old 8 Face and when he said about the trolley switch
burning I turned my light in the opposite direction, because the air
comes straight down...from the new intake aircourse and there was just
a solid wall of smoke behind me.  So I called the dispatcher and told
[him] to get in contact with all the people in 8 Face Parallel and get
them out because all the smoke was going in on them.
The construction foreman then went into 7 Butt to alert a fire boss, two
mechanics, and four others working in the section.  Because of the conversation
he had overheard, the construction foreman told those with whom he spoke that
a trolley switch was probably burning:
He...thought it was a wire fire, you know, like a trolley wire.  We have
a lot of them down there, so you don't have to be worried about it too
much...Everybody took their time.  So me and the mechanics...even took
the time to put the tools away.
This group, led by the construction foreman, elected to ride jeeps and a portal
bus out the track entry.
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8 Face Parallels
A general foreman was with two men cleaning up a roof fall.  Needing some
large reinforcing bolts, he had been scouting in the 8 Face area.  After finding
the materials he needed, the foreman sent a worker to retrieve them.  In the
meantime, he ate a sandwich and waited in the old section switch at 8 Face:
There's a phone there.  I saw some smoke coming up the track entry.
I called the dispatcher...I said, "What we got here?...I'm getting some
smoke up in here."  He told me at that time, he said, "Maybe a hanger
burning, or something."
The general foreman sent a worker into the 8 Face Parallels section to warn
everyone there and tell them to gather near his location.  While he was waiting,
the foreman was joined by two motormen who were bringing a load of rails into
the area.  In all, eight miners rendezvoused with the general foreman.  These
men then attempted to walk out through their track entry.
In essence, miners in all eight groups received some sort of warning,
following the discovery of fire, telling them either that "smoke" was headed their
way or that they needed to leave the mine.  At this point, however, most workers
seemed to be acting "as if" there was a problem that required action, but were
not too concerned about their chances of getting outside:  "Well, at first nobody
really thought too much of it, you know."  It was not until their perspective was
challenged by an unexpected occurrence that the miners began to diagnose their
problem as a serious one.
Diagnosis
It is axiomatic that people tend to interpret events from a normal perspective
as long as they can before starting to define the situation as abnormal [McHugh
1968].  This notion is illustrated by the initial misdiagnoses of those who
discovered the nominal problem at each study site.  Adelaide's dispatcher, for
whom unreliable sensor readings had become routine, did not accord legitimacy
to the first actual warning he received:  "I took it as a false alarm." The fire boss
at Brownfield also saw the event incorrectly when he initially encountered
smoke:  "I stood up and I smelled smoke.  I just kind of thought it was, you
know, maybe a bad roller, the belt was rubbing on the straps, or something like
that because we've had that before."  The haulage foreman at Cokedale seemed,
to those who overheard his trolley phone exchanges, complacent about the
problem he was facing:  "I even heard him talk to the people [outside].  He said,
"Look in my locker or by my locker and get another trolley switch.'"  This
tendency to normalize circumstances also carried over to the way in which those
inby the sources of combustion came to diagnose their situations.
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1 Right - Adelaide
The crew on 1 Right had their evacuation delayed due to miscommunication
between a buggyman and the operators he went to warn:
We were just taking our good old time...There was no smoke; you
couldn't smell anything...It was clear, you know...I said..."Really, what's
going on?"...And [a buddy] said, "I'm telling you, the place is on fire."
Actually, it was not until the workers encountered heavy smoke that they began
to realize they were in a potentially deadly situation.  Group reliance upon
normalcy gave way at that point to a change in the way they construed their
condition [Kinston and Rosser 1980].  What had been considered a routine
evacuation became disrupted:
You could smell the coal actually, and we started pulling the self-
rescuers out and passing them around...Three guys run over to the
intake...and they were just—we were running, you know, here and
there..."What do we do—what do we do?"
Very soon, however, the workers began to take stock of their predicament.  At
this point they were actively seeking information that would let them make sense
of what was actually happening:
Common sense tells me if there's a fire, chances are the fire is going to
be in the belt entry.  I'm also thinking if the fire is there, the fire wants
to go for fresh air.  It can be fueled by fresh air [in the intake].  And
I didn't want to go the belt entry...Let's get into the return and find out
what we have.
As the group's evacuation turned into an escape, everyone tried to fill
information gaps with guesses about the fire's location and how best to proceed.
The way in which they filled these gaps would have an impact on the perceived
options as their escape progressed.
2 Northwest - Adelaide
There was no initial question of whether something might be wrong on
2 Northwest; rather, group members became concerned with the extent to which
something was wrong.  On this section, even with the smoke that was present,
a few workers tended to downplay the seriousness of what their senses were
telling them.  This behavior, normal for the early diagnosis stage, is typified in
a comment made by a bolter operator:
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I figured, well, with all the safety features that are supposed to be built
in this, they got a little fire down there and the smoke coming up and
they want us the heck out of here, but I figured...we're going down with
fire extinguishers, I figured we'll ride down in a mantrip, come to it
and—we got the fire out, if there ain't somebody already down there to
get it out.  It was my feelings.
The least amount of minimizing was done by the buggy driver who had voiced
an alarm originally.  This person was a former mine rescue team member and
had experience in smoke:
I started to get a fire extinguisher off of the miner at that time, and the
smoke was getting pretty bad then.  And so I said, well, to hell with the
fire extinguisher.  I'm going to, you know, take care of myself.
As can be seen, even where individuals had smelled rubber, seen smoke, and
heard their section boss confirm they had a fire on their mother belt, there was
variability in how a diagnosis was reached.
3 Left - Adelaide
Like the bolter operator quoted above, one of the workers on 3 Left also
thought his crew was leaving the face to fight a manageable fire:
They said, "We got a fire on the belt.  Back the machine out and let's
go."  Well, I just felt we'd run down and put it out.  I didn't think there
was any real major [problem], they said it was just a small [fire],
burning on the belt.  Well, if that's all there was to it, we could have
took a fire extinguisher, run down there in the mantrip [and put it out].
When the group encountered heavy smoke they became disoriented and lost their
way momentarily.  This added an element of uncertainty that made an accurate
diagnosis of their situation all the more difficult.  That, combined with the fact
that they did not know where the fire was, prevented them from reaching a clear
picture of what was required for everyone to reach safety.
4 South - Brownfield
On 4 South, the workers had decided to travel down their belt, which was
isolated by stoppings from the intake and return entries:
I walked over to a door in the belt entry and saw that it was clear air...
There was no smoke coming up the belt...I just run that belt on the day
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prior to this and I know the stoppings were intact...So the belt entry
should be clear if there was a problem in the intake.
Some of these miners expected to encounter light smoke in their belt line (be-
cause of a possible leakage through the stoppings).  When this indeed appeared
to happen, a diagnosis of the real nature of their problem was confounded by
stress induced from having to deal with a relatively unfamiliar breathing
apparatus:
We stopped and everybody knelt down and started putting their [self-
contained] self-rescuers on...when I looked over and saw the...miner
operator, that's about the first time I started getting a little worried
because he was shaking somewhat severely...and I just thought...we are
going to have trouble because he's having a hard time even, you know,
getting his self-rescuer cover off.
I got the machine on and started down there and I wasn't getting the air
that I thought it was going to give me...So I took the mouthpiece out...
you need to breathe and you're not getting what you're supposed to.
Focusing on these perceived problems with their self-contained self-rescuers, the
workers did not anticipate meeting heavy smoke during their evacuation.  There-
fore, when the miners did encounter dense smoke in their belt line, they were
presented with an extra (and unexpected) experience.
This new occurrence, however, was one that stemmed from their environ-
ment rather than from a piece of technology.  It was this second event that
caused them to begin diagnosing their situation as very serious indeed:  "I was
thinking, I remember distinctly thinking to myself, all this smoke around...I can't
even see...You couldn't even see where you were going."  Choices made by these
workers later in their escape, then, were based on the necessity of dealing with
apparatus that did not perform as expected in conditions the miners had not
foreseen.
5 South - Brownfield
The predicament of heavy smoke in areas that were supposed to be isolated
was also unanticipated by the workers who escaped 5 South:
We turned around and we were going to go down the intake and we
didn't get more than 50 feet when we could see the smoke coming in
towards us...one of the bratticemen said we'll get into the belt line 'cause
it's neutral air...Everybody got up in there and...we only went maybe
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two, three hundred feet and the smoke was in there—the belt entry...
How it got in there, we don't know...We haven't figured that out yet.
This element of uncertainty stemming from a lack of information regarding the
fire source was exacerbated by the workers' internal state.  In essence, these
individuals knew enough about the mine's environment to understand that (as-
suming a properly functioning ventilation system) only a large-scale fire would
cause contamination of all possible escape routes:  "I tell you, panic hit, believe
me...'cause all the teaching and training—everything—these are all supposed to
be separate splits...Well, the first thing that goes through your mind is
everything's burning."
Once the miners determined there was not a smoke-free escape route, then
their particular knowledge of the ventilation system  led them to diagnose the
problem as more serious than it actually was.  Additionally, this misperception
about why the smoke was behaving as it did caused some of them to consider
giving up their escape attempt:  "I sat down with those rock dust guys and
I figured...this is it...I was just going to say goodbye to the world."  The stress
engendered by their inaccurate analysis of actual conditions influenced the
workers' subsequent choices and actions.
6 West - Brownfield
The men on 6 West Mains began their evacuation knowing that a fire existed
at 4 South and that there was some smoke already in their section.  The
maintenance foreman did not diagnose this as a significant occurrence, though.
At the beginning, he had little concern regarding his chances of exiting the mine
safely.  The maintenance foreman held this notion up to the moment he ex-
perienced heavy smoke:  "I've encountered smoke [in the mine before], but noth-
ing like this."  When the amount of smoke presented irrefutable evidence that
things were out of the ordinary, the maintenance foreman stopped defining his
situation in terms of past instances when he had seen smoke in the mine.  Such
a dense collection proved, in his opinion, that the present state could no longer
be diagnosed as commonplace.  The maintenance foreman then began to per-
ceive the scope of the evacuation problem differently:  "Once I seen that smoke,
then I got pretty well shook."  His subsequent choices came to be affected by
that new viewpoint.
7 Butt - Cokedale
On 7 Butt, the construction foreman told all seven people in his area that
"smoke was coming in" and they would have to leave.  This initial warning did
not disturb any worker unduly, as one of the mechanics later recounted:
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We were going to have to get out and—that was about it.  We would
probably be coming back in after they got the hanger, the little hanger
fire put out.
The group, riding in four different vehicles, had not traveled far when they
encountered thick smoke in their track entry.  Three of the four vehicles, two
jeeps and a tandem motor, collided because of poor visibility.  The construction
foreman drew upon prior experience to reach a diagnosis of what faced them:
I set all the ventilation up down there, and I knew basically what was
going on with all the smoke.  The intake escapeway would have been
full of smoke.  So I told them we'll try to go out on power.
Everyone except three workers in the fourth vehicle, a portal bus, boarded the
lead jeep and continued on.  After a short distance, however, those five men in
the lead collided with a parked vehicle.  They and the miners following in their
portal bus were forced to choose an alternative plan that would entail escaping
on foot.
8 Face Parallels - Cokedale
Nine miners tried to walk out the track entry from 8 Face Parallels.  When
they encountered heavy smoke on the track, they decided to get into their intake
escapeway.  After traveling only a few hundred feet, they again found
themselves in thick smoke.  There was little discussion at this point:
No, it was pretty much, you know, this is out.  Let's try something else.
Well, naturally the next thing would be the return.  So we decided to try
the designated return, at which point [the boss] did not know which was
the designated return.
The group entered their left return and went a short distance before discovering
they were not in their designated alternate escapeway.  By this time the workers
were diagnosing their problem as a serious predicament:  "That's when it came
into my mind...We're in bad shape."  This sentiment was echoed by the other
group members.  The difficulty these workers had in finding their way at the
start of their escape had an impact on how subsequent choices were made.
In each case, such a low level of concern exhibited by affected miners at the
beginning of their evacuation was due partially to uncertainty about the true
nature of the problem.  This uncertainty, stemming from incomplete information,
allowed the workers to define their situation initially as normal (or at least as
nonthreatening).  Further into the events, however, unexpected occurrences
began to challenge the miners' interpretation of their predicament:
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"We just [put on self-contained self-rescuers] and everybody seemed
fairly calm at the time, but then...we got down to the thick stuff...and a
sense of panic [set in]...we weren't told where the fire was."
As it became impossible to interpret circumstances from a normal perspective,
many of the workers reacted and started to define the fire as perhaps worse than
it really was:
You got one thing in mind—death—believe me...I was scared...I don't
think there was a man there that would tell you that he wasn't...I really
didn't think I would be here.
Essentially, as can be seen, the miners lacked adequate information to accurately
assess the true nature of the problem they faced.  Many workers' knowledge of
the environment and of how elements were supposed to behave in it combined
with their lack of information to mislead them.  All of the individuals were in
danger, but the real danger was from smoke inhalation—not, as some thought,
because their entire mine was burning.
Options and Choices
After completing the diagnosis of a problem, a person must decide which
actions, if any, must be taken.  This part of the decision-making process calls for
recognizing and evaluating available options and then choosing an action that is
determined to be best given the circumstances.  A number of variables impact
a person's perception of particular choices and their appropriateness to his or her
situation.  Analyses of decision-making therefore must focus not only on the
objective outcome of each action, but also (and perhaps more importantly) on
choices that were made given the impact of elements influencing the decision-
maker.  The following paragraphs outline how options were viewed and choices
arrived at during the three fires.
1 Right - Adelaide
When the crew from 1 Right, attempting to evacuate on a mantrip, had to
stop because of poor visibility, they were faced with limited alternatives.  Three
miners tried to cross the belt entry to check their main intake.  When they
opened a door into the belt entry, these men found it to be contaminated:
And I told them, "Whoa, whoa, wait a second.  If you got smoke on your
track and when [you] opened the door...I seen you have smoke on your
belt, you got smoke in your intake."  One of the other guys on the crew,
...who was my buddy that night, says, "Why don't we go back to
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Peterson [shaft] across the bleeder and come out?"...They didn't want to
go back to Peterson...I says, "If you don't want to go back  to Peterson,
then if you have smoke on your intake, we were always taught to get
into your return, and then keep checking until you see clear intake."
The group decided their only option was to get into their left return.  They found
a door and had to pry it open.  Before entering this return, the face boss called
outside and told the dispatcher what they were planning to do.  The crew then
started out in air that had not yet become smoky.
As the 1 Right group traveled their return, they were faced with several other
points at which decisions had to be made.  First, the smoke that had been coming
in their intake made its way across the faces and caught up with them near the
mouth of 8 Left:
So we put the SCSRs on.  Now one guy's SCSR wouldn't work, so [one
of the buggymen] gave him his spare one, and we started to come down
this return.  And we came to these overcasts down here; you know, one
overcast we came on, it was hot and thick smoke was coming out.  And
after looking at it, it was the belt that was going up to 3 Left, and I mean
you could feel the heat coming down it.  [The buggyman's] SCSR didn't
work and he told me..."I'm not going through that.  Mine doesn't work."
So, the buggy runner who had earlier given a spare SCSR to a buddy, now
having problems with his own, balked at crossing the overcast:
I made the decision I couldn't go in this smoke...I was like the third,
fourth one in line...and we went into that smoke and I couldn't breathe
and I was gagging on that self-rescuer.  I couldn't breathe anything at all.
I don't know if it was psychological or what...I came back out...I did
know where I was because...I'd worked in that area a lot...The other
overcast that we just went over was over the intake...So I went back...
I went into the door and it wasn't too bad...And I thought I'll go down
this way, but then I said, no, if I don't go out with them guys, I know
they're going to be looking for me.  If they get out, they'll be looking for
me and they'll think I'm lost.  So I better go out with them guys.  So
I went back into the return again...I went over an overcast where the
smoke was.  I went over top of the overcast in the smoke and I couldn't
breathe...They were already gone through there.  I couldn't see—
I couldn't tell where they were because you couldn't see anything over
there...I can't breathe.  I'm going to die here, and I don't want to die.
I don't want to die here.  Back into that intake again...So I went...over
the stopping—over two overcasts there and got into the intake
escapeway at 2 Northwest.
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The rest of 1 Right crew continued out their return until they came to a door
leading onto 2 Northwest track at crosscut No. 10.  At this point, they discovered
the shuttle car operator was not with them, and were faced with another
decision:
When we got outside that door, and it was just fresh air, and everybody
wanted to take off, that's when I told them..."Hey, [the buggyman] is
back there, his self-rescuer didn't work; he didn't come through that."
So that's when we went back in...You're not supposed to do it...They tell
you not to do that...But we felt, you know, when you work with a bunch
of guys, you become close...And [the miner helper] told the boss..."Hey,
I'm not leaving."  Because the boss said, ..."Hey, let's go"...you know,
and [the miner helper] said..."We're not leaving [the buggyman]"...and
then we started going back in.
The buggyman, meanwhile, had traveled the 3 Left intake escapeway to an area
outby the fire.  It was some time before the crew got back together.
2 Northwest - Adelaide
Choices required of the 2 Northwest group were affected by the fact they
had two experienced people with them.  Their face boss knew the mine well and
one of the shuttle car operators had been a mine rescue team member.  When the
crew entered heavy smoke on their track, a decision was made to stop the
mantrip:
The guy that was driving stated that he didn't think we'd better go any
more, so that was more or less a judgment call.  We could have gone
down the line—you could have put your rescuers on and you could have
kept going out [on] the mantrip, but the pole...would have been off...I
don't know how many times, on the way out, that the poles were
jumping pretty frequently going out of there...So...we stopped the
mantrip and got the rescuers, took those and went back up to the section.
On the way back into their face area, the former mine rescue team member
helped everyone put on a self-contained self-rescuer:
This time we got everybody together and [the face boss] said, you take
the back, I'll take the front.  Don't let anybody in back of you, you know,
and we'll keep everybody together.
The face boss led the group toward their intake escapeway.  At the entrance to
this entry, crew members took additional SCSRs that were stored there.  Then,
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grouped together with their face boss leading and the shuttle car operator
bringing up the rear, everyone proceeded out the intake escapeway.  After
traveling 500-600 ft, the group encountered dense smoke.  The face boss then
decided to enter the right return, which was a designated secondary escapeway:
Every 3-by-3 door, [the face boss] would go check...We done this for,
I counted, my calculation was 55 breakthroughs.
When the men reached the No. 3 stopping, which was outby the fire, they found
the air to be clear.  Finally, the face boss saw the shift foreman and notified him
that everyone from his section was out.
3 Left - Adelaide
A section foreman and nine crew members were on 3 Left, which was a
retreat section.  The group started out on their mantrip.  After traveling "four or
five breakthroughs," they entered smoke.  At that time they made a decision to
backtrack toward the face and get into their primary escapeway.  The group
walked two breaks and found a door leading into their intake escapeway:
So we went down the intake approximately, oh, I don't know, maybe
seven or eight breakthroughs, it's hard to say the number right now, but
it wasn't very far.  And we were getting a lot of smoke in there and it
was rubber smoke.  You could smell it just as plain as could be; it was
a belt burning.
A decision was then made to get into the alternate escapeway.  The group had
not gone very far in this return entry when they again encountered smoke.  At
this point the SCSRs were donned:
I remember thinking to myself, I said, "This is stupid, I know better than
to walk through smoke without putting that thing on because you don't
know how much CO's in it."  And that's when we stopped and put them
on.  And then, we kept on going out of the return.  We got down to
where our overcasts was and there was an overcast there that we
couldn't cross.  It was leaking so bad, and the smoke was so thick we
couldn't get over it.
The face boss, deciding to get back into the intake escapeway through a door in
the overcast, became disoriented temporarily:
And then we had to have a little team meeting there.  We knew there
was an intake; the intake escapeway was still in that area if we could
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find the right door to get into it...The subject of barricading was brought
up, but that's—what are you going to barricade if it's full of smoke
everywhere?
After figuring out the proper direction of travel, the face boss led everyone over
the overcast and out their intake entry.  One of the roof bolter operators began
having trouble, presenting the group with another decision:
When [the roof bolter operator] went down, we was all single file and
I was last...I noticed no one turned around at that point...I spit out the
mouthpiece and I hollered as loud as I could...And only two people
come back...It made a mean feeling in me that it was every man for
himself at that point on.
Approximately three crosscuts from clear air, the group met Adelaide's shift
foreman, who had been traveling the entry looking for them.  He helped
everyone get out from there.
4 South - Brownfield
The miners escaping from 4 South were troubled by some elements that
colored their abilities to make decisions.  Awareness of past mine disasters (such
as a recent fire at Utah Power and Light's Wilberg Mine, in which 27 miners
died) revealed to these workers how deadly a mine fire could be.  Such
knowledge made any uncertainty about the scope of this fire even more
problematic:
 We all encountered a panic situation where we didn't know where the
fire was, we didn't know the extent of it, and my personal thoughts were
that it was a Wilberg disaster, and that's all that was in my mind...Where
is that smoke coming from?  How bad is it?  Well, I panicked...I know
I did, I'll admit it...Everybody, I think, did.
A complex background problem also hindered an efficient escape.  Although the
miners had received training on self-contained self-rescuers, few had any actual
experience wearing the apparatus.  During their escape, they found the device
was difficult to breathe from and made communication almost impossible:
I was with [the miner helper] and [he] was having very difficult
breathing through it...He was gasping for air...[The inspector] was trying
to help [him] breathe...And then with the mouthpiece in, it's real hard to
communicate—you can't hear one another...Some of us took the
84
mouthpiece out to try to speak and then to even breathe...It was so hard
to breathe through that mouthpiece.
In addition to not knowing the location and extent of the blaze in their mine,
these side issues were on the workers' minds as they attempted to determine
options available and to choose the best course of action for themselves.
One miner had so much trouble that assisting him became, in itself,
a background problem that had to be dealt with, as evidenced by three different
perspectives:
Miner helper:  The smoke started getting pretty thick...You couldn't
really see where you were going and I was having a lot of trouble
getting enough air...I'd go a ways and I'd stop and a couple guys [stayed
with me]...I was pretty shook up; I guess I panicked and a lot of stuff
went through my head...Hell, you didn't know where it was coming from
or anything...Finally...I just couldn't go anymore.
Inspector:  I couldn't get him back up again...He looked at the
mechanic...I saw him look at the mechanic and he said, you guys go...
You just leave me here...I can't go no more...I'm just going to stay here...
I looked at the mechanic and I said I got to go...there is no sense in me
staying...I can't breathe now.
Mechanic:  I didn't know my way out of there...I lost all orientation...
I knew my way out, but I forgot...It was just a panic thing...I thought,
well, [the miner helper's] not going to make it, I'm going to try and get
out...I was only about a hundred foot from [the miner helper] when
I came through the overcast and I opened the door and I saw No. 7 and
I thought [wrongly], good, this is fresh air...I thought well I'm going
back in to get [the miner helper].
Essentially, facing so much uncertainty about the fire, the miner helper gave up
because he had projected a worst case scenario in which the crew would have
to travel through smoke all the way out of the mine.  The inspector, convinced
that his self-contained self-rescuer was about to fail and forgetting that he was
carrying a spare under his arm, wanted only to get out of the section.  The
mechanic, believing himself to be in No. 7's intake aircourse, concluded that he
had left the miner helper only some 100 ft from safety, although the distance was
actually much farther.  Based on his incorrect estimate, the mechanic decided to
go back for his buddy.  In reality, all three men based their actions on
assumptions that were false when, if the facts had been clear, they might have
made other choices.
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5 South - Brownfield
The old adage that "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing" seems to have
a particular relevance when it comes to perceiving and assessing one's options
at specific moments in a mine fire.  Other times, however, a little knowledge can
be rather beneficial.  As can be seen from the following comment about the
escape from 5 South, prior experience in an environment may afford a sound
basis for simplifying an individual's application of some elements in the
judgment and decision-making process:
 I know one thing I had going for me, when I first went up into that unit
it wasn't 3 days after that I went down the return with one of the
bosses...So if somebody had never went down it at all...I'm sure they're
probably more uptight about the situation than I was...At least I had an
idea where I was going...and then another good thing, we had
bratticemen with us and they knew their way down through there, and
the boss was there too.
Additionally, an ability to place the crisis cognitively in one's surroundings can,
by reducing uncertainty, foster a positive attitude:
So we went and then we run into two other guys coming down...and
then they told us where the fire was at...4 South sidetrack where the
motor was setting...So then we had an idea how far we had to go, so it
took a little bit of pressure off 'cause we knew we was goingCwe had
a pretty good chance now.
When knowledge acts to minimize sources of stress, therefore, it need not be
comprehensive to have a positive function.
6 West - Brownfield
Choices made during the escape of those three workers on 6 West Mains
were affected by stress along with any knowledge and skills brought by each
worker to the situation.  The heavy smoke they encountered created stress by
impeding their ability to see and by forcing them to use relatively unfamiliar
oxygen-generating breathing apparatus.  This in turn led to a level of anxiety that
hindered clear thinking:
I got down to 5 South...and couldn't find my way...the door wasn't there
where I knowed there was a door...but I mean, I didn't waste no time
hunting...Whenever I walked past and couldn't see the door or feel it,
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I didn'tCI went back the next day and the door was there.
The miner's knowledge of his environment told him a door should be at a given
location and that he ought to go through it in order to continue his escape.
Because he could not find this door, the worker had to discover an alternative
route.  In this instance, then, prior knowledge (of the door's location) was not an
element that was applied to aid the worker's evacuation.
In the maintenance foreman's opinion, cognizance of 6 West Main's
designated escapeways may actually have been misapplied and consequently had
a negative effect on decisions that were made during his attempt to evacuate the
section along with his two coworkers:
You try and pay as much attention in class as you can on your escape
routes and stuff, and I guess I panicked a little bit when I seen the
smoke in the belt line as heavy as it was...I could have went...back...
and...over and...down 6 aircourse and been scot free of everything...
I wouldn't have even needed to don my rescuer...But...you're trained to
follow your escape routes.
Although the objective outcome of considering only designated escapeways is
known (all three individuals on 6 West survived), it did limit those options
available to the escaping miners.  As for the possibility that these men, in
adhering rigidly to their training algorithm for mine evacuation procedures, may
have overlooked a better route of travel:  "I know if it ever happened again,
I would explore...all routes of exit before I made a real quick decision."
7 Butt - Cokedale
The decision-making on 7 Butt was done by the construction foreman, who
possessed a great deal of "mine wiseness" and who took charge immediately:
That was one of the things that I had to commend the people for.  I was
a foreman in charge of that area, and when I said to these people what
we had to do, there was no second-guessing my decision.  These people
were counting on my knowledge that this was right and there was no
second guessing it.  I had no problem with these people as far as my
decision.
The construction foreman reported that he knew evacuation would be necessary
as soon as he saw the amount of smoke that was coming down their fresh air
intakes.  He then had to choose between going into 7 Butt or 8 Face Parallels to
warn workers that they were in danger:
87
And I made the decision to go into 7 Butt to get these people because
they were far enough away from communications that somebody would
have to go and recover these people and being that I was there, I was the
one to go and get these people and get them out...But the dispatcher
could get in contact with [the 8 Face Parallel] people and tell them
that they had to evacuate because of the amount of smoke that was
coming in.
As mentioned previously, the construction foreman attempted to get everyone
out in vehicles.  Looking back on that choice, he reported he would have taken
a different option if he could do it over:
As I brought these people out, we would have stopped when we got to
the smoke, and at that time everybody had their SCSRs on and then we
would have walked...I don't know if I told the dispatcher or not that
I was going out the return escapeway to Crystal.  But I would have been
a little bit more organized the next time as far as my...communications...
to the surface, my travel, and how many people I had with me.
One reason the construction foreman made some decisions at the smoke that he
later second guessed himself on was because of a significant background factor:
I was anticipating the trolley switch burning out.  There's quite a bit of
smoke with it...and I was assuming that if the trolley switch was
burning, from what I heard...that would be the main concentration and...
we would go through here.  And it was like second-guessing instead of
coming to the smoke area, getting together, and then walking out.
Once the group got into their return escapeway, the construction foreman began
checking mandoors leading to the track entry.  He did this in order to determine
when they had reached clear air.  Upon getting outby the fire, the construction
foreman called outside and arranged for his crew to be picked up and transported
to the surface.
8 Face Parallels - Cokedale
Lack of knowledge was an important factor in perceived options and choices
that confronted the group from 8 Face Parallels.  Initially, the nine miners there
tried to walk out their track entry.  In a short time, however,  they hit smoke and
had to make another choice.  A general foreman who was with this crew decided
the next option should be to go out their intake escapeway:  "You're always
trained intake, track, intake, return.  I tried track, that was no good, tried intake."
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The problem was that this intake did not extend to the shaft bottom.  The only
person who seemed aware of this fact at the time was a trackman who had been
delivering a load of rails to the area.  He was unfamiliar with that part of the
mine, however:
I was like the most greenhorn out of the group, so ICI pretty much kept
to myself what my thoughts were.  The game plan [was] that they were
going to walk out the intake. Now at that point, I can't say how I knew
this, I obviously heard it from somebody at some point and it stuck with
me, but I was told that...the intake went out onto the track. According
to the old laws...they didn't have to [take] it to the shaft...And that stuck
with me, and when they decided they were going to walk the intake,
I specifically said to [the general foreman], "We can't go out the intake.
That's just gonna take us right under the smoke."  No, we'll walk the
intake.  Well, you know anarchy can't reign.
The group proceeded about six breaks in their intake and encountered heavy
smoke again.  At that time they decided to return to the face and try to go out
their secondary escapeway.  At the section loading point, another mistake was
made.  Because of stress and unfamiliarity with the section, the men entered the
wrong return.  After traveling a few breaks, someone realized there were no
reflectors indicating that this entry was an escapeway.  The group was forced to
backtrack in order to reach the correct entry.
On their way out in the alternate escapeway, group members faced other
choice points.  When they reached their section regulator, it was decided to stop
briefly.  A general inside laborer, who had once been a maintenance foreman,
suggested to the general foreman that the two of them investigate conditions
ahead.  Leaving everyone else at the regulator, these individuals went a few
hundred feet on.  When the smoke became worse, the general foreman expressed
reservations about continuing that way:
He said, "We can't lose the smoke this way."  I said, "I know...we have
to go through this—go out the return.  Smoke, no smoke, or whatever,
we can't keep changing our minds—we'll be here forever."  So he
agreed.
The general inside laborer then went back to get those workers waiting by the
regulator.  Some of them were already discussing whether to put on their filter
self-rescuers (FSRs) or don their SCSRs.  The general inside laborer and a
mechanic donned self-contained self-rescuers.  Everyone else put on their filter
devices:
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We were always trained [that] at the first sign of smoke you should [put
on your SCSR]. At the first sign of smoke I didn't put it on because, you
know, they were saying fairly confidently that it was probably just a
hanger burning...[Later] the instances that I pointed out...led me to
believe that this man wasn't going to get us out of there in a safe period
of time...You have an hour with that SCSR.  Not knowing where I was,
that's the reason I didn't put it on immediately.
The group traveled for some time until the filter self-rescuers became hot.  At
that point, the men knelt in a circle and donned their SCSRs.  They then
proceeded outby in the return, checking through mandoors for fresh air.
It seems from the preceding comments there were two factors that had a
disproportionate impact on the choices miners made.  The first was their internal
state, specifically their knowledge (or lack thereof) regarding how elements in
the environment were supposed to fit together.  While all of the workers
generally understood what it means to have the haulage belt on a neutral split of
air, for instance, few seem to have considered the possibility that something as
simple as an open door, rather than a raging blaze, could explain the
contamination of this air.  In the same vein, although the miners had internalized
an awareness of what their self-contained self-rescuers were supposed to do, not
many were prepared for the actual experience of breathing with one.  The second
factor influencing the miners' choices concerns the amount of uncertainty
stemming from a lack of adequate information.  Those workers who did not
know the fire's location, or its source, were inclined to believe the worst.  Their
choices tended to be based on a perceived need to travel some miles with close
to zero visibility before the oxygen in their apparatus ran out.  For the few
miners who had been told where the smoke was coming from and what was
causing it, the goal was simply to get outby some point inside their mine.
Actions
Once a choice is made it then can be executed.  Any action taken by an
individual or group therefore has real consequences that are frequently used by
others as a basis for an analysis of the quality of this choice.  The actual
decision-maker, however, aware of all those factors that affected the process,
may evaluate his or her choice using different criteria.  Those who escaped from
the three fires discussed options they exercised and reflected on the quality of
their actions.
1 Right - Adelaide
The first action taken on 1 Right was a delayed one:  "The phone was
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ringing but we never answered it, you know, because usually the boss would
take care of that."  This delay, combined with the holdup caused by a subsequent
miscommunication between the buggyman and miner operators, could have had
severe repercussions:
Another 5 minutes and we wouldn't have been able to come out the way
we did because that overcast did go and collapse.  We'd have had to find
another route out of there.  And it was already 45 minutes...I only had
15 more minutes on that self-rescuer because they said it only lasts an
hour.  And we were just fortunate.
A second significant action was when the crew abandoned their mantrip.  The
miner operator discussed an option that occurred to most of the groups but was
not executed successfully by any of them:
If we had known, we probably could have put the self-rescuer on [and
ridden] out in the mantrip.  But then we thought about that, and when
you have a mine fire, you're [liberating] other gases too, and the pole on
this [mantrip] always jumps off.  And what we were afraid of is [the
pole] jumping and a spark and having an explosion. You know, we were
a little concerned about that.
In view of these concerns, therefore, the group explored their possible choices
and decided the best course of action was to go out their left-side return airway.
A heroic but ill-advised action was undertaken when the crew reached fresh
air and found one of the buggymen missing.  A bolter operator, the miner helper,
and a bratticeman volunteered to go back and look for him.  The miner helper
borrowed the face boss's light so he could tie it to a water line that ran in the left
return.  This light was to indicate the point at which the three men should make
a left turn to find the door they had come through.  Leaving the bolter operator
at the water line, the miner helper and bratticeman continued on to the overcast
where the buggyman had separated from the group:
When I got to that overcast, as soon as I was going up on the
approachway, you could just feel something collapse. I mean, the
smoke, you couldn't even see your hand in front of you.
When the overcast blew out, the bratticeman, who had been holding onto the
miner helper's belt, drew him away from the approach.  The two men then
retreated back along the water line, running over the bolter operator in the dense
smoke.  All three individuals then crawled until they saw the light they had tied
to the water line.  They turned left into the break and went back through the
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mandoor to fresh air.
2 Northwest - Adelaide
Perhaps the most significant action on 2 Northwest took place at the
beginning of the miners' escape.  The face boss quickly assigned the former mine
rescue team member to bring up the rear as everyone traveled out.  The boss
stayed near the front and tried to keep the men from walking too fast—a tactic
that was appreciated by the utilityman:
No, he was like in back of me there and we just—we all stuck together
real well. You know, if I got too far or [the bratticeman who] was with
me, he'd get out in front of me and if we got out too far, the boss or
somebody just said, "Take a break."  And the one guy was having
trouble and he said...that he needed to rest some, and we just stopped
and rested with him.
Because the face boss did not know the fire's exact location, he would open each
door in the stopping as the group progressed.  This offered the workers another
opportunity to stop and catch their breath.  Overall, as the data show clearly,
2 Northwest had the most orderly escape of any of the eight groups in this study.
3 Left - Adelaide
It was mentioned earlier that some of the 3 Left crew balked at crossing the
overcast at 3 Left junction.  The face boss decided to get back into their intake
escapeway through a door in the overcast.  At that point, according to the miner
helper:
We got confused and we started going back into the section till we run
into the first door, and we just made a complete circle and come right
back to that main overcast again...He made a right instead of a left the
first time.
The boss, coming through the door again, knew which way to go the second time
because he stopped a moment to feel the air current on his face.  "Once we made
the left, we were in good shape."
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4 South - Brownfield
On 4 South the seven miners and one Federal inspector started their escape
by going down the section's belt entry:  "[The boss] had noticed there was some
smoke already coming up [the intake] and they figured the return would be filled
up too, so we couldn't go down [that] way...So they figured the belt would be the
best way to go."  At the beginning of this evacuation, all eight individuals were
hurrying along the belt.  Not all of these workers, however, had the ability to
keep up this rapid pace.  Therefore, two groups were formed.  The section
foreman went ahead in order to keep up with three workers who were moving
rapidly, leaving the inspector with slower members of the crew.  This second
group was also divided as one person in it continued at a slow but steady pace,
essentially escaping alone.  Those left behind were the miner helper who had
been having difficulty, along with the mechanic and inspector who were trying
to help him.  Finally, these two individuals left the miner operator as well.
As was indicated previously, the mechanic, believing that he had entered
4 South's intake aircourse only a short distance from where he had abandoned
the miner helper, went back after him.  The mechanic and section foreman, who
had by this time also returned, assisted the miner helper to the track entry.  All
members of the crew then continued outby the burning motor.
The interview data show widely divergent opinions about the
appropriateness of 4 South workers' actions during their escape:
 The one thing we did wrong, it come out that we was two different
groups of four...We kind of split up and got ahead of each other.
I didn't want them splitting up...I was glad that the inspector was there
because I felt he's going to watch [the slower] people and I'm going to
watch the other group.
It's nice if we could have stayed together...but nobody knew where the
fire was and everybody was trying to get out as best they could...It didn't
bother me that I was left behind.
Actually, [having the whole crew stay back with the slowest person]
might have been worse...Everybody fumbling around...[The others]
weren't able to see this man in, I guess what you'd call a panic state and
maybe that's good for them.
It is interesting that the first statement, implicitly critical of some miners leaving
others, was made by a worker in the first group out.  The last two quotes, which
suggest that leaving was at least understandable, were taken from miners in the
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slowest group.  During their interviews, most of the individuals from this section
reflected at length on their personal decisions to leave (or not to leave) others
behind.  Obviously, the choices made by each miner were arrived at within a
context of extreme stress:
It did cross my mind a couple of times that we should be sticking
together and come out as one group...We had one man that sat down and
didn't want to go any further and there was four of us ahead...There
could have been four extra guys to at least help the guy, something...
You never know what you're going to do until you get in a situation...but
definitely we should have stayed together.
I didn't want to go to the head of the pack—I wanted to stay and know
where my people are...That was my first concern...I just didn't like the
idea, but I didn't want [the faster group] taking off the way they were...
I can't sit on them all...So long as [the inspector] would go with that
group, I'd go with the faster group.
I'm back here with this guy and he's having all this trouble breathing and
now I'm having trouble breathing...there's no sense in me staying...I can't
breathe now...I know where I'm at...I can send somebody back...I'll go
out and get somebody...If it's only to the main track, there will be
somebody, I hope, out there...I can send them back and I know exactly
where you're at.
As can be seen from their accounts, the trip off 4 South was very problematic for
these workers.  Even though everyone lived through the experience, there was
little consensus as to whether or not the best choices had been made.
5 South - Brownfield
Like the miners on 4 South, those in 5 South crew began their evacuation
down the belt entry:  "We said we couldn't go down the intake because that's
where the smoke was coming from...So everybody decided to go down the belt
line."  These workers, who stayed close together throughout their escape, con-
tinued along the belt line until they hit heavy smoke and then crossed into the
return aircourse.  They traveled down the return entry, checking through doors
for clear air as they went.  At one point they finally detected fresh air, crawled
through this door, and it led them out onto the track.
An official investigation was conducted after the blaze.  In this inquiry there
was some criticism of the workers' choice of escape routes.  The belt entries
traveled by those miners from 4 South and 5 South had not been designated as
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either primary or secondary escapeways.  The Federal inspector who escaped the
fire addressed this criticism during his interview:
It had been suggested through the course of the investigation...that we...
didn't...follow the proper escape procedures because we didn't utilize the
return aircourse as an alternate escapeway...I promptly informed this
person...you had smoke coming up the intake, there's only one way for
that smoke to go and that's back down the return...the first thing I did
was check the belt...and the belt was clear...So I know the belt entry had
permanent stoppings...I had no reason to believe that that belt entry
should have been contaminated.
While the correctness of these miners' actions can be questioned, the inspector
was sure that, given his situation, the best escape route had been taken.
As was also suggested during the investigation, there may have been an
escape route for 5 South that was objectively better than the one they chose:
From what we were told...instead of going down the return, we could
have went up...Being [the fire was in] 6 West Mains (which we didn't
know at the time), we probably would have been better off going up the
hill to 6 West Mains and across.
This miner agreed that, with the advantage of hindsight, a better route of escape
might have been chosen.  He went on to note that decisions being made by the
miners on 5 South during their escape were executed with incomplete informa-
tion about the fire and the condition of the mine.  So, without the luxury of
prescience, the workers used their best judgment.
6 West - Brownfield
After picking up their self-contained self-rescuers, the two miners and State
mine inspector who were working in 6 West Mains began their evacuation:
"I was going to ride the jitney out of there, but [the inspector] wouldn't let us, so
we went on foot."  The men started down 5 South's intake aircourse, walked
approximately 50 ft and hit thick smoke:  "When I turned around and said we got
to go back, [the inspector] says no, and I says you can do what you want to do,
I'm going back."  All three did backtrack, entered the return, and continued their
retreat out of the section until they came to an overcast where the miners from
5 South were encountered:  "then I was relieved a little bit because I knowed that
boss coming with that crew was real familiar with the mine."  After crossing this
overcast, the miners began hunting for a door that would take them into the
intake aircourse.  One miner from 5 South called and said that they had just
95
passed a door.  Everyone returned to that door, went through it, and eventually
got into clear air.
During their interviews many of the miners speculated about the State
inspector's decision not to permit use of the jitney in the evacuation of 6 West
Mains section.  Even though the inspector based his actions on the knowledge
that a mine fire can liberate potentially explosive gases and that these gases
might be ignited by an electrical motor, there was still extensive debate centered
upon whether or not the people on that section should have ridden out.
One of the miners who had been on 6 West Mains and who had complied
with the inspector's directive not to ride out, thought that the decision was
nevertheless a poor one:  "I know one thing, if it ever happens again and there's
something to ride, I don't give a damn who—they can do with me what they want
when they get me outside, but I'm riding."  Later in their escape, when the three
men hit heavy smoke, this miner refused to regard the inspector's initial refusal
to backtrack and enter the return aircourse:  "I said, 'You can follow me or do
what you want.'  At that point I didn't give a damn who followed me or who
didn't, I was getting out of a heavy concentration."
Even though it meant retracing their steps, the worker considered going back
in order to enter the return an appropriate choice:
When I encountered the really heavy smoke...We could have probably
made it down through there...I'd have probably made it just as quick or
quicker...because I [backtracked] and then we went further down [past]
4 South to come out [into fresh air] than I would have if I [had stayed
in] the intake...But I'm glad I went the way I did because we might have
went down further and encountered smoke...you wouldn't have knowed
where you was at...you might have went in circles.
While analyzing his actions, the miner pointed out that because of uncertainty
about the true condition of his intake aircourse, he had to assume that smoke in
this supposedly smoke-free entry meant there was possibly fire as well.  The
thought that they very well might  "run right into the fire" is what made this
worker seek alternative escape routes once he and his companions encountered
smoke in their primary escapeway.
7 Butt - Cokedale
The group from 7 Butt intended to ride out in vehicles.  A mechanic, who
was in the lead, stopped his jeep as soon as he encountered heavy smoke and
began putting on his self-contained self-rescuer.  The construction foreman, who
was following, collided with the stopped jeep.  This caused the wireman who
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was riding with him to lose his cap, cap lamp, and battery.  A general inside
laborer, who was operating a tandem motor carrying himself and a trackman, ran
into the foreman's jeep.  After retrieving the wireman's cap and other gear, all
five men boarded the mechanic's jeep and continued.  They had not gone far,
though, when they collided with an abandoned locomotive.  This time, the
wireman lost his cap, cap lamp, and battery for good.  He then had to be helped
by the others.  This is the point at which these members of the group got into
their return.  They then waited for three people who had not followed them into
the smoke.
The remaining three workers in this group were traveling in a portal bus.
A mechanic and a general inside laborer had stayed on the section briefly to
rendezvous with a fire boss who was conducting his preshift examination.  When
they encountered smoke, the fire boss, who was driving, backed the portal bus
out into clear air.  They heard, over the mantrip's speaker phone, conversations
that ensued from the collisions up ahead.  The three men decided to take another
route out:
So we put our self-rescuers on. We looked into the intake escapeway;
it was filled with smoke.  So we crossed over to the return and there was
just starting to get smoke in there.  And we started out there and we
went out the return and we tied back in with [the construction foreman]
and our group that left right before us 'cause we waited for the fire boss.
The eight workers proceeded out their return.  Two individuals stayed close to
the wireman who had lost his cap and light, reassuring him and helping him
along until they came to the set of double doors through which everyone exited.
8 Face Parallels - Cokedale
Execution of decisions was a problem on 8 Face Parallels because the
group's familiarity with the area did not extend to their escapeways.  The general
foreman addressed this issue in regard to his choice of their primary escapeway
even though the fire was in a track entry:
And it's my fault that I didn't know the...escapeway was dumping on the
track.  Of course, I didn't know where the fire was at either.
Once the group reached their section regulator and the general foreman,
accompanied by a general inside laborer, explored ahead and saw more dense
smoke, they were faced with another decision to execute:
And we put [the filter self-rescuers] on at that point in time when the
guys came up to me and I signaled everybody.  I already had mine on
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and my clips on; everybody put them on...It was an old return that I'd
walked and we put those on and we may have made about a thousand
feet.  We didn't make it anywhere near the mandoor to Steiner.  And
boy, they were cooking.  They were cooking and we all knelt down and
put the [SCSRs] on...We knelt in teams...helping each other and
checking everything.  Maybe 3, 4 minutes.  It's hard to tell.
This group proceeded on out under air from that location, eventually joining up
with the miners who had escaped out of 7 Butt.
Discussion and Analysis of a Particular Case
The interview data show that everyone who escaped from the three mine
fires experienced numerous episodes of problem recognition, evaluation,
decision-making, and action while being influenced by their internal state and
the environment.  In order to understand the decision-making that was done by
these workers during their escapes, background variables were identified and
included in a model.  This heuristic device was then used as a starting point for
analyzing the characteristics of decisions made during the emergency.
The escaping miners were continually processing information and acting
upon their perceptions of the mine environment.  Though some of the workers
spoke of being in a state of "panic," they do not tell of any points at which they
were not actively evaluating their situation and attempting to continue to safety.
Even those miners who had the most difficulty and, in fact, could not escape
without assistance, were thinking through their available options.  This can be
seen in the attempt by the 4 South mechanic to switch from a self-contained self-
rescuer to a filter self-rescuer just before the others came back to help him.  In
this extremely dangerous situation, the will and the ability to make decisions was
not lost.  It is likely that the decision-making process will exist in all contexts
and, given the right techniques, will be available for study.
The authors of this chapter are not experts in either disaster management or
mine rescue.  A group of mine rescue experts were, however, brought together
to review the reported actions of those miners on 4 South.  They then worked
with a cognitive psychologist to develop a simulation problem based on the
event [Cole 1989].  This problem unfolds over time and only offers information
and alternatives that would have been present in the environment at a particular
choice point.  From the simulation, then, it is possible to arrive at some insight
into what these experts agreed on that would be either a good decision or a poor
one in the context within which it occurred.
Perhaps the worst decision, in terms of any attempt to allay stress during
these workers' escape, was made by the shuttle car driver on 4 South.  It will be
remembered that this individual hung up the page phone and went to warn his
buddies rather than stay on for another moment and try to get more information
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about the fire's location and magnitude.  Put simply, whether the fire boss
actually knew any more details than he was able to communicate is immaterial:
the shuttle car driver saved a minute—2 at most.  Even coal mines do not burn
up in that space of time.
Interestingly enough, those experts who constructed the mine fire simulation
agreed with the Federal inspector that 4 South's belt line was the one good
escape route available.  This inspector could not know that it would become
filled with smoke, nor could he foresee those difficulties encountered by a crew
member (which were made worse by cramped conditions along the belt).  A poor
decision was to undertake travel down this entry without first calling outside to
inform someone that the workers would not be using either of their designated
escapeways.
Another bad decision was to move into the belt line without first donning
self-contained self-rescuers.  Even smoke-free air can be contaminated by carbon
monoxide.  In fact, since brattices tend to leak, there could have been more CO
in the "neutral" air along their belt than in the smoke-filled but rapidly moving
air of 4 South's intake entry.  A good choice was to check through the mandoors
leading into the primary escapeway periodically, thus enabling crew members
to get into fresh air as soon as possible, since they were having problems with
their self-rescuers.
Regarding use of their emergency breathing apparatus, expert opinion was
that the crew members made some decision errors that could have killed them
had carbon monoxide levels been high.  For one thing, they waited too long to
don their apparatus.  Secondly, almost all of the workers "cheated" by taking the
mouthpiece out to breathe  in areas where smoke was not so dense.  This was
done despite the fact they had no way to check for carbon monoxide in their
atmosphere.  Finally, two individuals used their devices to assist the miner
helper (these apparatus are approved for self-rescue only), when a better course
of action for them would have been to remain outby the fire and wait for a mine
rescue team to arrive.  While there was some debate among the mine rescue
experts as to how filter self-rescuers and self-contained self-rescuers may be
employed optimally, they were in agreement about the notion of "self" rescue.
This led them to conclude that those four workers who left their slower-moving
comrades behind and continued outby the fire made a good decision.  Their
reasoning was that since the self-contained self-rescuer has a finite supply of
oxygen (about an hour) and 4 South's crew had no idea where the fire was
located, to stay with the miner helper might well have spelled everyone's doom.
Furthermore, someone should have gone on outby in order to inform mine rescue
personnel where to look for those who could not make it (since they were not in
either the primary or secondary escapeway).
In summary, even though the assessments of decision-making quality
discussed above result from a consensus of experts, there is still room for debate.
The point here is that research that focuses on judgment must include scrutiny
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not only of decisions that are made, but also of real-world variables that in-
fluence them.  The quality of any decision may have little or no direct rela-
tionship to the eventual outcome of its execution in a given situation.  This is
because a decision-maker is constrained not only by the stress of the situation
or personal knowledge and attitudes, but also because he or she can only weigh
information that is available.  Acknowledging the complex context of concrete
decision-making environments is a first step to understanding the skill of
decision-making and learning to evaluate the abilities of decision-makers.
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CHAPTER 6.—FIRE WARNINGS AND INFORMATION
UNCERTAINTY
The first steps in the process of mine evacuation are the recognition of a
problem and an attempt to communicate the problem to miners who may be
affected.  This chapter will focus on the way that a problem, fire, came to the
attention of mine personnel and the messages that were sent to miners in the
affected areas.  The concept of information uncertainty, which was introduced
in chapter 4, will be discussed as it influences problem perception and diagnosis.
Sociotechnical and interpersonal communications will be explored and sug-
gestions for improving these systems will be offered.
It might seem that the first indication of a dangerous fire would motivate
individuals to take self-protective action, to evacuate the affected area or struc-
ture, and to provide clear warning to others who are in danger.  Research has
actually shown that in most situations this does not occur.  Instead, time is taken
to gather more information, confirm information that is provided, and consider
possible alternative explanations that could account for the given circumstances
[Canter 1990; Scanlon 1979; Bickman et al. 1977].  This process of confirmation
can lead to the loss of critical time.  Canter [1990] summarizes the problem in
his book, which reports studies of a number of fire events:  "As discussed
throughout this book, ambiguity and confusion, incoherent instructions and time-
wasting actions, lack of appropriate instructions and misunderstanding of the
nature of the event that is unfolding, are all hallmarks of fires and emergencies
that kill people."  In this chapter, the detection of each mine fire and the com-
munication of warning to endangered miners will be reviewed with an emphasis
on how those processes were affected by the availability and use of  information.
Information can become available through a variety of mechanisms during
an emergency situation.  First, cues may be taken directly from the environment.
Smoke is an obvious example.  Secondly, mechanical devices, such as smoke de-
tectors, may provide warning messages.  A third source of information is inter-
personal communications.  These can occur face-to-face or through some me-
chanical device such as a telephone.  With all three methods there is a  possibil-
ity of miscommunication, misunderstanding, and misinterpretation.  All of these
means of communication were used with varying degrees of success in the three
mine fires analyzed here.
A fire, like any nonroutine situation, engenders uncertainty about a diagnosis
and understanding of the problem [Mead 1938].  This uncertainty leads to delays
in realization of the seriousness of the situation and therefore in the proper re-
sponse to it.  Delay in action is an important concern in any fire setting, but is
even more at issue in underground coal mine fires.  Mine fires are qualitatively
different from structural blazes: workers' escapeways may be miles long; the
seam height at many operations is so low that it is impossible to walk upright;
access to underground workings is always limited to a few (sometimes only two)
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openings; the coal provides an inexhaustible supply of fuel; explosive concentra-
tions of gases may build up quickly; and logistics are difficult [Mitchell 1990].
In these difficult circumstances, anyone who delays too long before beginning
an escape attempt or who gets lost in the maze of dark smoke-filled entryways
will likely die.  Given such a scenario, it is easy to understand the increased im-
portance of early detection and clear communication of warning.
When transmitted warnings or direct stimuli from the environment convince
people that danger exists and they perceive that options are available, they are
likely to take action.  According to Nigg [1987], the tendency to believe a warn-
ing and take action is influenced by the credibility of the source of the warning
and the content of the message.  The content will, however, be interpreted in
terms of  what people expect to happen [Auf der Heide 1989].  Since fires or
other potential disasters are nonroutine events, the predisposition is to disbelieve
messages that could be interpreted as signs of such danger.  Coupled with the
tendency toward disbelief is the inclination to interpret an occurrence from a
normal or usual perspective as long as possible [Meltzer et al. 1975].  In disaster
situations, unfortunately, potential victims are likely to put the best face on the
situation whenever possible and decide that response is unnecessary  [Perry
1987].  Therefore, the more credible a source and the more unambiguous the
message, the more disposed individuals will be to switch their frame of reference
and believe that a nonroutine event is occurring [Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1991].
Even when the message appears to be clear, however, interpretation is a sub-
jective phenomenon that will vary by individual and context because of personal
and social history [Duchon 1986].  Therefore, warning messages must be as
timely and unambiguous as possible.  Regardless of the warning provided,
though, it must be anticipated that some people will respond more quickly and
more appropriately than others.
Use of Information in Mine Fire Detection
Like structure fires, underground mine fires can be detected by environ-
mental cues, verbal warnings, or alarms from detection systems.  Research con-
ducted in the area of response to fire warnings shows that warnings given by any
of these means are not always effective.  Canter  [1990], for instance, explained
that in many fire settings environmental cues are not recognized as warnings:
"In every disaster that has been examined in this book, it has been found
that, in the early stages of fire growth, people have ignored or mis-
understood the early cues indicating that a dangerous fire was
developing."
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Canter [1990] then provided three reasons that traditional audible alarms are also
often ineffective:
1. A failure of people to differentiate fire alarms from other types of
alarm.
2. A failure of people to regard fire alarms as authentic warnings of a
genuine fire.
3. A failure of fire alarms to present information that will assist fire
victims in their attempts to deal with fire.
It is evident that these findings may be readily generalizable to the fire detection
and warning systems in a mine setting.
The following sections will describe how the fires were discovered at the
three mines.  The means of detection differed at the three sites.  In one location,
the fire was discovered when a resulting situation created a problem with
continuing routine work and the miners went in search of the cause of that
problem.  In other words, the fire was not detected by a system designed for that
purpose, but instead was happened upon by personnel during the course of their
work.  Systems for detecting dangerous conditions did come into play at the
other two sites.  At one site, a mine examiner discovered the problem during a
routine check for hazards.  The third site had installed a mine-wide monitoring
system that provided their initial warning.  The stories of fire detection can
therefore be seen to range from the casual finding of smoke during routine tasks
to the use of sophisticated warning equipment.  Details of each event will be
discussed in the following sections in order of increasing use of formal warning
systems.  Each account is given from the perspective of the individuals who first
determined that a serious situation did exist.
Fire Detection at Cokedale Mine
The workday began to vary from routine at Cokedale Mine when workers
driving motors noticed fluctuations in power supplies to their vehicles:
When I went to put the power on, there was none, and I asked my buddy
if he had lost power, and he says, yeah, but it came back on.  And then
I hit my controller and the power was back on again, and then I heard
[the haulage foreman] say, "Well, my power's on down here, but it's real
weak...My lights are real dim...I've got this thing on full power, and it's
hardly moving."
The two motormen and the foreman driving the affected vehicles then began to
search for the source of electrical power fluctuations that were impeding routine
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work.  First the dispatcher was called and asked to check the above-ground
substation.  The dispatcher found that the automatic system had locked out the
power and called back to report this information.  Meanwhile, one of the
motormen saw "about an inch of smoke along the roof."  His initial diagnosis
was that a switch had burned out.  The dispatcher explained why this diagnosis
was made:  "I heard [the foreman] telling [the motormen] to check No. 1, which
we had a switch burned up once before down there.  It was about the same way."
The motormen put the smoke into a framework that had been created by a past
event (which gave similar environmental cues) and went to the area of the earlier
problem to search for confirmation.
 About half the entry was filled with smoke.  I ducked down and tried to
look around the corner and I wanted to see if that trolley switch was
burning, which was probably maybe 6 to 8 feet in...I couldn't really see
so I took a step into it, and it was just—black.  I mean, everything right
now was black.  It was nothing, and I couldn't even, I turned around and
I couldn't see anything.
At that point, the motorman determined that this situation was not a repeat of the
prior one, as he had been expecting.  He called the dispatcher and reported what
he had found.
We got a problem down here...Something's burning and I don't know
what.  I said, I don't think it's a trolley switch, there's too much.
The dispatcher realized the seriousness of the situation from this verbal com-
munication and called to tell miners working inby the fire to evacuate the mine.
Fire Detection at Brownfield Mine
Detection of the fire at Brownfield Mine consisted of a process that involved
the experience of one individual.  On the day of the fire, a mine examiner was
performing a preshift examination.  A mine examiner's job is to routinely check
the mine for hazardous situations before and during shifts.  He was walking a
beltline when he went through a door and then smelled smoke.  Like the motor-
man at Cokedale, this miner assumed the smoke was the result of a situation that
occurred in the past:  "I just kind of  thought it was, you know, maybe a bad
roller.  The belt was rubbing on the straps, or something like that."  He continued
his examination, specifically checking the rollers to see if one of them was the
source of the smoke.  As he walked on, the smell of smoke grew stronger, but
there was still no sign of the source of the problem.  He began to hurry toward
an overcast because that was the location of a past problem.  When he got to a
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section belthead, "the smoke just  seemed—it was there.  I mean, all of a sudden
it was there."  Even though the amount of smoke provided undeniable warning that
this was an abnormal situation, the mine examiner still wanted to confirm exactly
what was happening.  Therefore, he started running through the entries searching
for the source of the smoke and for a safe passageway.  He heard a rumbling,
which sounded to him like a welding torch.  Again trying to understand his sur-
roundings within a routine framework, he thought that maybe someone was
welding and a problem had resulted. "I yelled for [the welder].  I yelled about two
or three times for him and there was no answer or anything."  At this point, the
mine examiner began having problems maneuvering through the smoke.
When I got in there, the smoke was real thick in there, too, and I couldn't
see, ...I was coughing around and it really burned my chest at  this time,
so I probably stayed there a couple minutes to get my bearings again.
The mine examiner still had not reported the situation to anyone.  He chose
instead to continue to search for the welder who he thought might be in jeopardy
in the smoke-filled area of the mine.  He also was attempting to determine the
exact source of the problem so that he could take action in response to the threat.
I crawled up along the rib, 'cause I still thought [the welder] was in there
and had a fire or something had happened.  I thought there was a man
in there.  I went up along the rib and I got my head around the corner
and I looked in and I  yelled for [the welder] a couple more times and
I could see the flames...coming off the top of the motor.  I went back and
I knew that there was a cutout...in the high spot, but in the smoke
I couldn't see it, so I wasn't about to try and find that cutout, so...I run
back down to 6 Left and pulled the cutout blade.
When the mine examiner saw the flames coming off the motor, he knew that this
fire was a major problem.  He determined that he could not find the welder, so
after he had taken the only response action that he felt was available to him,
cutting the power to the trolley wire, he called to report the fire to miners at inby
locations and to the shift foreman.
Fire Detection at Adelaide Mine
Warning of the fire at Adelaide Mine was given by a carbon monoxide (CO)
monitoring system.  Adelaide's dispatcher was alerted by a CO warning of
10.5 ppm, which cleared from his computer screen almost immediately.  A few
seconds later, the same sensor registered a warning of 11.5 ppm, but cleared in
less than 30 seconds.
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I turned to the page where the alarm was and it dropped straight back off
the normal and I took it as a false alarm.
An element in how this particular warning got diagnosed was the fact that past
false alarms had strongly conditioned Adelaide's dispatcher to question the
legitimacy of each alarm.  Due to his mistrust of readings provided by the mon-
itoring system, the dispatcher did not follow a normal protocol for responding
to this first CO warning of the shift.  Instead, he continued his ordinary routine
until he received an alarm that was more likely to be a true reading of an
abnormally high CO level.  At that time the dispatcher looked for more in-
formation about the situation:
[The monitor reading] went 18, 20, 22. It just started going straight up.
I got on the phone and called the dumper's shanty...I told them I had a
high alarm at 23 stopping, to get up there now and check it out.  I guess
it was like 5, 6 minutes later, he called me back and said I better get
some fire extinguishers up there fast, that there was a lot of smoke.
Upon confirmation of a serious blaze from the miners at the dumper shanty, the
dispatcher determined that miners in three areas of the mine were in danger and
must be evacuated.
Discussion of Fire Detection at the Three Mines
To those unfamiliar with the mining environment, it may be difficult to
understand how seeing unexpected smoke could be interpreted as normal.
During a study in which 214 miners from 8 mines were asked about mine fire
related experiences, however, 65% reported that they see or smell smoke in the
mines where they work at least once per month [Vaught et al., 1996].
Furthermore, 15% said that they had been surprised or caught off guard by the
smell or sight of smoke within the past month.  There are a number of potential
sources for smoke underground that do not usually lead to large fires.
In all three cases, the miners who discovered the fires initially attempted to
interpret the messages they were receiving within a framework of normal mine
operation.  In the first two mine fires discussed above, the miners who initially
discovered smoke attempted to attribute it to such sources.  Like the miners in
the Vaught et al. [1996] study, they had past experience with smoke in the mine
that had not led to major fires.  The suggested causes—a burned-out switch,
a hot belt roller, or a welding torch—would not necessarily create major
problems.  In these first two cases, however, the environmental cues provided,
the amount of smoke, and/or a view of the flames, could not be explained within
the miners' normal frameworks.  When they reached that conclusion, the initial
warning was received successfully.
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In the third mine, initial detection came from a mechanical device instead
of directly from the environment.  As discussed in the introduction to this sec-
tion, for fire alarm systems to be effective they must be viewed as "authentic
warnings of a genuine fire" [Canter 1990].  Unfortunately, the dispatcher at
Adelaide had background filters that predisposed him to not take heed of the CO
monitor's warning.  The system had in the past given multiple false alarms and
had thereby made false CO warnings a normal frame of reference:
It's just unbelievable.  There was times that all I did was go back and
forth and back and forth, you know, just turn the other alarm off and hit
the next page.  That's all I did.  There was times where I would be talk-
ing and they'd be going off for like 30 or 40 seconds before I could get
over there and shut it off and check it.
The system had been put into service while still being finished.  Unfortunately,
some of the monitors were attached to roof bolt plates, causing a short circuit.
The resulting false alarms seem to have lulled the dispatchers into complacency.
These false alarms were particularly problematic because of the way the system
was implemented at the mine.  Adelaide's dispatchers had been placed in charge
of the monitoring terminal, but no analysis was performed to determine if this
job was complementary with their primary tasks—to "direct traffic and move
coal."  The dispatcher occupied a key role: being able to recognize and com-
municate potential danger from readings of increased CO levels, but did not
view that as an important part of the job.
Another implementation problem was the lack of adequate training.  The
system manufacturer's representatives conducted two formal training classes that
were attended by supervisors and maintenance personnel but not by the dis-
patchers:  "I had no classes.  It was just as they got things in, they told me little
bits and pieces."  Mine management had allocated resources to the implemen-
tation of a sophisticated system which, if working properly, should provide early
warning of fire.  However, the same attention was not given to the human-ma-
chine interaction that was a vital link in the system.  When the dispatcher de-
cided that this time the warning might be real, he still asked for confirmation
from miners who had to go and look for the alarm's source before he determined
that miners inby the fire were in jeopardy.
Communication of danger was delayed in all three mines because in-
dividuals tried to place the abnormal cues into normal unthreatening frame-
works.  Miners caught inby the fires could have begun their escapes earlier if
those who discovered the problems had risked making errors on the conservative
side and reported the potential danger as soon as the first cues were received.
In the first two cases, the environmental cues could have been somewhat am-
biguous.  One way to improve that situation would be to use mechanical devices
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that could remotely provide more explicit information and clearer warnings.
While this could have helped in the interpretation of conditions in the first two
examples, the third case shows that implementation of technology without
careful consideration of how its messages will be interpreted will not be
successful.
Warning Information Communicated to Miners Inby
Regardless of the means used to detect a fire, after it has been discovered
any workers in the affected areas must be warned about the potential danger.
They must be given messages that will allow and encourage them to act
appropriately and escape efficiently.  In these cases, eight separate groups of
miners were forced to escape from inby the three fires.  In some cases, the
information they received assisted them with an effective egress from the
section.  In other cases, little information was conveyed to the miners at risk.
Communication of the initial warnings will be discussed in the following
sections.
Warning Miners Inby at Cokedale
When the dispatcher at Cokedale heard confirmation of the fire from the
miners who discovered it, he attempted to communicate a warning to workers
who might be in danger.  Miners were working or traveling in two areas that
could be blocked by smoke from a safe exit.  In both sections, however, the dis-
patcher's message was not the first cue they had that something was not normal.
The miners who started looking for the reason for the power fluctuations dis-
cussed previously were communicating on an open channel.  Individuals on the
sections, therefore, could overhear the conversations regarding the problem and
the speculations about a trolley switch burning.  Miners in the inby sections got
another cue as they began to smell and/or see smoke.  They began to think that
something unusual might be happening and looked for confirmation of that fear.
The dispatcher provided confirmation through phone calls in which he relayed
the information that a fire was burning underground and that they should evac-
uate the mine.  Each section started evacuation after that message was received.
They began the trip, which would take them through thick smoke, knowing that
a fire was burning.  The other information at their disposal was more vague,
however.  From the overheard conversations, they had some notion of where the
miners were who had discovered the fire.  They therefore could make a rea-
sonable guess about the fire's location, but had no information about its severity.
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Warning Miners Inby at Brownfield
The fire boss who discovered the fire at Brownfield called miners working
on the three sections at risk.  The message given to two of the sections, 4 South
and 5 South, was that there was a belt fire and that they should evacuate the
mine.  The fire boss, with the vision of hindsight, discussed what was lacking in
the warnings received by those miners.
So I called them and told them there was smoke coming out, they better
get out of there.  But the one mistake I did make is, well, the man that
I talked to in both cases never—he never give me the opportunity to tell
them where the fire was at.  It made it kind of a bad situation for those
guys coming out, cause they really didn't know where the fire was,
which was one thing I learned from the whole situation.
The stories of the miners who took the fire boss' calls confirm that, as the fire
boss reported, they did not wait for additional information after hearing that the
mine was burning. In both cases the miners were forced to make decisions about
their evacuation without knowing the fire's location.  The third section, 6 West,
had more information available as they decided which way to go.  The foreman
who took the call from the fire boss explained why:  "I was the only one of all
the guys [who escaped] that knowed where the fire was. And the reason for that
is I took and asked [the fire boss] where the fire was."  This miner had asked for
and received exact information about the fire's location and used it to make
decisions about evacuation.
Warning Miners Inby at Adelaide
As discussed in the section about detection above, the dispatcher at Adelaide
received warning of high carbon monoxide levels and sent the dumper to explore
the situation.  When the dumper reported back that a fire was burning, the two
workers split the task of contacting miners inby.  There were three sections af-
fected and all three were told, either by the dispatcher or the dumper, that there
was a fire on the belt and that the mine should be evacuated.  No information
about location or severity of the fire was provided and no further details were
requested by the miners who answered the calls.  All of the miners inby the
Adelaide fire evacuated without knowing where the fire was and, therefore, how
far they had to travel.
Discussion of Communication of Warning at the Three Mines
Most of the miners who evacuated from the three mines did not have
information that would allow them to make decisions about efficient escapes.
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The communication breakdown came from two directions:  the individuals pro-
viding the warning did not offer details about the situations even though some
details were known, and the individuals who received the warnings did not ask
for clarification of the situation.  As discussed in chapter 4, this lack of in-
formation allowed miners to continue attempting to place cues into normal
frameworks after they should have evaluated the situation as abnormal and
threatening.  When the environment left no doubt that this was not a routine exit
from the mine, it was too late to gather more information because there was no
form of communication to the surface in those locations.  Most decisions about
appropriate travel directions had to be made without the miners knowing where
the fire was, and therefore where the smoke was likely to be.  Equally important,
the miners did not know whether they must face the extreme conditions for a
hundred yards or 5 miles.  In the case of Cokedale, miners could guess where the
problem was from monitoring the radio calls.  They could not be absolutely cer-
tain of its source, however, and they had no indication of its severity.  As shown
in figure 5.1, uncertainty created by a lack of information increased stress on the
escaping miners and influenced their decision-making (and therefore their
actions).
Improving Fire Warning Systems in Underground Coal Mines
Data from the three fires studied show information that could have been
used to help with evacuation decision-making had it been provided to the miners
who were most in jeopardy.  In all three cases, delays in activating the warning
communication system happened because the individuals who first determined
that an abnormal situation existed sought additional confirmation before com-
municating the cues they had received.  Further delays occurred when the miners
inby also sought confirmation before evacuating, and often, even then, did not
believe that an emergency was in progress.  The lack of reliable detection meth-
ods and standard protocols for emergency communication caused those miners
who were put in danger by the fires to delay their self-rescue attempts, and often
to act without needed information.  The following sections will suggest methods
that could be used to address some of the causes of faulty communication that
occurred during these mine fire evacuations.  First, technological advances in
fire detection will be discussed.  Then, human interaction with technology and
human reaction to warning and risk communication will be explored.  The last
section of this chapter will summarize issues that should be considered in the
design of a fire warning system.
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Fire Warning With Smoke Detectors
The fire at Adelaide was detected initially by a mechanical device.  Having
any mechanical device installed to provide early warning of a fire may allow
miners inby more time to escape.  The CO detector system used at Adelaide,
however, may not be the best choice.  Instead, a smoke detection system might
provide even more time for evacuation decision-making and actions before the
mine atmosphere becomes irrespirable.  Data from fire testing indicate that a fire
will generate smoke reaching levels that will force evacuation, and make travel
difficult, significantly earlier than it will generate a toxic environment due to its
product gases [Litton et al. 1991].  This is significant because it implies that for
even moderate levels of smoke, the air is still breathable and life-supporting.  It
is only when the levels of smoke begin to totally obscure visibility that the tox-
icity of the combustion products begins to play a role in the question of escape
and survivability.
As shown in chapter 7, smoke from a fire is a significant obstacle to escape.
The rapid detection of smoke at very low levels can increase the time miners
will have to escape before smoke obscures visibility completely.  Such rapid
detection is possible because smoke is produced much earlier than other fire
signatures during the stages of fire growth and development, and smoke sensors
are extremely sensitive devices.  Smoke sensors can respond to smoke levels
that are barely visible to the human eye.  Furthermore, smoke sensors will alarm
while CO levels are often still near the ambient threshold of CO alarm sensors.
Since smoke may be the greatest impediment to survivability during a mine fire
escape, its early detection can optimize the chances of surviving.
Smoke Detection
In the United States, both Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., and Factory Mu-
tual Research Corp. use standard tests for approving smoke sensors to be used
as early-warning fire sensors.  Abroad, similar standard tests are employed for
approving smoke sensors (such as EN-54, used by the European community).
These standards are based on the optical density of the smoke.  In very general
terms, a smoke detector passes the sensitivity tests if it alarms before the smoke
optical density reaches a value of 0.058 m-1.  Many approved smoke sensors
typically alarm at optical densities of one-third to one-fourth of this value.
It has been proposed [Litton et al. 1991] that smoke sensors approved for use
in underground coal mines be classified more rigorously by defining two classes.
Class 1 smoke sensors are those which always alarm at smoke optical densities
less than 0.022 m-1.  Class 2 smoke sensors are those which always alarm at
optical densities less than 0.044 m-1.  Any smoke sensor that alarms at optical
densities greater than 0.044 m-1 would not be approved for use in underground
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coal mines.  For a class 1 smoke sensor, the range of visibility would exceed
40 m.
In determining which type of alarm system should be installed in un-
derground mines, it is appropriate to compare the approximate levels of CO that
would be present at the alarm thresholds of class 1 and 2 smoke sensors.  This
comparison is shown in table 6.1 (flaming).  For a class 2 smoke sensor, the
average CO levels at smoke alarm are 5.7 ppm for flaming fires.  For a class 1
smoke sensor, the CO levels at smoke alarm are 2.9 ppm.  These numbers are
clear indications of the superiority of smoke sensors over CO sensors in
providing early warning of fire.
Table 6.1.—Approximate CO levels present at alarm 
threshold for flaming fires
Combustible
ppm CO at smoke alarms
Class 1 Class 2
Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 11.0
Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7  3.4
SBR conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9  3.8
PVC conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1  8.2
Neoprene conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . 3.2  6.4
The earlier the warning given to miners who will be required to travel
through smoke, the better their chances of making a successful escape.  As-
suming the maximum time available for escape is that point at which visibility
in an escapeway becomes critical, it is possible to determine how much of this
time is available to miners warned by different types of sensors.  In detection of
a fire in the belt entry, a reasonable time before smoke obscures visibility is
about 38 minutes.  It is possible to determine when, during that time span, vari-
ous types of sensors would alarm and therefore how much evacuation time
would be made available.  For smoke sensors, 30 minutes (79% of the total time)
are estimated to be available; for 5-ppm CO sensors, 23 minutes (61%); for
10-ppm CO sensors, 19 minutes (50%); and for thermal sensors, 3 minutes (8%).
Such an analysis clearly shows that smoke sensors can provide earlier warning
than CO monitors.
Smoke Sensor Classifications
Smoke sensor classification systems are based on various criteria. Smoke
sensors are often classified according to their principle of operation.  Smoke sen-
sors are either ionization-type, photoelectric-type, or some combination of the
two.  An ionization-type smoke sensor is one that uses a small source of radio-
active material (usually americium 241) to produce molecular ions in the air
space between two electrodes.  When a small voltage is applied to these elec-
trodes, the ions produce a current.  Smoke particles that enter the air space
between the electrodes serve to deplete the ions correspondingly by reducing the
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flow of current.  When the current loss is 10% to 20% of the total current, an
alarm is given.
Photoelectric-type smoke sensors, which are based on measurement of light,
may be divided into two subcategories.  The first subcategory contains sensors
that measure the light that is scattered from smoke particles.  This type of
detector is located to the side of a beam of light at some fixed angle (usually
around 45E from the forward direction).  In the absence of smoke particles, this
detector receives no signal.  When smoke enters the projected beam of light,
some of the light is reflected (scattered) into the detector producing a measurable
signal.  When the detector signal reaches some preset level, an alarm is given.
The second subcategory contains sensors that measure the transmission of light
through a cloud of smoke.  A light beam is projected into a detector, producing
a steady-state signal level.  When smoke enters this light beam, it reduces the de-
tector signal level and  produces an alarm.
Smoke sensors may also be classified according to their use.  Deployment
can be fixed-station, sampling, or open area.  The most common sensor deploy-
ment method is called fixed-station sensors.  These sensors are mounted on or
near the roof and are fixed into place.  Another type of smoke sensor is a
sampling-type smoke detector.  The sampling-type smoke detector usually em-
ploys a small axial-vane fan to convey a sample of air from some desired point
back to the sensor via plastic tubes.  Very often, this type of smoke sensor draws
samples from several different monitoring locations (usually about 10 per de-
tector).  This allows 1 sensor to essentially replace 10 fixed-station smoke sen-
sors, but also means that the 1 sampling-type detector must be more sensitive,
since smoke from any one location can be diluted by a factor of 10.  As with
fixed-station use, either ionization-type or photoelectric-type can be employed
in sampling.
The final type of smoke sensor to be discussed here is the open area (or
projected-beam) detector.  It requires the use of a photoelectric-type system.  For
this system, a light source is located remotely from a light detector.  The light
detector measures the transmission of the light beam through a cloud of smoke
particles.  This type of smoke sensor can function at separations between light
source and light detector up to 90 m.  It is intended for use in structures that are
relatively open on the inside, such as warehouses.
Use of Smoke Sensors in Underground Mines
Most smoke sensors that have been approved by a recognized testing
laboratory should perform reliably in an underground coal mine.  The major ob-
stacle to their effective use is dust.  Both coal dust and rock dust are present,
often at elevated levels, in underground coal mines.  Two problems can be
created by this condition.  First, false alarms can be given when dust enters the
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smoke sensors.  Because dust is similar to smoke except that the dust particles
are larger, dust can cause smoke sensors to alarm.  Second, dust may contami-
nate a smoke sensor causing the sensor to become more sensitive over time.
This is particularly true for ionization-type smoke sensors and those
photoelectric-type smoke sensors that use light attenuation as the means for
detecting the smoke.  Increased sensitivity due to dust buildup eventually results
in an increasing frequency of random false alarms.  For photoelectric-type smoke
sensors that use light-scattering to detect the smoke, dust accumulation can
eventually render them totally insensitive.
There is one fixed-station smoke sensor that is impervious to dust—the Becon
Mark IV ionization-type smoke sensor, manufactured by Anglo-American Electron-
ics, Inc., of the Republic of South Africa.  It achieves this result by using a radi-
oactive source (Kr-85) that emits β-particles rather than the α-particles produced
from americium 241.  This radioactive source has an activity level greater than the
exemption level specified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and special
licensing requirements are needed by a United States distributor before it could be
used extensively in underground mines in the United States.
Other than the Becon smoke sensor, sampling type smoke sensors offer the
greatest potential for reducing or eliminating the problems of dust in under-
ground coal mine use.  They use a forced flow to bring the sample of the mine
atmosphere to the detector for measurement.  Dust particles are much larger than
smoke particles.  Techniques exist for selectively filtering out these larger dust
particles from the flow and allowing only the much smaller smoke particles to
be transmitted to the detector for measurement.  With current readily available
technology, the sampling type of detector seems to provide the best solution to
problems created by coal and rock dust.
Communication of Fire Warnings
Timely detection of fire is only one step in the fire warning process.  As
shown by the activities that took place after the CO monitor alarmed at Adelaide,
proper response to mechanical detection devices is required for the warning
system to be activated.  If the individual responsible for monitoring the alarm
system trusts that the sensors are reliable and valid, and if that person has been
trained in the proper actions to take when an alarm sounds, the warning system
is likely to be activated immediately upon receiving the first alarm.  If, however,
the system has given multiple false alarms or the sensors are set inappropriately
and alarm to low levels of smoke, such as from welding, or to dust, then the
person monitoring the detector is likely to look for confirmation of a serious
problem before providing warning.  Even when the alarm is believed or the
situation confirmed, if the individual has not been trained in the proper way to
relay warning, vital information is likely to be forgotten.
A person who is responsible for communicating warning information will
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be doing so under stress.  That individual is in the position of telling others that
their lives may be in jeopardy.  In that situation, the person providing warning
must have a detailed protocol for relaying information that has been explained,
discussed, and practiced before the emergency occurs.  At a minimum, the
protocol should include elements such as (1) identification of the individual
providing the warning, (2) the location of the situation, (3) definition of the type
of problem occurring, (4) severity of the problem if known, and (5) instructions
for those at risk.  Information about changes to the environment or response to
protocol that have occurred because of the emergency should also be com-
municated.  As discussed previously, none of the individuals who communicated
a message to evacuate the miners in this study relayed all of the pertinent
information available.  In the worst cases, the miners inby were not told the lo-
cation of the fire and therefore lacked information vital to planning an ap-
propriate escape route.
For a warning system to be successful, the communicated message must also
be received appropriately.  This requires that everyone underground be trained
in the proper way to gather information during a warning communication.  In
many instances, workers who received warnings of the fires did not ask any
questions of the person telling them to evacuate the mine.  In the worst case, one
person simply ran from the phone as soon as the beginning of the message was
relayed.  Miners must be prepared to control their stress levels as they hear about
the potential threat and obtain as much information as possible so that later
decision-making can be done in an informed manner.  At a minimum, they
should be trained to ask (1) the nature of the problem, (2) the location of the
problem, (3) the severity of situation, (4) which actions should be taken, and
(5) any details of the situation that would be relevant specifically to the people
in that area.  If the person providing the warning and the person receiving it are
both trained in emergency communication protocols, the potential for an
effective warning system can be greatly enhanced.
Recommendations for an Effective Warning System
When an individual is warned of danger, that person will act if (1) he or she
believes the danger is real and (2) feels that there are options.  A warning system
should be designed to provide the most information possible to comply with
those two needs.  The detection of a problem, whether by mechanical or other
means, must be trusted so that warning can begin immediately upon discovery
of the problem, as opposed to waiting for confirmation.  After discovery, warn-
ing must be provided to everyone who is in danger.  Secondarily, warning must
be provided to those who will be called on to respond to the emergency, and in
such a way that it allows informed decisions to be made about what actions
should be taken.  Training is needed for both giving and receiving warning
messages properly. Developing an effective warning communication system
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should include—
1. Installing proper detection devices as appropriate to the situation.
2. Training personnel who will be monitoring the detection system and its
functioning.
3. Developing a warning message protocol to be used to provide warning.
4. Training personnel who will be monitoring the detection system in
proper protocol for providing warning when the system alarms.
5. Developing a receiving warning message protocol to be used when
receiving warning.
6. Training all personnel in the proper methods for use of the receiving
protocol to gather information when receiving a warning.
7. Incorporating this system within a general mine emergency response
plan.
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CHAPTER 7.—SMOKE AS AN ESCAPE AND BEHAVIORAL
ENVIRONMENT
This chapter focuses on smoke as it relates to escape from underground mine
fires.  Among the topics discussed are the measurement of visibility in smoke;
smoke-related hazards such as the production of CO, hydrochloric acid (HCl),
or other byproducts of combustion; and miners' personal experiences while
escaping through smoke.
Smoke Measurement and Visibility
In general, smoke consists of hundreds of thousands of very small particles.
These particles have some "size," usually expressed in terms of their diameters,
and they have some concentrations, usually expressed either in the number of
these particles per unit volume or the total mass of the particles per unit volume.
Humans cannot see individual smoke particles because they are too small.
Similarly, "umber concentrations" and "mass concentrations" of smoke particles
do not have much meaning to people unless they are trained technically.  Still,
individuals know that they can see smoke, independent of all the technical jar-
gon used to describe it.  Also, they know that when the smoke level gets too
high, it is no longer visible.  In fact, nothing is visible because the smoke absorbs
all of the light in its surroundings.
The eye is only sensitive to light in the wavelength region from about
400 nm to about 700 nm.  The maximum sensitivity of the human eye is to light
that has a wavelength of about 555 nm.  It is important to know how the eye
responds to light because if its response is known, it is possible to use a light
detector that has almost the same response as the eye.  Such a detector can then
be used to quantify the visible characteristics of smoke because it responds in the
same manner as the human eye.
Smoke is visible because it either scatters or attenuates (diminishes) light.  In
some instances, smoke is visible because the smoke particles reflect light which
is then detected by the eye.  The eye actually "sees" an intensity of light that has
been reflected from a cloud of smoke particles.  Imagine shining a flashlight into
a cloud of smoke.  Someone off to the side can actually "see" the beam of light as
it traverses the smoke cloud.  This is called scattering.  Smoke is also visible be-
cause it attenuates light.  Imagine having someone shine a flashlight into your eyes.
As smoke begins to build up along the beam of the flashlight, the light begins to
dim.  The smoke is visible because it is now reducing the intensity of light that
falls upon the eye.  As the smoke level increases, it is said to obscure our visibility.
When the beam is no longer visible, the smoke obscuration is said to be 100%.  In
other words, none of the light energy from the flashlight makes its way through the
cloud of smoke.  Another way of saying that the obscuration is 100% is to say that






Although it is possible to measure the light that is scattered by smoke, most
studies usually measure the amount of light that is transmitted through a cloud
of smoke.  There are three basic reasons for measuring light transmissions rather
than the amount of  light that is scattered.  First, the intensity of scattered light
depends on many factors, such as the size of the smoke particles, the angle at
which one measures the scattered light relative to the direction of the light beam,
and also the attenuation of the scattered light in the space between the beam and
the light detector.  Second, the amount that smoke obscures light is a direct
measure of a visibility hazard.  Obscuration by smoke is one hazard that is
clearly evident in mines.  Imagine a 100-watt lightbulb 3 m away.  If the smoke
is dense enough so that the effective power of the bulb is only 1 watt, then the
obscuration would be 99%.  If the cloud of smoke is so dense that obscuration
is total, then it becomes impossible to see.  Smoke from an unwanted fire that
reaches this level of obscuration represents a critical, life-threatening situation
because it becomes impossible to use one's eyes to escape.  Finally, the
measurement of light transmission allows for characterization of smoke by a
single parameter.  This parameter is called the "optical density" and is derived
from the amount of light that is transmitted (T), at a given intensity, through a
smoke cloud over some path length (L):
Optical density is used to assess hazards of smoke and levels of detectability.
It is important to remember that this transmission is measured using a light
detector that matches the response of the human eye.
Smoke Hazards, Visibility in Smoke,
and Human Response in Smoke
The chemical composition of smoke particles depends, in part, on the
material that is burning.  Some materials may produce gas, or gases that attach
to smoke particles, which can cause the eye to tear, even at moderate levels of
obscuration.  Smoke from a fire is also breathed into the lungs, where some of
the smoke is deposited before it can be exhaled.  The smoke and its chemical
composition can irritate the respiratory system and also contain elevated levels
of toxic gases or compounds that attach to the smoke particles.  All of these
effects are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify because of the many
combustibles that can burn and produce adverse effects.
Several studies have been conducted to assess the effect of smoke on
humans, especially with regard to ability to escape from smoke-filled en-
vironments.  Jin [1981] reported the results of a series of studies that investi-
gated emotional instability of individuals in smoke from fires.  Using human
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subjects, Jin measured both physiological and psychological response to smoke
produced from smoldering wood that was uniformly introduced and dispersed
throughout a test room.  For the experiments, individuals were seated one at a
time at a table in a test room with a floor area of 5 by 4 m (16.4 by 13.1 ft), with
no windows and one door.  At the table, each person was asked to manipulate a
steadiness tester which consisted of a metal plate with four holes of graduated
sizes, and a metal stylus.  Both of these devices were connected to recording in-
struments.  Each person was told to thrust the stylus into the holes in a specific
order, but trying not to touch the sides of the holes with the stylus.  The smaller
the diameter of the hole, the harder the subject had to concentrate to avoid
contacting the sides of the hole.  After completing one cycle of operating the
steadiness tester, which required about 30 seconds, each person stood up from
the chair, walked to the other side of the room, pushed a button switch located
on another table, and then walked back to the table on which the steadiness tester
was located.  The button switch ensured that test subjects walked to the other
end of the room after each cycle.  Each person walked a total distance of ap-
proximately 10 m (33 ft).
In the experiment, Jin divided subjects into two groups.  The first group,
composed largely of fellow researchers, received a pretest briefing in which
individuals were made familiar with the layout of the test room and were also
informed that the smoke being used was harmless.  The second group, which
constituted subjects from the general public, was placed in the test room without
being familiarized with the area or informed of the smoke's nontoxicity.  For
both groups, few individuals had previous experience with exposure to smoke
from fire.
Jin noted that as the smoke density increased, fear of the smoke coupled with
irritations of the eyes and throat impeded individuals' ability to concentrate on
the task of operating the steadiness tester.  This resulted in increased frequency
of contacts between the stylus and edges of the holes.  Human response levels
were correlated with the optical density of the smoke produced by assessing the
number of stylus contacts on the steadiness tester.
Results indicated that, for the general public, most individuals began to ex-
perience emotional effects when the smoke optical density reached 0.044 m-1.
In contrast, most subjects in the group of researchers began to show emotional
fluctuation at smoke densities of 0.15 to 0.24 m-1.  It is interesting to note that,
while all individuals were told they would be advised when they could leave the
test room, 15 people out of the general population group fled the room to escape
the smoke before their test run was completed and prior to the smoke density
reaching 0.22 m-1.
Following these experiments, some of the participants were interviewed
regarding their experience.  Jin generalized the comments for the general public
test subjects as follows:
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Smoke itself didn't scare me much when it was thin...irritation to the
eyes and throat made me nervous, and when I thought of the smoke
getting still thicker...I was suddenly scared of what's going to happen
next.
Jin concluded that the data from these individuals could be treated as being equal
to data that would be obtained from a group of people who are unfamiliar with
the internal layout of a building.
 Among subjects from the group of researchers, most individuals became
more anxious about physiological factors such as throat and eye irritation rather
than the psychological element.  As mentioned by one participant, "When I got
the signal to end the test, irritation and suffocation were near the limit I could
physiologically stand."  Jin concluded that—
1. For a person unfamiliar with the escapeways and exits of a building,
that individual's ability to escape safely from a fire within that building is
severely reduced when the smoke optical density exceeds 0.066 m-1.
2. If an individual is familiar with the escapeways and exits of a building,
that person's ability to escape safely is severely reduced when the smoke optical
density exceeds 0.22 m-1.
During these tests, the levels of CO were continuously measured, reaching
a peak value of 50 ppm at the end of each test (D . 0.305 m-1), which equates to
an optical density/CO ratio (D/CO) of  6.10 × 10-3 (ppm@m)-1.  At these levels of
optical density, smoke obscuration is severe enough to reduce visibility to near
zero levels.  For instance, at D = 0.066 m-1, the range of visibility is about 13 m
(42.5 ft) while at D = 0.22 m-1, it is approximately 4 m (13 ft).  Because of this,
Jin referred to these optical densities as critical values at which the smoke
becomes untenable due to the total impact of the smoke on the human response,
which includes reduction in visibility and other physiological and psychological
effects.
Other studies have chiefly focused on visibility in an effort to determine
critical limits for optical density in smoke.  Rasbash [1975] conducted experi-
ments in which subjects, wearing breathing apparatus, focused headlamps that
were held waist-high on a target.  The target was a black letter "C" on a white
background.  As smoke was introduced, visibility values were recorded based
on individuals' ability to see the target.  Rasbash concluded that the visibility
limit in smoke occurs at an optical density value of 0.08 m-1, which corresponds
to a distance of about 10 m (33 ft).  Babrauskas [1979] studied escape from
rooms containing burning furniture.  Because of the short travel distance used
in these experiments, Babrauskas used an optical density of 0.5 m-1 as an ob-
scurity criterion for escape.  Heyn [1977] obtained similar results when
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measuring the relation between smoke density and visibility at the Tremonia
Experimental Mine in Germany.  For these experiments, Heyn conducted tests
using small conveyor belt fires which resulted in visibilities of only a few
decimeters.
Miners' Emotional and Physiological Experiences in Smoke
Miners who escaped the three mine fires experienced psychological and
physiological effects similar to those noted by Jin [1981], as well as visibility
problems like those noted by Heyn [1977] and others.  One analysis of the data
revealed that a number of workers experienced trouble wearing their SCSRs
[Brnich et al. 1992].  Twenty-nine of the miners who escaped these fires (63%)
reported having difficulty breathing with their SCSRs, largely because they were
unfamiliar with how an SCSR worked.  As a result, 27 of the 29 said they either
took the mouthpiece out to catch a breath or "breathed around" the mouthpiece
in smoke.
Many of the miners interviewed at each of the three mines had some prior
experience in dealing with fires underground.  Often, though, these fires were
small ones, such as equipment cable fires, hot belt rollers, or hot trolley wire
hangers along the haulage.  These types of fires generate heavy smoke in some
cases, but rarely result in the need for miners to escape through smoke-filled
entries.  Consequently, many of the miners who were caught inby the three fires
had never escaped through smoke.
Most of the miners who escaped the fires at Adelaide and Cokedale Mines
were unfamiliar with the escapeways leading from their working sections.
About 3 weeks before the fire at Adelaide, the company realigned section crews
in an attempt to boost morale and improve productivity.  Many miners were
assigned to sections they had never worked on before.  As a result, a number of
these reassigned workers had not been given an opportunity to walk the es-
capeways from 1 Right, 2 Northwest, and 3 Left sections in order to become
familiar with them.
Personnel caught inby the fire at Cokedale Mine worked on a maintenance
shift and were not assigned to any particular section.  On the night of this fire,
these miners were in the process of setting up a new production section in 8 Face
Parallels or doing maintenance work in 7 Butt.  All individuals were working in
an area of the mine with which most were unfamiliar, and, like miners at Ade-
laide, many of them were not familiar with the escapeways leading from this
area of the mine.  Unlike workers at the other two mines, miners who escaped
the Brownfield Mine fire were working on their regular sections and knew their
escapeways, but chose alternative routes in an attempt to elude heavy smoke.
As mentioned earlier, Jin [1981] concluded that a person's ability to escape
by an unfamiliar route is severely reduced when the smoke optical density
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equates to a sight distance of about 42 ft.  Persons familiar with escapeways
have their ability hampered when the smoke optical density equates to about
13 ft of visibility.  Based on Jin's findings, it is reasonable to expect that miners
who were not familiar with their escapeways would have been at a disadvantage
compared to those who knew the travel routes.  However, individuals who es-
caped the mine fires reported visibility distances that were often far below those
calculated from Jin's results.  Consequently, familiarity with escapeways did not
necessarily help miners navigate, due to the overall poor visibility.  Visibility
distances estimated by workers ranged from less than 2 ft in primary es-
capeways, track and belt entries (mean 7.3 ft) to as much as 60 ft in return
airways (mean 47.5 ft).  In addition, some miners did not expect the smoke they
encountered to be as thick as it was.  A wireman, who was moving a power
center in 7 Butt at Cokedale Mine when the fire occurred, described his
experience:
I didn't expect it to be that thick...they show you movies, you can get
down on your hands and knees and crawl out. I don't think you could do
that...you could see it coming right off the runaround.
Miners characterized smoke in various ways by both its color and thickness.
In areas where the smoke was lighter, a worker described it as having a bluish-
gray color and being "like...more just like a filtering smoke."  Another miner,
traveling with his crew through a return airway, said he could see about 30 to
40 ft and that walking through the smoke was like walking through a light fog.
Other workers, however, encountered thick, heavy smoke as they escaped.  Two
miners described the thickness of the smoke they encountered.  A utilityman
from Adelaide Mine said:
You couldn't see...it was just like, I'll tell you what it reminded you of...
like riding in behind...a bulk duster for rock dusting.
Another utilityman, also from Adelaide Mine, was traveling with his buddies
through the secondary escapeway located in the right-side return aircourse of
3 Left.  When they reached an overcast where the return crossed the intake, the
group encountered heavy smoke:
 I walked up there to the overcast and I stepped right into it.  And it was
like a black wall.  It was like burning 50 tires and trying to walk through
it...and I said, "We can't go that way."  So we walked out and there was
some—I know there was doors in those overcasts.  I said, "The intake's
here someplace.  All we've got to do is find it."  And you'd open up the
door and it'd just billow out; and you'd open another door and it would
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billow out...we opened up [one] door, it looked like it was a black river
running by.  That's how thick it was.
A miner from Brownfield Mine could not find the mandoor in a stopping
because of the thick smoke:
The [stopping] was probably on the other side of these props, but
I couldn't see it.  I couldn't even see the door, that's how thick it was.
I put my hands out...and I couldn't see the end of my fingers.
For miners escaping in heavy smoke, navigating through the mine was dif-
ficult because of the poor visibility.  At Brownfield Mine, the smoke was so
heavy that a foreman actually walked into the belt structure while attempting to
make his way to the other side of 6 West mains to check for fresh air in the No. 7
intake:
So I went out through this door, and I'll tell you the smoke's so thick
right here I walked into the belt.  I couldn't see it.
Regardless of whether they followed designated escapeways or not, miners
used various (and in some cases highly creative) means to keep themselves
together to prevent becoming separated and to navigate through the smoke.
Workers escaping from the 7 Butt section at Cokedale Mine held on to one
another as they attempted to stay together while crossing through the track entry
to get into the return:
Smoke was coming on the tracks, we reentered on the tracks there by the
spray pump, smoke was real bad we had to hang on to each, one another
like a bunch of elephants.
To guide themselves, miners escaping through smoke followed objects they
encountered in the mine entries, such as stopping lines, rows of props, old track,
and water lines.  At Adelaide, the 1 Right crew was led out by a utilityman who
was a former fire boss.  He led his buddies down the left return airway of old
8 Left to the 2 Northwest left return and then continued outby.  For the entire
distance, the utilityman followed the stopping line located between the intake
and return entries knowing that, by keeping the stoppings on the left, his crew
would be less likely to make a wrong turn.  A maintenance foreman and mechan-
ic, working in the 6 West section of  Brownfield Mine, were following the pri-
mary escapeway from the section.  Hoping that there would be lighter smoke in
the secondary escapeway, the two miners, along with a State electrical inspector,
went through a door into the left-side return aircourse.  Although the group
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encountered moderate to heavy smoke in the return, the foreman knew that the
return airway would lead them directly past the fire area.  The foreman, there-
fore, decided to continue traveling in the return, since he could follow a row of
posts in this entry to guide himself.  "I mean, the return is double-timbered.
I just stayed between the props and went."  The crew from the 5 South section
at Brownfield Mine also traveled through the 6 West left return and used the
props to guide themselves:
We just stayed—we knew that the return went straight down because
we'd walked it before.  So we just stayed in the 6-foot walkway between
the posts, and more or less we were walking from overcast to overcast.
 A group of miners who were escaping from the 8 Face Parallels at Cokedale
used a unique method to help them find their way.  The crew, being led by a gen-
eral inside laborer (GIL), made their way to the secondary escapeway located in
the right return aircourse of 8 Face.  Because the escapeway followed entries
that were mined more than 35 years earlier, the passageways had deteriorated.
Miners had to cross over roof falls and contend with low clearances due to floor
heave and low crossbars.  Although the escapeway was marked with reflective
signs, miners reported that it was difficult to see them due to the heavy smoke
and the fact they had to bend over to walk.  To more easily navigate through the
escapeway in the smoke, the GIL who led his buddies from the 8 Face Parallels
area did not try to follow the reflective markings in the escapeway.  He instead
followed the footprints left by fire bosses who had conducted prior hazard
examinations of the area, knowing that the footprints would lead him out of the
mine:
As you're walkin', you're not walkin' on a—you're goin' up and down
crawlin' [over falls] this and that—people were, you hear people goin'
"ow, ow" hit their head...And I just kept lookin' at the ground and
lookin' at footprints and I did catch I did see footprints.  Reason I say
I was lookin' at footprints and not the signs was why keep bangin' your
head needlessly.  If you can't see 2 feet, how are you gonna possibly see
that sign—I don't care whether it is red or green, you can't see it.  The
footprint is the closest thing to you that also meant to me—these
[returns] have to be walked periodically.  When I see footprints, I felt
better.  Somebody was through there already there is only one set goin'
out.  So chances are that if there was a return set of footprints, I would
think somebody had to turn around because it's blocked.  Being there
was only one set, there's got to be an opening up ahead somewhere.
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While some miners had the "luxury" of being able to follow markers or other
objects to guide themselves out of the mine, the smoke was so thick in some
cases that miners could not follow objects visually.  Instead, they had to feel
their way along in places in order to find their way out.  Miners felt their way
along water lines, posts, the mine's ribs, and other features in order to make their
way to safety.  At Brownfield Mine, a Federal mine inspector was escaping with
the crew from 4 South and was part of a group of four miners making their way
off the section by traveling the belt entry.  During their escape, the group began
to break up after a miner from the crew started having trouble walking.  At this
point, fearing he would run out of oxygen in his SCSR, the inspector left the
group and continued on his own.  When he reached the mouth of the section, the
inspector decided to go through a door in an overcast and check the intake
escapeway for smoke.  Upon seeing that it was still filled with heavy smoke, he
came back into the belt entry, which also contained heavy smoke, and attempted
to continue his escape.  Unable to see, the inspector felt his way along a machine
guard on the belt drive:
The belt drive is entirely guarded with chain link fence...as I come out
of the overcast area, it seemed like the first thing, I reached up as I came
out and the chain link fence was there.  I really couldn't see but I just
hand over hand followed the chain link fence so I wouldn't trip on
anything.
In his experiments, Jin [1981] noted that as smoke density increased,
individuals began to fear the smoke and experienced physical irritation as well
as an elevated apprehension that severely hampered their concentration.  Miners
who escaped the three mine fires reported psychological and physiological
effects similar to, and in some cases more dramatic than, those experienced by
participants in Jin's experiments.  Of the 48 miners interviewed, nearly one-half
of them (48%) reported experiencing some level of emotional instability as they
made their way through the smoke-filled escapeways.
Several miners said that they became frightened when they first encountered
smoke.  In some cases, fear of smoke severely hampered miners' ability to con-
centrate and perform motors tasks such as those associated with donning an
SCSR.  The wireman, who had been in the 7 Butt section of Cokedale Mine, was
riding in a jeep with the section boss when they encountered smoke in the 8 Face
track entry:
We were in the jeep, and we hit smoke.  I got all scared you know, all,
what the hell we going to do, you know, all this smoke...And I was on
the jeep, and [the boss] said, "Get your SCSRs on."  And I...opened
mine up and I was like shakin' like a leaf, couldn't get the damn thing
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open.  And [the boss]...said, "Here, pop this, stick this in your mouth..."
I mean, I couldn't get the damned thing, I was so damned scared I didn't
know what else, I didn't know what the hell to do, you know.
Other miners said they began to fear the smoke when it became thick and
heavy.  Apprehension about the smoke caused one of the shuttle car operators
at Adelaide Mine to experience difficulty breathing, even though he was wearing
an SCSR and was protected from the smoke.  When his crew encountered heavy
smoke billowing from an overcast that they had to cross at the intersection of
3 Left and 2 Northwest Mains, this miner experienced tremendous anxiety:
We went into that smoke and I couldn't breathe and was gagging on that
self-rescuer.  I couldn't breathe any at all...I couldn't go in [that smoke].
I guess it may be psychological or something about being in that smoke
or something.  I couldn't breathe at all.  In [the smoke] I was gagging but
as soon as I would come out of there, it seemed like I was breathing
better, a little bit better.
Because of his experience, the shuttle car operator chose not to follow his
buddies into the heavy smoke at the overcast.  Instead, recognizing where he
was, he decided to follow another route that led him across 2 Northwest Mains
and down the right-side return escapeway to a point outby the fire.  This decision
is significant because several of the miner's buddies, believing him to be lost,
risked their lives by going back to the overcast to look for him after everyone
had reached safety.
While some miners became afraid in the smoke, others became confused and
disoriented.  This inhibited some miners' ability to think clearly and respond
functionally to the situation.  The Federal mine inspector, who escaped from
4 South at Brownfield Mine, had conducted numerous inspections in the sections
off 6 West Mains and was moderately familiar with the layout of that portion of
the mine.  Nevertheless, he reported becoming disoriented and confused in the
heavy smoke, especially toward the end of his ordeal as he made his way from
the belt entry to the track:
As soon as I found the crosscut, I went in because I didn't want to miss
it and I went to the end of the crosscut and run into a permanent
stopping.  Well, I started looking for the door and it seemed like I was
lost.  I wasn't lost but it seemed like I was lost because I got sort of that
feeling, well, I know that door is here but I just couldn't find it.
After getting into the track entry and traveling another crosscut, the inspector
reported seeing lights ahead of him, but he was not sure of their significance
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"I could see lights ahead of me.  I could see these lights...[but] the lights really
didn't mean anything to me."
The 4 South section mechanic was in the same escape group as the Federal
inspector.  After the escape group broke up, the mechanic continued traveling
outby along the beltline.  Even though the belt entry led directly out of the
section to 6 West mains, the mechanic became confused and disoriented in the
smoke:
I didn't know my way out of there.  I lost all orientation how to get out
of there.  I knew my way out, but I forgot.  It was just a panic thing.
Jin [1981] noted in interviews with test subjects that, as the smoke became
thicker, some individuals became apprehensive as they wondered what would
happen next.  Based on these findings from a controlled experiment, it is not
surprising that miners who escaped the fires experienced similar mental anguish
when thoughts of what lay ahead entered their minds.  Miners who experienced
emotional instability reported thinking about many different things as they made
their way through the mine.  The foreman of the crew escaping from 8 Face
Parallels said, "Your heart's thumping and all kinds of goofy crap's going
through your head."  Some miners thoughts turned to their families.  A brattice-
man who escaped with the crew from 3 Left at Adelaide Mine said he thought
about never seeing his family again:  "I kept thinking, I want to get out.  I don't
want to die in here, I want to see my wife and kids."
Other miners experienced thoughts of not escaping the fire and dying in the
mine.  The shuttle car operator, who left his crew at the overcast to explore
another escape route, said, "I thought I was going to die right there in that
smoke."  Several miners said they thought about the Wilberg Mine disaster and
wondered to themselves if they were going to meet the same fate as their fellow
miners did in December 1984:
But what was in everybody's mind was the thing that happened at
Wilberg.  Myself, I thought we wasn't going to go, to get out.
And my personal thoughts were that it was a Wilberg disaster, and that's
all that was in my mind.
While some miners only thought about the possibility that they were going
to die in the smoke-filled entries, others had virtually given up hope.  After
checking the left-side intake of 6 West Mains at Brownfield Mine and seeing
that it was full of smoke, a roof bolter operator from 5 South made his way back
to where several other miners were waiting:
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And there was a couple of rock dust guys right there.  I sat down with
those rock dust guys and I figured this is where I bunk—this is it.  I was
just going to say goodbye to the world.  I couldn't see anything.
In another instance, the miner operator from 4 South at Brownfield Mine
reported being also ready to die.  He had been evacuating with the section me-
chanic, the Federal inspector, and another miner.  While traveling along the
4 South belt entry, the miner operator experienced great difficulty.  He was
having problems breathing with his SCSR, became disoriented and unable to see
in the smoke, and kept falling down in the mud.  After falling down for one last
time, and after his buddies had left him, the miner operator gave up:
So I was there by myself and I was down in the mud.  I remember just
stopping a couple of times and just, you know, wishing it would get over
with, almost wishing I'd die or something, just to get it over with.  It was
a horrible feeling.
It is evident from these accounts that miners experienced great emotional trauma
while escaping through the smoke-filled passageways.  In some cases, miners'
ability to concentrate, make informed choices, and take appropriate actions
during their escape was severely hampered by the need to deal with emotional
effects of the smoke.
Besides having to cope with the psychological effects of smoke in their
escape environment, many miners had to contend with physiological elements
as well.  Smoke clouds carry CO as well as sensory irritants, both of which are
byproducts of combustion.  As mentioned earlier, Jin [1981] measured CO levels
and calculated the ratio of CO to optical density as D/CO.  It is worth noting that
the ratio observed by Jin (D/CO = 6.10 × 10-3 (ppm@m)-1) is identical to the value
quoted by Litton [1989] for smoldering wood.  Therefore, depending on a
person's familiarity with his or her surroundings during a fire, the levels of CO
that are present when smoke visibility reaches its critical level lies somewhere
between 10 and 35 ppm.
Relationship Between Critical Levels of Smoke and CO
In Jin's experiment, these critical levels of optical density were measured for
wood smoke.  Depending on the actual material burning and the resultant char-
acteristics (both physical and chemical) of the smoke produced, these critical
values could increase or decrease.  Clearly, a critical level of optical density at
which the range of visibility is reduced to •1 m represents an upper limit.  The
range of visibility is defined as the distance at which the light obscuration
exceeds 86% (or, the transmission is less than 0.14).  At a 1-m visibility range,
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the critical level of optical density is 0.92 m-1.  This value should be considered
as an absolute maximum value based solely on reduced visibility.
Using the data of Litton for the ratio of CO to smoke optical density, it is
interesting to compare the expected levels of CO that would be present at the
values of optical density equal to 0.22 m-1 (the maximum critical level reported
by Jin) and 0.92 m-1 (the absolute maximum), discussed above.  These levels are
shown in table 7.1 for smoldering fires and in table 7.2 for flaming fires.
Data have been acquired in full-scale tests at Lake Lynn Laboratory which
demonstrate the levels of visibility that occur as a function of the CO level.  In
these tests (see figure 7.1), placards were placed at fixed distances from a
camera and irradiated by a white light.  As time progressed during these tests,
the smoke level increased, eventually obscuring the placards.  As these placards
disappeared in the smoke, the levels of CO at the times of their disappearance
were measured.
Figure 7.2 indicates the visibility (in meters) measured as a function of the
CO level (in parts per million).  The solid line indicates the level of visibility
predicted from smoldering coal fires, while the dashed line indicates the level
of visibility predicted from flaming coal and styrene-butadiene (SBR) belt fires.
It is important to note that during the large-scale experiments, the initial levels
of CO and smoke come from a smoldering coal fire while the later levels come
from a flaming coal and conveyor belt fire.  In figure 7.2, the level of CO at
which the coal fire ceases to smolder and begins to flame is indicated by the
arrow.  The importance of these data is apparent:  significant reductions in visi-
bility occur at relatively low levels of CO (10-20 ppm).
Table 7.1.—Visibility as a function of CO level in smoldering fires
Combustible ppm CO at
D ' 0.22 m&1
ppm CO at
D ' 0.92 m&1
Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   36.0   150.0
Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9.0   38.0
SBR conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . .   2.5   10.5
PVC conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . .   3.0   12.5
Neoprene conveyor belt . . . . . . . 7.0   29.0
PVC line brattice . . . . . . . . . . . . .   11.0   46.0
Table 7.2.—Visibility as a function of CO level in flaming fires
Combustible ppm CO at
D ' 0.22 m&1
ppm CO at
D ' 0.92 m&1
Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   56   234
Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   17   71
SBR conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . .   19   79
PVC conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . .   42   176
Neoprene conveyor belt . . . . . . . 32  143
Transformer fluid . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7.5   31
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Figure 7.1.—Depiction of experimental setup in A-drift at Lake Lynn Laboratory.
Figure 7.2.—Visibility measured as a function of CO level.
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Depending on the material burning, other toxic and irritating elements can
be produced.  For conveyor belts, in particular, the generation of HCl vapor due
to chlorine in the belt, as either a component of the base polymer or as an ad-
ditive to make the belt more flame-resistant, is an example of such an irritant and
also represents a potential toxic hazard in addition to the CO produced.  Smith
and Kuchta [1973] have measured the levels of HCl and CO produced from
flaming SBR and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) conveyor belts.  They found that the
ppm of HCl is equal to 0.105 times the ppm of CO for SBR belts and 0.205
times the ppm of CO for PVC belts.  Similarly, for smoldering conveyor belts,
Egan [1992] finds that the ppm of HCl is 0.30 times the ppm of CO for SBR
belts; 0.40 for PVC belts; and 1.0 for neoprene belts.
For CO, the level quoted as being immediately dangerous to life and health
(IDLH) is 1,500 ppm; for HCl, 100 ppm [Mackinson et al. 1980].  If one uses
these numbers as critical values and assumes them to be additive, then a toxic
environment is produced downstream of a fire when the following condition is
satisfied:
Using the levels of HCl produced relative to the CO, tables 7.1 and 7.2 can be
used to generate values of TOX at the indicated levels of smoke optical density.
These are shown in tables 7.3 and 7.4.
Table 7.3.—Values of toxicity at indicated levels of optical density in smoldering fires
Combustible TOX at
D ' 0.22 m&1
TOX at
D ' 0.92 m&1
Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.024 0.100
Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.006 0.025
SBR conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.009 0.038
PVC conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.014 0.059
Neoprene conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.075 0.313
Table 7.4.—Values of toxicity at indicated levels of optical density in flaming fires
Combustible TOX at
D ' 0.22 m&1
TOX at
D ' 0.92 m&1
Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.037 0.155
Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.011 0.046
SBR conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.033 0.138
PVC conveyor belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.114 0.476
Transformer fluid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.005 0.021
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Only a flaming PVC conveyor belt produces toxic products of CO and HCl
to such an extent that the combustion products begin to pose a severe toxic
hazard.  This occurs at the maximum allowable level of optical density.  It is
clear from tables 7.3 and 7.4 that the presence of smoke poses a more severe
impediment to survivability and eventual escape from fire than the toxicity of the
gases produced.
It is interesting to note several subjective observations regarding smoke
irritation made by Kissell and Litton [1992] during a conveyor belt fire test.  In
levels up to 40 ppm CO, test subjects experienced some labored breathing and
mild eye irritation.  When CO levels reached 80 ppm, individuals experienced
hard breathing and stinging of the eyes.  At 160 ppm CO, subjects found it very
difficult to breathe and reported severe eye irritation.  Participants also stated
that they could barely see.  These results indicate that severe sensory irritation
can occur at CO levels below those that would cause carboxyhemoglobin danger.
Experiencing Smoke Density and Physical Discomforts
The studies reported here indicate that smoke density and the physical ir-
ritants produced pose a greater threat to escaping miners than the levels of CO
and other gases, which do not reach toxic levels when the critical optical density
is reached.  In the three mine fires, however, some miners could have been in
danger had CO levels been high enough.  The reason is that most of the miners
who escaped did not really understand the dangers that combustion products can
pose.  Miners were asked if they thought about the presence of CO during their
escape.  One miner provided his thoughts:
Well, the way I was thinking, we was on the intake side...and was just
starting to get some smoke.  When we went in the return, it wasn't even
heavy as that, so why worry—you know what I mean—as long as you
can't see the smoke.
Although research has shown that the levels of CO and HCl do not appear
to always reach toxic levels in thick smoke, a number of miners reported
experiencing moderate to severe physiological effects, particularly sensory
irritation.  Slightly more than one-third (34.8%) of the miners who escaped said
they experienced various problems such as choking, coughing, and eye irritation.
Some miners said that they traveled barefaced through smoke before donning
their SCSR and subsequently inhaled smoke.  A mechanic at Cokedale, escaping
with his buddies from 8 Face Parallels, described his experience with smoke
inhalation:
 The section was really starting to fill with smoke,  I had never had such
a dry mouth or throat; it's almost like you could spit dust.  I mean it's so
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dry, that's the one thing I remember vividly.  And at that point, the
smoke had started to uh, to overcome me.  I was choking, coughing, and
gagging and at that point, I took it upon myself to use my small [filter
self-] rescuer.
Some miners experienced eye irritation from particulates in the smoke.
A trackman who escaped from 7 Face at Cokedale said, "My eyes were affected
somewhat.  They were extremely red when I got outside."
It is understandable why miners experienced emotional instability during
their escape through smoke from these fires.  However, one might question why
more than one-third experienced physiological problems since miners would
have been offered respiratory protection from either their SCSR or FSR and eye
protection from the goggles contained in their SCSR.  These problems are easily
explained: besides removing the mouthpiece to breathe, as mentioned earlier,
nearly 48% of the miners who escaped also took the mouthpiece out in smoke
to talk.  Subsequently, miners inhaled smoke and various contaminants which
caused them to experience breathing discomfort. The interviews also revealed
that few miners wore the goggles supplied with their SCSR to protect their eyes.
Many of the miners said that the goggles fogged quickly and hampered their
vision.  As a result, more than 63% of the escaping miners said they did not wear
the goggles for that reason.
One of the most interesting problems that affected miners' emotional
stability during escape was the unanticipated presence of smoke in certain areas
of the mine.  Ventilation systems can be extremely complex and made up of four
or more air shafts, tens of miles of aircourses, and hundreds of stoppings and
overcasts.  This is especially true in large, older mines such as Adelaide, Brown-
field, and Cokedale, where air must travel several miles from an intake shaft
through intake entries to the working sections and back to the shaft via return
aircourses.  Where air must traverse such considerable distances through older
aircourses, excessive air loss is common.  Depending on the mine, it is not un-
usual to lose between 30% and 50% of the air before it ever reaches the working
sections [Mosgrove 1981; Stefanko 1983].
Air loss is due to a variety of reasons, including frictional resistance in the
aircourses and leakage across stoppings and overcasts.  In a mine fire, air leak-
age across ventilation devices can result in significant amounts of smoke making
its way into escapeways and other entries.  To demonstrate, a U.S. Bureau of
Mines investigation by Litton et al. [1991] studied the detection of conveyor
fires.  For this experiment, researchers placed a pile of coal beneath a section of
SBR belt.  Air velocity in the test tunnel, designed to simulate a single mine
entry, was 10 m/sec (200 fpm), while the air quantity was 7.6 m3/sec (16,000
cfm).  Researchers then monitored combustion products in the air 20 m (65 ft)
downstream as the pile of coal smoldered, burst into flame, and then set the SBR






contaminant and visibility levels, resulting from air leakage across stoppings, in
a hypothetical escapeway that might be located adjacent to an entry containing
a fire [Kissell and Litton 1992].  These calculations reflect conditions
60 minutes into the fire.  The concentration of contaminants in the escapeway
(Ce) was determined using the dilution equation:
where Cf is the contaminant concentration in the fire entry, QL is the quantity of
air leakage, and Qe is the quantity of air in the adjacent escapeway.  Assuming
a Qe of 9.4 m
3/sec (20,000 cfm) in the escapeway, a CO concentration (Cf) of
2,700 ppm in the fire entry, and a QL of 0.94 m
3/sec (2,000 cfm) across the
stopping line, a CO concentration of 245 ppm was calculated for the escapeway.
A similar calculation was performed to determine the optical density in the
adjacent escapeway.  Using the optical density value, a visibility of 0.3 m (1 ft)
was calculated.  These results indicate that visibility reaches minimum accept-
able limits at relatively low leakage levels.
The reason an unanticipated presence of smoke helped elevate workers'
apprehensiveness is that miners tended to have certain predisposed beliefs about
how the ventilation system should function and, consequently, where the smoke
should be encountered under "normal" conditions.  In a normal situation, fresh
air comes into the mine via the intake air shaft, traverses the mine entries to the
section, sweeps the faces, and then makes its way back to the upcast air shaft via
the return aircourses.  Ideally, air flow should occur with no air leakage across
stoppings and overcasts, provided all ventilation devices are intact and mandoors
are closed.  However, minimal leakage is inevitable in any ventilation circuit
regardless of how well stoppings and overcasts are sealed.  Typically, a certain
amount of air leakage will occur across mandoors, especially if they are left ajar.
As calculations reported by Kissell and Litton [1992] show,  smoke will make
its way across ventilation devices into escapeways and other entries as a result
of leakage.
About 37% of the miners who escaped the fires at the three mines apparently
never considered the fact that air would leak across ventilation devices and
introduce smoke into entries that they assumed should be clear.  Surprisingly,
some miners had misconceptions of how the smoke from the fires would travel.
As a result, some groups of workers decided not to continue their escape in the
smoke-filled intake escapeways or track entries and chose instead to move into
the return aircourses, believing that the smoke there would be lighter or non-
existent, since it would have to make its way to the faces before reaching the
return entries.  A continuous miner operator at Adelaide Mine, who was
escaping with his crew from 1 Right section, elaborated on his crews' decision:
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Then if you have smoke in your intake, we were always taught to get
into your return, and then keep checking until you see clear intake.  So
we got in our left return.  There was no smoke because it hadn't reached
up to the face and come back down the return.
At least one miner thought that by getting into the return, he and his crew would
be safe, again because of a belief that any smoke in the intake must travel to the
faces:
 We started in the intake escapeway, yeah.  And whoever's decision it
was, I don't know, because when we hit smoke, we decided it was time
to get in the return because we figured all the smoke would have to go
up to the unit or the face and come down behind us.  So we're clear and
out of all danger.
When miners encountered smoke in areas where they did not expect it, they
began wondering how the smoke got there.  A bolter operator described his
thoughts:
 I think that was the thing that threw a lot of us off was when we came
to the return, we hit the smoke on the haulage, we went over and we hit
smoke in the belt entry, we got over into the return and it was still pretty
clear.  Because we went down 10 or more blocks, 15 blocks, whatever.
That's when we starting hitting smoke [again].  Now, we got smoke in
all, all the escapeways, you know.  What is wrong?
In some cases, miners who became emotionally distressed assumed the worst
when they encountered unexplained smoke.  A utilityman quickly surmised that
the fire had burned completely across the section when his crew hit smoke in the
return:
We were in the return by then and it was filled up with smoke and
I knew we were in serious trouble then, we had a long way to go and we
were already full of smoke...At that time, I couldn't get through my mind
how we had smoke in the return escapeway that quick.  I said, what did
it do, burn all the way across and we don't have any way out now?
In fact, there were plausible explanations why smoke was being found
unexpectedly in various locations at the three mines.  As mentioned in an earlier
chapter, a large quantity of air was being used to ventilate the 2 Northwest belt
entry at Adelaide.  Because this was a high-pressure entry, vast quantities of air
quickly leaked across ventilation devices into adjacent intake and track entries,
especially between the fire location and the mouth of 3 Left.  As a result,
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significant amounts of smoke bled into these adjacent entries and eventually into
the returns.  This explains why the crews escaping encountered heavy smoke in
all entries including the returns.
Several crews who escaped the fire at Brownfield Mine experienced similar
situations, encountering smoke unexpectedly.  Knowing that the beltline was on
a separate split of intake air, miners escaping from the 5 South section decided
to follow the belt, believing they would have clear air all the way out.  When
they encountered smoke in the belt entry, however, miners became concerned:
We started down the belt because we figured the belt should have been
neutral, really, but by the time we got there, the smoke was already on
the belt line...we still can't figure out how the smoke got on the belt.
Nobody—our boss can't figure out how the smoke got on the belt line.
We should have been able to go down and get out the belt.
Misunderstandings about where smoke should be was not confined to rank-and-
file miners.  The mine inspector who escaped with the 4 South crew at Brown-
field had a similar misconception.  Knowing that smoke was already in the
intake escapeway, the inspector checked the belt entry and found it to be clear.
The section foreman, after conferring with the inspector, decided to take his
crew down the beltline.  All the while, the inspector thought the belt entry would
be clear for the entire distance:  "I really believed that the belt entry would be
clear the entire way."
Some individuals, though, did think about why they were encountering
smoke in certain locations and reasoned what was causing the problem.  The
mine inspector who escaped from 4 South at Brownfield Mine hypothesized later
that a mandoor had to have been left open for there to be thick smoke in the belt
entry:
To this day we really didn't conclusively come up with an answer why
that belt got contaminated.  We checked the [stoppings].  I understand
[stoppings] do leak somewhat but not to go from no smoke to thick
heavy smoke in a matter of minutes.  [Stoppings] don't leak that much.
Someone left the doors open into that belt, also.  I believe it.
At least one miner at Brownfield Mine was thinking clearly about why there was
so much smoke in the belt entry.  He was traveling with his buddies from
5 South:
Thick smoke was in the belt lines before it was in the return...somebody
goofed and opened something and left that air in.  My opinion is that
somebody opened the doors right across [4 South] ramp.
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Finally, some miners at Cokedale Mine were perplexed by the way smoke
"behaved" in the mine air courses, especially the return escapeways.  Miners
escaping from 8 Face Parallels were traveling in the return escapeway that led
to Crystal air shaft.  The workers noticed that there were points where the heavy
smoke they were traveling in would suddenly lift and the air would become
moderately clear.  The miners might then travel several crosscuts in this clearer
air until they encountered heavy smoke once again.  A mechanic who was in the
group escaping from 8 Face Parallels describes this occurrence:
We headed out the return and  we had gotten so far and it cleared a little
bit, and we were kinda relieved, but then for some reason we hit the
thick smoke again.  It didn't clear completely but it looked like it was
gonna clear, but then we went a few more blocks and it got real thick
again.  Why it was clear in that area I'm not really sure.
Because the smoke behaved in this manner, miners experienced a false sense of
security when they reached the clearer air, only to find that the heavy smoke
would return as they continued their egress.  This undoubtedly helped to increase
workers' anxiety as they escaped from the mine.
Discussion
Research on human behavior in smoke has shown that (1) people not fa-
miliar with escapeways tend to experience higher levels of emotional instability,
and their ability to escape from a fire is severely reduced when the visibility falls
below 13 m and (2) subjects familiar with escapeways experience relatively
more problems with physiological effects of smoke, and their escape ability be-
comes hampered when the visibility falls below 4 m.  Fire research data indicate
that smoke reaches levels of untenability significantly earlier than it takes the
fire to generate a toxic environment due to its product gases.  It is only when the
levels of smoke begin to totally obscure visibility that the toxicity of the com-
bustion products begins to play a role in the question of escape and survivability.
Most of the miners who were caught inby the fires discussed here had never
escaped through smoke.  As a result, a number of workers experienced emotional
instability that resulted from the need to cope with smoke in their escapeways.
The psychological effects of smoke, in some instances, inhibited workers' ability
to think clearly, make correct choices, and take proper action during their
escape.  In addition to suffering emotional upset during their escape, a number
of miners also experienced some physiological effects of smoke, including
smoke inhalation and eye irritation.  In short, miners' ordeals in smoke when
escaping mine fires confirm the findings of the research.
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While underground miners must receive retraining annually on topics
including mine ventilation, escapeways, emergency evacuation, and the use of
SCSRs, it is evident that workers who escaped these three mine fires still were
not adequately prepared to escape through smoke.  In the future, mine operators
may wish to consider offering smoke training to their workers as part of their
annual retraining regime.  Miners could don an SCSR training apparatus and
then traverse a manmade network of corridors filled with nontoxic smoke.  This
type of training would allow miners to practice escaping through a smoke-filled
environment, plus experience breathing through an SCSR.
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CHAPTER 8.—WAYFINDING AND ESCAPE BEHAVIOR
The notion of wayfinding, as conceptualized by planners, geographers, and
psychologists, denotes the ability of an individual to move from one point to
another through physical space.  In order to achieve this movement, a person
relies on a cognitive map of spatial representations [Passini 1984].  Which
features of this cognitive mapping will be stressed depend, in part, on the re-
searcher's perspective.  A planner, for instance, would tend to emphasize the
effect of physical structures on mobility.  A psychologist, on the other hand,
might focus on individual differences in how human minds encompass and
represent physical space [Evans et al. 1984].  There is yet another dimension to
wayfinding that needs consideration, and it rests upon the idea that reality, as
experienced by human beings, is mediated:  "[People] have preselected and
preinterpreted this world by a series of commonsense constructs...which help
them find their bearings in their natural and socio-cultural environment and to
come to terms with it" [Schutz 1967].
These "common sense constructs" are arrived at socially and constitute the
agreed-upon schemas that guide people's everyday activities.  According to this
principle, cognition is governed by some nonlogical factors that reflect not only
individual procedures but collective ones as well.  These group strategies, which
are shaped by shared rules and values, influence "the information gathered, the
ways it is processed, the inferences that are drawn, the options that are being
considered, and those that are finally chosen" [Etzioni 1992].  From this per-
spective, cognitive maps, rather than being individual-centered templates of
environmental images [Rovine and Weisman 1989] or representations of spatial
relationships [Evans 1980], are partially group-centered schematic processes.
As such, they are subject to reinterpretation, revision, and outside intervention
[Kaplan and Kaplan 1982].
As intermediaries between the environment and behavior, cognitive maps
serve as bases for decision-making.  Traditionally, it has been assumed that good
maps facilitate correct decisions, which in turn leads to optimal performance
during wayfinding [Hunt 1984].  Given the argument that there is a social (non-
cognitive) facet to cognitive mapping, however, this image of a cognitive map
as some sort of static reference construct that motivates individual action is too
narrow and mechanistic.  If cognition involves less a knowledge of the environ-
ment than it does the process of "giving it meaning through imposing an order
on it" [Rapoport 1976], then wayfinding behavior is not just a function of setting
and individual differences, but is also a function of one's "normative-affective"
structure [Etzioni 1992].
Rapoport [1976] used such an assumption as the base for a set of hypotheses
about the connection between "external demands" and "organismic factors."
One significant assertion deriving from Rapoport's ideas is that environmental
139
knowing, the way people order their spatial world and act within it, is partially
dependent on "cultural habit."  Camic [1992], citing the 19th century French so-
ciologist Emile Durkheim, underscored this function of cultural habit by noting
that as long as an equilibrium exists between the environment and individual
dispositions, action takes place without much reflection.  That is because hu-
mans behave habitually.  Furthermore, these habits are external to the individual
since they are a product of socialization, and constrain people by imposing
customary practices upon them.
An interesting implication becomes apparent at this point.  Just as there are
supposed to be individual characteristics of spatial representations, there ought
to be cultural ones as well.  In other words, every social group will share some
distinct cognitive categories that help its members order the world conceptually.
While these "noticeable differences" [Rapoport 1976] may be more pronounced
between a simple society and an industrial nation, it is logical to assume that a
certain amount of taxonomic differentiation will also exist within a populace.
Even researchers who do not engage in cross-cultural comparisons can still
contribute to a greater understanding of wayfinding behavior by focusing on the
immediate cultural context within which spatial problems are defined and
solved.  This chapter intends to make such a contribution, while examining es-
cape activities during the three underground coal mine fires that are the subject
of this book.
The Mine as an Ecological System
In effect, coal miners spend their working days encapsulated in a gigantic
maze that may lie a thousand feet below the Earth's surface.  The floor of this
maze is composed of fire clay, its walls are unmined coal, and the ceiling is
made up of slate or shale.  The height of a particular coal seam determines if
workers must crawl from place to place or whether they will be able to stand
upright and move around freely.  Seam heights vary from less than 3 ft at one
operation to 12 ft (or more) at another.  In either instance, workers' environs are
well-defined and rigidly bounded.  This section contains a discussion of how the
process of extracting coal and the culture miners have created helps them make
sense of this environment.
Because underground coal mines are dangerous, rules have been promul-
gated to help support and protect workers.  For instance, Federal regulations
(30 CFR 75) require that a routine communication system be installed in each
mine.  This system must include a telephone (or some other two-way device)
connecting the surface with each working section.  The regulations also mandate
installation of automatic fire warning devices on each underground belt
conveyor.  These devices must furnish audible and visual signals at either of two
locations:  (1) all work areas where miners may be endangered or (2) a staffed
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location at which personnel have an assigned post and there is telephone or
similar communication with all workers underground who may be endangered.
Finally, the Federal code stipulates that underground operations have to maintain
separate and distinct passages, to be designated as escapeways, which are
properly marked by reflective signs and symbols.  There must be at least two of
these travelable escapeways, one of which is to be ventilated with intake air,
extending from each working section to the mine's opening.
While formal rules are critical, the most immediate source of support and
protection miners have is their workplace culture.  Social scientists recognized
early that work groups share some sort of informal structure, but have agreed on
neither its coherence nor overall importance [Roethlisberger and Dickson 1947;
Roy 1953; Stoddard 1968; Bryant 1972; Schwartzman 1986].  It has been argued
by those studying dangerous occupations, however, that a rather cohesive body
of beliefs, values, and behavioral norms exists in risky work settings.  Fur-
thermore, these cultural elements function to increase certainty of action by
subordinating individual will in order to realize larger group objectives [Hayner
1945; Janis 1968; Fitzpatrick 1974; McCarl 1976; Vaught and Smith 1980;
Smith and Vaught 1988].  These arguments are supported by the work of Kaplan
and Kaplan [1982], who pointed out that any culture, in order to be viable, must
be a mechanism for coping.  The three avenues through which culture should
provide a template for individual cognition, according to Kaplan and Kaplan, are
(1) relating people to ecological constraints in their environment, (2) guiding
interpersonal behavior by enabling one to anticipate his or her cohort's likely
actions in a particular situation, and (3) orienting members to the larger world
that they might be expected to deal with.
The ecology of an underground coal mine is one in which humans are busily
creating a void beneath the Earth's surface.  This act produces dust that is un-
healthy, because some of it is respirable and dangerous.  Explosive gases are
liberated during the mining process and water may seep in from disturbed
aquifers.  Additionally, massive forces brought to bear upon the newly exposed
mine roof and coal pillars present the possibility of cave-ins or floor upheavals.
Men and women work routinely in the face of these hazards, because they can
draw upon a stock of accumulated knowledge intended to help them control such
situations.  Mine workers believe that they will be able to grasp both obvious
and subtle cues about changing conditions and take action in time to prevent
mishap, which gives miners a feeling of mastery over their work environment
[Althouse 1974].
Workers underground recognize, of course, that nonroutine events do occur.
This is a major reason why they expend so much effort achieving mastery over
the social domain.  An elaborate unwritten normative structure has evolved to
ensure group cooperation and individual predictability in the mine setting.  The
details of miners' preoccupation with rules of interpersonal behavior and the
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ritualistic sanctioning mechanisms they invoke to enforce these norms have been
discussed in other publications [Lucas 1969; Althouse 1974; Fitzpatrick 1976;
Douglass and Krieger 1983; Smith and Vaught 1988].  The point to be made
here is that in this environment, as in others where group survival is problematic,
there is little tolerance for personal aggrandizement.  Rather, a lot of concern is
focused on the ideals of shared expectations and coordination of efforts.
The resulting consensus, based on workplace norms, implies that everyone
has approximately the same cognitive map of their underground world.  Ac-
cording to Kaplan and Kaplan [1982], such uniformity is of benefit to the
members of any culture because, as they put it, "Sharing and affirmation...lead
to conviction, which in turn reduces...the confusing."  This type of arrangement
is especially functional in coal mining, where section crews must labor as
cohesive units in order to perform their tasks safely [Vaught and Smith 1980].
Cohesion does not, however, imply rigidity.  It should be obvious that no cog-
nitive structure which did not provide a great deal of flexibility could serve as
a coping mechanism in the underground environment.  Thus there exists, on an
individual level, a tension between control and complaisance.  As will be seen
in the analysis, this contradiction is apparent when miners must draw upon
cognitive templates to devise escape strategies during emergencies.
How Workers' Ability Will Be Analyzed
It was stated in the section above that workers have roughly the same cognitive
map of their mine environment.  That is to say, each miner carries an internalized
representation of direction, distance and material structures, which allows him or
her to interact and work cohesively with others in the setting.  In an elaboration of
this notion that coherency is a requisite of crew functioning, workers' environ-
mental cognition was depicted as orientation not only in natural space, but in a
nonphysical or social one as well.  The process of wayfinding, then, may be char-
acterized as "purposeful mobility" [Passini 1984] during which spatial problems
are solved on the basis of systemic images.  Results will hence be discussed in
terms of how ecological constraints, interpersonal behavior, and conceptual
content affected information gathering, item processing, inferences drawn, options
considered, and choices made during the escapes under investigation.
Ecological Constraints
Ordinarily, the question of how to exit a familiar setting will have a straight-
forward solution based on environmental information recalled from past ex-
perience [Passini 1984].  In all three mines, the normal means of exit would be
travel by portal bus to the shaft bottom.  The fires, however, presented an
unusual factor:
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We had power on the mantrip, so we figured we can get out with the
mantrip.  We started out in the mantrip, got out so far, and we hit...
smoke.
Upon finding they could not evacuate along their normal course of travel,
workers were faced with the necessity of generating alternative escape routes.
It was this exigency that changed the behavior at all of these sites from a more
or less automatic series of responses to the known (or expected) into actual
spatial problem-solving activities.
Adelaide
A physical characteristic of the affected sections at Adelaide that had
wayfinding implications was the ventilation setup.  Because working sections
were being advanced farther from the main fan and there were a limited number
of intake aircourses going into the 2 Northwest area, it was decided to ventilate
active working places with belt air.  The operator requested and was granted per-
mission by the MSHA District Manager to make these modifications.  Require-
ments contained in the approved request were made a part of Adelaide's existing
ventilation, methane and dust control plan.  One of the requirements was that
management would install a carbon monoxide monitoring system and locate the
sensors in belt entries at distances of 1,000 to 2,000 ft (depending on air ve-
locity).  A second aspect of the plan allowed suspension of the requirement to
separate the belt and track entries with stoppings.  In actuality, this had only
been done on 3 Left.
At the beginning of 2 Northwest, it was the belt and track entries that carried
most of the air.  The belt was a high-resistence entry, however, and lost its air
rapidly.  Most of this air went into the track and an adjacent intake entry.  The
result was that perhaps as much as 60,000 cfm of air passed over the belt at the
fire site.  Also, the belt entry at that point contained a velocity of more than
1,000 fpm.  The fire therefore had enough oxygen to propagate rapidly, while the
smoke-filled air started dumping into the intakes within a few breaks.  Thus,
when workers inby the source of combustion began evacuating, they found that
not only their track but all intake entries had been contaminated with smoke.
One of the crew members from 1 Right found a novel use for some of the
lids that were discarded when everyone put on their SCSRs in the smoke:
And when we first started out I was picking up the lids...Every time we
would turn I would drop one of those orange lids.  Because I figure if we
get down there and we can't get out, because we didn't know where the
fire was, exactly...and we got to backtrack, I wanted to know where
I came from.  And if I find one of them lids, I know that I had been there
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and...follow my way back...I was saving them like Hansel and Gretl—
drop the little bread trail.
Another individual, the miner helper, made use of physical characteristics with
which he was familiar because he had worked as a fire boss for several years:
There was guys walking up this bleeder—the old bleeder...[There] are
reflectors in there. They were following the reflectors. I told them,
ignore the reflectors, because you're going to get lost.  I said, "Keep the
stoppings to your left."
By using the stoppings to maintain their orientation, the group was able to travel
their left return to an area outby the fire.
The 2 Northwest crew had comparatively little trouble finding their way,
since their face boss was very familiar with the area.  Because they did not know
the fire's location and were in such thick smoke, however, there were times when
they had problems.  The former mine rescue team member recounted the effect
this smoke had on even one as experienced as he:
But from my experience...I thought...we were walking right into this
fire...I started to get a little upset, a little tight...And in our returns we
have reflectors...And it's a good idea if there's no smoke but...you ought
to have something in there to grasp a hold of [to] tell you...if you're
going the right direction. You fall down and you get up and you get
turned around, you know, if somebody doesn't know where you're going,
you could be crawling around down there.
Some of the group, being new to the section, had not walked their escapeways
and were dependent on either being able to see the reflectors or having someone
to help them:  "I wasn't up on that section [very long] but I know that big man,
the boss, knew how to go and I figured I'm sticking with him."  It was the face
boss who kept everyone together and led the group out.
3 Left, as mentioned previously, did not have belt stoppings all the way up.
As the crew was on its way out, they "just hit a wall of smoke" and had to stop
the mantrip.  The group first went into their intake escapeway and, when they
encountered smoke after traveling only a few breaks, got into their return:
When we got to the return, why someone just took off, you know, never
waited on anybody...They panicked and got scared...That's the worst
thing in the world to do...Everybody should stick together and then
there's everybody in one place...They know where you're at; they know
if you're strangled out there.
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The men who "just took off" were four buddies who had worked on that section
for several years and, as a result, knew the area well:
We were all...together because we're all real familiar with that escape-
way...So we were more or less in the front, leading the way and the
foreman was back with some of the other people and I'm not sure who
was in—at dead rear...We were the ones that were picking the
escapeway out.
Those who had gone ahead were also the ones who balked at crossing the
overcast located at 3 Left junction, according to the face boss:
I could see lights coming back at me and they said they couldn't make
it over those overcasts; there was too much smoke.  So we started back
because I noticed the 3-by-3 door in the return.  So I wanted to get back
into the intake.  Well, I couldn't find that 3-by-3 door and I knew I didn't
want to start running around in circles.  So I sort of collected myself and
we started up over an overcast in the return and in the...sidewall of the
overcast there was a 3-by-3 door and one of my men opened it up and
said, "This is the intake escapeway."  So everybody went out into the
intake escapeway...We started walking and we were in the intake
escapeway but something didn't look right to me...Around vacation time
they had dug the sump and you had a path—as you come out your intake
escapeway, the slate's on your left side and the path's on the right side
and...I'm walking along and I started thinking something's wrong
because that damned slate should be on my left side, not on my right.
When he realized his crew was headed back into 3 Left section, the face boss
decided to get back in the return.  The crew discussed their next move, then trav-
eled to the overcast once again, where, upon opening the mandoor into their
intake this time, the boss felt air movement on his face and was able to de-
termine which direction the group should go from there.
Brownfield
A physical factor that affected group escapes from locations inby the fire at
Brownfield was a double set of doors in the 4 South supply chute.  A door in the
second set was open to a width of approximately 6 ft.  A locomotive parked in
the chute had been left with its controller set on first point.  When the motor
overheated, smoke passed through the open door into the intake aircourse of
6 West Mains.  In a short time, the intakes of 4 South and 5 South were
contaminated as well.  This forced all miners inby the source of combustion to
evacuate through moderate to heavy "white smoke."
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When smoke was discovered coming up the intake into 4 South, a Federal
inspector who was on this section quickly checked the belt entry.  The inspector
and face boss decided to go out that way, because the belt was clear.  Within a
few hundred feet, however, the group encountered smoke on the belt.  After
donning their self-contained self-rescuers, the crew continued on down the belt
line.  The face boss began looking for a way out of the heavy smoke:
I knew there was a crosscut—on 5 South it cut down into our belt line,
and I knew there was a wall there with a door.  I thought, well, maybe
if we got to that door and went through it, maybe it would be clear in
there.  That was just a future longwall face area; [there wouldn't] be
much smoke in it...So it got to the point where you had to feel the rib,
you couldn't see.  You might see water line.  I was feeling the rib just to
find out where that crosscut was and finally found the crosscut.  We
went up through the brattice door.
The face boss and three men who were with him paused to get their breath and
formulate a plan for exiting the mine:
I told them since the smoke was in the belt line...and track, we were
going to have to get over into 7 aircourse [of 6 West] Main on the other
side...Maybe that one was clear. That's where I told them we would
probably be heading...And [the smoke] was all heavy, so we continued
across the main and we got out into the track area and it was the same
out there...There was no door to go over into...the intake on the other
side.
Unable to get into 6 West right intake, the face boss and his companions decided
to travel outby in the track entry.  After going four or five blocks, they found
themselves past the burning locomotive:
I'm kind of glad there wasn't a door at 7, 'cause...I guess they opened the
door on that right side to help clear the smoke out...I would have been
worried if I had gone to 7 and saw smoke on that side, too, 'cause then
I would have known [mistakenly] we'd have a long way to go to get out.
In the next several minutes, the face boss was joined by others from 4 South and
learned that his miner operator was down up the belt line.  He then went back
after this individual.
Although the 5 South group started to evacuate by way of their intake es-
capeway, they only traveled a hundred feet before deciding to enter the belt
entry.  Unlike the crew from 4 South, however, they did not stay there.  After
proceeding approximately 400 ft with the smoke increasing in density, the group
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came to a steel door:  "I don't know his name, the bratticeman, he was first.  He
went into the return."  The smoke was lighter here, so everyone continued down
their return until they reached a regulator at 6 West left-side return.  At this point
the miners donned their self-contained self-rescuers.  According to the face boss,
his crew was somewhat strung out by the time they had gotten outby to the
5 South intake overcast:
A couple guys had already come out and went over this way trying to
get to this door.  'Cause this is the belt line, track entry, then [6 West
right] intake.  In my opinion, they did the right thing, you know, trying
this way.  But then they got out to this intersection here, they couldn't
see...anything, so they turned around and come back to the door.
The face boss then decided to make an attempt to reach the 6 West right-side
intake himself.  Telling those with him to wait, he opened the door and went into
the belt entry.  The smoke was so thick he ran into the belt.  The face boss
crossed it and came to a second door:
I opened this door and the power center's setting here. I couldn't even
see that from the door...Right then, I tell you, panic hit, believe me.
'Cause all the teaching and training, everything, these are all supposed
to be separate splits.  Well, the first thing that goes through your mind
is everything's burning.  In my opinion, there was no sense even trying
to get [to the right-side intake], so I come back.  There's a bleeder pipe
that goes from this overcast over to the power centers and that's how
I found my way back over here.  They waited for me.  They made up
their minds that they was going to wait 10 minutes for me and then go.
When I come back, the smoke was getting a little bit heavier in the
return...I said, "You guys want to try to make it over there" and before
I said much more...the bratticeman said, "We're ahead of the smoke!
Let's go!"  Well, right then—well, everybody seen the smoke here.
That's when there was not much control, you know, and everybody
started just going.
One of the masons, who thought his SCSR was not working properly, took it off
and threw it away.  The face boss helped him don his filter self-rescuer.  The
group, with "everybody stringing out pretty good [by] then," passed across the
overcasts at 4 South, the face boss checking doors as they went.  He came to a
door outby the fire area, opened it, and found fresh air.  The boss called
everyone back and they went through that door onto the track.
A maintenance foreman working on 6 West took the fire boss's call.  He then
gave himself an advantage over members of the other two groups by discovering
the fire's location:
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And I knowed I had to go down past 4 South here...I was the only one
out of all the guys that knowed where the fire was...And the reason for
that is I took and asked [the fire boss] where the fire was.
The maintenance foreman, a mechanic, and a State mine inspector met at the
beginning of the intake escapeway.  The three men donned their SCSRs at that
time because they could see light smoke coming up the intake.  The group
traveled down to 8 Left aircourse, where they encountered heavy smoke.  About
50 ft past that point, unable to see, the maintenance foreman decided to
backtrack:
The smoke was so heavy you couldn't even find the mandoor at the
overcast.  But I knowed if I went up one more crosscut and I went up
along the rib pretty close and went into the left and then come back a
crosscut [I'd get] into the return.
The men did this and went through a door into 6 West main return, which was
their alternate escapeway.  They proceeded outby in that entry:
And we was probably halfway between 5 South and 4 South whenever
I heard the 5 South crew coming.  I heard them coming over the
overcast, and then I was relieved a little bit because I knowed that boss
coming with that crew was real familiar with the mine.
Knowing that the fire was at the 4 South supply chute, the maintenance foreman
continued in the lead.  He passed up a mandoor that would have brought his
group into clear air outby the chute, however, and was called back by the
5 South face boss.  The 5 South and 6 West groups then entered the intake and
from there proceeded out onto the track.
Cokedale
One particular physical characteristic of that area of the Cokedale Mine where
both affected crews were located proved to have a significant impact on everyone's
wayfinding behavior.  The primary (intake) escapeway, which in most mines
would have extended "separate and distinct" to an air shaft or portal, led instead
onto Cokedale's main haulage track.  Since the source of combustion was on this
track, that meant the escapeway could rather quickly become smoke-filled.  If any-
one possessed a clear picture of the layout and was able to communicate this fact
to his group, no time would be wasted on attempts to evacuate down the intake
entry.  Without knowledge of the source of combustion, however, this primary es-
capeway should be the first choice.  Thus, what might have been a minor com-
ponent of even the most comprehensive cognitive map became critical in this case.
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After encountering smoke on their section track, the group from 8 Face
Parallels held "a small discussion as to where we were going to go, what we
were going to do."  A trackman, who had just delivered a load of rails to the area
but who was unfamiliar with that part of the mine, recounted his reaction when
those supposedly more cognizant of their immediate surroundings began to
consider going out the intake escapeway:
According to the old laws they didn't have to [route] it to the shaft and
this fell under [the old laws] since it was an old established section...
And that stuck with me, and when they decided they were going to walk
the intake, I specifically said to [the general foreman], "We can't go out
the intake."
Regardless of this warning, the accounts show that "it was the consensus of
everybody [to] head for the intake."  Additionally, the decision seems to have
been based not on any stock-taking but on a generalized training protocol that
suggests miners should always travel their primary escapeway if possible.
A problem arose immediately because "nobody seemed to know how to get
into the intake escapeway from where we were out at the mouth of the section."
The general foreman mentioned above, who had been leading this group
initially, decided to "go back [and] get into the intake from the face." The
workers then returned to the section in order to enter their primary escapeway.
Everyone walked across the face area, got into the designated intake entry, and
proceeded down it until "we came to an overcast and as we walked over top of
the...steps, you could see on the other side the smoke was coming in the intake."
At about this time "the guys started...making the decisions on what to do,"
although there was still little discussion taking place.  Since there was only one
way out of the smoke—back up the entry to the face—the miners, led now by a
trackman, retreated in that direction.
Once again on 8 Face Parallels section, the group was faced with yet another
decision.  Given the general instructions miners receive in training classes,
"naturally the next thing would be...the return [secondary escapeway]."  Their
choice was made fairly quickly, and, while appropriate under the circumstances,
did not get translated into proper action.  In fact, a procedural error was com-
mitted, further compounding the crew's earlier decision error:
So we decided to try the designated return, at which point [the general
foreman] did not know which was the designated return.
We headed out...on the right side and...went five or six blocks and...one
of the guys up front noticed there's no arrows; we're in the wrong return.
We're not in the return escapeway.  So then the bratticeman from the
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section, he said, "Oh, yeah—that's on the other side of the section."  So
then we turned around.
For the second time, then, an important item in at least one person's cognitive
map was disregarded, causing the men to travel an additional thousand feet
before ending up back where they had started from.
Regrouping in the face area, several workers decided to gather information
before beginning the next attempt to find their way out.  An individual
remembered the section map, which had been hanging in their dinner hole:
I stopped and got the map, read the map, and two other guys...they
stopped and was reading the map with me and...what we wanted to do
was see where it brought us out...and once we...saw where it brought us
out...we knew the smoke was coming down there so we knew...the fire
had to be fairly close.
Reassured by this knowledge,  the miners entered their designated return es-
capeway and, led by a general inside laborer who had once been a foreman,
finally started their ultimately successful exit from the section.
Those on 7 Butt had a somewhat different experience.  According to a gen-
eral foreman who was with this group, "we all started out at the same time...and
we ran into that wall of smoke [on the track]."  When they ran into the smoke
they also collided with a stopped vehicle.  As a result, one person lost his hard
hat and cap lamp.  He was assisted by his buddies as the general foreman
gathered everyone and planned their next step:
I [had] set all the ventilation up down there and I knew basically what
was going on with all the smoke. The intake escapeway would have
been full of smoke.
Informed by his cognitive map of the area, this individual was able to depict for
these miners some of the features that would be affecting their intended escape.
He first told crew members the location of a mandoor they should go through to
get into one of their return entries.  Next, the general foreman assured everyone
that they would encounter less smoke by taking his course of action.  Finally, he
provided a preview of their route:
The return that we started going out was not a return escapeway; it was
just a return airway. I told them...we go through the mandoor, follow
[the return entry], ...cross over the overcast, check the doors up there...
get into the return escapeway and follow it up to [the portal].
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Thus, the workers all had at least a limited notion of where they were going and
how long it would take to get there.  As the crew walked, the general foreman
was able to keep them updated:
Everybody was asking me where we were...what direction we were
headed.  And with the information that I had...I knew first-hand...what
direction we were headed, ...where the mandoors were, ...[our] location
[in reference to] the motor road...and where I was gonna bring 'em out.
With these reassurances, the miners from 7 Butt were able to stay together and
exit their section in an orderly manner.
Interpersonal Behavior
Overall group performance largely depends on how well group members can
play their assigned roles.  In nonroutine situations, difficulties may arise if som-
eone who normally holds a leadership position is not prepared.  The same may
be said of a person who, because of his or her experience or expertise, is con-
sidered to be "mine wise" but who does not use that wisdom.  Workers still look
to these people for guidance.  This complication stems from the fact that roles
which people enact during an emergency, instead of being expressly different
from their typical roles, are existing ones that have been carried over and
tailored to unusual circumstances [Best 1977; Johnston and Johnson 1988].
Worker accounts reveal clear differences in behavioral patterns within and
among the eight groups under discussion here.  This section addresses some of
the ways these and other social phenomena began to have a bearing upon
individuals' use of cognitive maps and their subsequent wayfinding activities.
Adelaide
The section foreman on 1 Right had been recalled only recently to Adelaide.
While this might not have been too detrimental to his performance of duties at
the face,  he encountered difficulty when he had to extend his leadership role
into emergency circumstances.  The miner operator explained his attitude toward
the boss's performance:
The boss; I can't blame that boss...This was the first time he was on the
section in 5 years; he'd been laid off...He...didn't actually know just
where to go, but [the utilityman] was a fire boss at one time, so more or
less...took the lead.
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The utilityman, who was working as 1 Right's miner helper that night, initially
wanted to lead this group through the bleeder system to Peterson shaft:
I told them if we get [back] in the mantrip and...go back to 35 stopping
or 36 stopping, there's a door in a left return. I said, "You can walk
across the bleeders to Peterson shaft."  I said, "Let's all get in the
mantrip, we'll go back, and we'll get out of the mantrip, we'll call and
tell them that we're getting out and we're walking to Peterson; they'll
have a mantrip waiting for us at Peterson."...We was standing by the
mantrip, but they wouldn't get in it.
Having failed to convince his coworkers to backtrack, the utilityman then began
acting as advisor to the face boss and crew:  "I don't know...They say I [took
charge] but I don't think so...I just knew where to go...that's all."  Regardless, the
accounts show that this person's recognized "mine wiseness" and relationships
with other crew members played a significant part in how his group found its
way out of the mine:
And when we walked down through here, you had to watch because if
you followed the reflectors, you'd end up in this bleeder here or in the
gobs, because they had reflectors. And [the utilityman] kept telling
them, "Hey! Keep the stoppings on your left.  If you veer off, you're
going to end up in a bleeder or gob."  So twice he had to say, "Hey!
No, no!  You're going the wrong way."
Thus, the utilityman apparently used his fire bossing experience to compensate
for the face boss's lack of familiarity with the area while refraining, in his view,
from actually assuming control.
On 2 Northwest, the section foreman moved quickly to control the situation,
drawing upon the experience of one of his buggy operators, who had been a
mine rescue team member:
We got everybody together and [the boss] said, "You take the back, I'll
take the front...we're going in single file...Don't let anybody in back of
you...and we'll keep everybody together."  The boss took control...He
told them, "This is what we're going to do."  There was no, well, I think
we ought to go here; I think we ought to go—we knew what we were
going to do...where we were going...I had confidence in him; everybody
did...And he had confidence in...me...being from mine rescue.
The behaviors of both individuals were consistent with their roles.  2 Northwest's
face boss was familiar with the area and continued to direct his crew.  The buggy
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operator performed according to certain expectations of his mine rescue role.
This group escaped without undue complications.
Leadership roles on 3 Left shifted during the course of their escape, with
individuals making suggestions or taking the lead at different moments:
I was the first one in line going over the second overcast and when
I seen that smoke coming up out of there, it was so bad, I told everybody
in line, "There ain't no way in hell I'm going...I'd rather have it coming
in my face [than] at my back."  And we got back into our intake escape-
way and had the smoke coming in our face.
Some of the miners attributed the vaguely defined leadership in this group to
panic.  Another, and perhaps better, explanation stems from the fact that 3 Left
was a "split crew."  Some of the miners were buddies who had been on the sec-
tion for several years and knew the escapeways well.  Others had been there only
a few days or weeks and were unfamiliar with the section.  They were left be-
hind by those who could more readily find their way.  Unlike the foreman on
2 Northwest, who was able to take the head of the line because of help from a
person well-versed in mine rescue procedures, the foreman of 3 Left found it
necessary to stay with the workers who were having trouble.  His ability to con-
trol the escape was therefore hampered.
Brownfield
There were two individuals on 4 South who possessed not only a certain
degree of "mine wiseness," but who were also in authority positions:  the face
boss and a Federal inspector.  As the group proceeded down their belt line, some
members began to get ahead of others.  The inspector broached this problem to
the face boss:
I said, "Those guys are getting ahead and I don't think we can slow them
down. Someone better travel with those guys."  There was never any
discussion on who was going to go with them.  I said, "Why don't you
go down there and go with those guys and run them ahead and I'll stay
with these guys."  I knew the mine quite well so I didn't have a problem
with where we were going or where the aircourses...[were].
Later in the escape, however, the inspector encountered difficulties of a different
sort.  One of the two workers he was with (the miner operator) became unable
to continue.  The inspector's knowledge of the mine, combined with his lack of
information about the fire's location, presented him with a predicament.  Should
he continue his helping role or leave the victim behind in order to save himself?
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I knew we were in the belt entry, but I didn't know where we were as far
as getting out to the main but here again, not knowing where the fire
was, I didn't know how far we had to go once we got to the main.  Once
we got to the main...if we had to travel in smoke, I knew it would be at
least another hour to get to the portal.  So it started to concern me, the
time element and getting out of this section.
The inspector did not immediately make a decision to depart.  Rather, he kept
trying to assist until the victim himself suggested the others leave:
He looked at the mechanic.  I saw him look at the mechanic and he said,
"You guys go. You just leave me here.  I can't go no more.  I'm just go-
ing to stay here."  I looked at the mechanic and I said, "I got to go.
There is no sense in me staying...I can't breathe now...I can send
somebody back.  I'll go out and get somebody.  If it's only out to the
main track, there will be somebody, I hope, out there.  I can send them
back and I know exactly where you're at..."  Even when I told this man
I thought I was out of air, I got to go get help, I was still carrying an
extra self-rescuer and I guess I had taken enough smoke...I didn't realize
I had it.
The mechanic, left alone with the miner operator, soon became convinced there
was nothing further he could do:
I didn't know my way out of there.  I lost all orientation how to get out
of there.  I knew my way out, but I forgot.  It was just a panic thing...so
anyway, I thought, "Well, [the miner operator's] not going to make it;
I'm going to try and get out.  So I started out and I was only about a
hundred foot from [the miner operator] when I came through the
overcast and I opened the door and I saw No. 7 and I thought, "Good.
This is fresh air...the way out."  I thought I was out to the track, but
I was only into No. 4 aircourse.  So I thought, "Well, I'm going back in
and get [the miner operator].  I'm this close, we're going to get out of
here."
Buoyed by his mistaken belief that the victim was only a hundred feet from fresh
air, the mechanic went back to renew his rescue efforts.  He was soon joined by
the face boss, who brought two replacement self-contained self-rescuers.  The
face boss informed both men that fresh air was just 500 ft away.  The mechanic
and face boss then got the miner operator on his feet and supported him as all
three made their way outby the burning motor.
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The workers on 5 South stayed close together during the first part of their
escape.  When asked how much planning was done before they left the face area,
the section foreman replied:
Actually, there was no real planning until we got down to this regulator.
We put our self-rescuers on, then we got down and couldn't get out here
[into 6 West right intake]—then everybody knew they was going down
the return. Everybody knew where they were then...and there is no turns.
Everything's straight in that return.
The section foreman finally came to a "void" in the smoke where he spotted the
door that led into fresh air.  He then shouted for those group members who had
gotten ahead and the crew all exited into the intake and from there into the track
entry outby the fire source.
The maintenance foreman who took the mine examiner's warning call on
6 West asked him where the fire was located:
Well, he told me there was a fire at 7 Left ramp.  He didn't know what
was burning, because he couldn't get in to it.  But I knowed how far
I was from 7 Left and I traveled as fast as I could to beat it.  Only you
don't beat those things.  I found that out real quick.
The maintenance foreman reported that he walked ahead of the mechanic and
State mine inspector who were with him, looking back frequently to make sure
they were keeping up.  There was little discussion among the three, because the
maintenance foreman was familiar with the area and knew what point the group
needed to reach in order to be outby the fire.
Cokedale
One early problem for 8 Face Parallels (8FP) stemmed from the fact that
Cokedale's dispatcher, whose functions may be envisioned as somewhat akin to
those of an air traffic controller, did not inform everyone of the fire's location:
He was trying to call the other section right away.  So...I can
understand...what he has to go through trying to call everybody and try
to get them out, call the DER [State enforcement agency] and everything
else.  He got his hands full.
Worker accounts indicate that the resulting uncertainty heightened this crew's
confusion and indecisiveness.  Where they would ordinarily look to management
for direction, the miners had a general foreman who was as confused as they
155
were.  Additionally, given Cokedale's authority structure and work rules, an
alternative leadership mechanism was not in place—one had to emerge.  This
emergence was a process negotiated over an extended period of time, seemingly
at the expense of efficient wayfinding behavior.
It has already been stated that by the time 8FP began its final attempt to exit
the section, the workers were being led by a general inside laborer who had once
been a foreman.  Researchers reached this conclusion by weighing various
responses to questions about who was actually making decisions at certain points
during the escape.  While there was much agreement in everyone else's accounts,
the general inside laborer himself had a slightly different interpretation:
At that point in time me and [the boss] was close together—there was
nobody right there that could hear what I was saying.  I say, "I didn't
bring the map, [but] we have to go out this return."  Being as [the boss]
knows me, it was more a mutual agreement...He respects my knowledge
from mining and I respect his so...that he understood more or less what
I was talking about—that...we were running out of time.  That wasn't the
time for no argument.
Thus, this worker cast himself in the role of advisor, deferring as much as
possible to his general foreman's authority and legitimate leadership position.
Also, the general inside laborer presented himself much the same way during
interactions with his buddies:  "I was not in a foreman capacity, but I could see
things going on that was wrong...so I would say, 'I sure wouldn't [do that].'"
Eventually, the crew traveled outby to their section air regulator and
stopped.  At this point the general foreman decided to explore ahead.  The gen-
eral inside laborer chose to accompany him, so both men went through the
regulator and proceeded some 100 ft farther outby:
You could see 50 feet and then you couldn't see 2 feet...[I thought] there
was a stopping blew out [or something] because [the air was] all mixed
up no matter which way you turned...[The boss] said, "We can't lose the
smoke this way."  I said, "We have to go through this—go out the
return.  Smoke or no smoke...we can't keep changing our minds...else
we'll be here forever."
After regrouping, the miners did continue out their return through smoke that
kept varying in density.  This phenomenon concerned the general inside laborer
as he tried to orient himself, because "if something happened at one point [and]
you walk six, seven, eight hundred feet, then you could be in a better situation
or a worse situation—but that wasn't happening."  The smoke's behavior con-
fused everyone, and, as one motorman observed, caused a few individuals to
waste time looking for ways out of it where there obviously were not any:
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We would come to places in the return where the bleeders were and
people would actually go and look over the wall at the bleeder—for
what purpose, I don't know...maybe they weren't familiar at all with
what the return looked like or whatever an old bleeder would be.
It was this person's opinion that the aimless search for alternative routes as they
traveled could have been curtailed by more forceful leadership.
Even though the men were wearing emergency breathing apparatus and were
not supposed to remove their mouthpieces, they did so in order to communicate.
As the general inside laborer's comments suggest, crew members seem to have
kept up a running commentary regarding their location:
Somebody mentioned..."We're going parallel to the track..."  I'm
thinking, "Boy, that's a bright deduction after we walked all this way—
whoever said that's really thinking.  If we ain't parallel to the track, we're
in a lot of trouble...what the hell's wrong with these people?"
What was wrong, in the motorman's opinion, involved a circumstance of past
experience and perspective:
Now I found...out after[ward] that the older fellow had worked in those
returns off and on [setting timbers] and things like that...But...one old
entry looks like another one...as far as I'm concerned.
The men therefore drew upon each other for support and continued to speculate
about their progress, since "we still didn't have the slightest idea where we were
or how long [we had been walking]."
The general inside laborer checked behind mandoors as the group came to
them.  He eventually located one that opened into fresh air on the loaded track.
The miners crawled through onto this track and began to get their bearings:
My buddy immediately recognized where we were. He said, "We're
between 18 and 19 crossover."  Because he'd run motors out there for so
many years...he could recognize where we were...We gathered our-
selves. The elation was just unbelievable.
After resting a few moments the crew members made their way over to the
empty track and up it to 19 crossover, at which point they joined with workers
escaping from 7 Butt.
It has already been stated that the people from 7 Butt did not have as many
problems finding their way as did those from 8FP; nor did they waste time trying
to go out their intake escapeway, because the general foreman with this group
knew where that entry led.  The workers still encountered some difficulties,
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however.  At one point, according to several accounts, the pace quickened
almost to a run.  This proved particularly stressful for that individual who had
lost his hat and lamp in the vehicle collision and was depending on his buddies
to lead him:
My buddy in front...I held onto his belt all the way out...I followed their
lights plus held onto his belt...I lost him a couple of times.  I kept
yelling...'cause everybody was running—everybody was in a hurry.
Aside from aiding their coworker, who began to "get excited," these miners' big-
gest concern was staying together and keeping themselves oriented.  Although
there was little talking reported among this crew in comparison to the miners
from 8FP, several still queried the general foreman about their location as they
traveled.
The group proceeded out their main return, with the general foreman
checking through mandoors to see if they had yet reached a point where there
was fresh air in the track entry:
Every time he would check a door he had us stop to cut our breathing
down a little bit, which was nice—everybody kinda got a little rational...
I think we had to check maybe two or three.
The workers came finally to a set of double doors situated between 18 Face and
19 Face:  "It...probably took about an hour, but...you weren't doing anything or
really thinking 'cause it was just basically following the leader at the time."  The
general foreman led them through these doors into clear air, across the loaded
track entry, and into their intake.  The men walked outby to 19 crossover, where
they met 8FP crew.  Following a head count and brief telephone report to the
outside, these combined groups continued toward 20 Face, where mine
management had arranged mantrip buses to take everyone to a portal as yet
unaffected by smoke.
Conceptual Content
As Kaplan and Kaplan [1982] observed, "humans are inclined to be painfully
distressed by confusion and by helplessness."  When they experience this anguish,
people most commonly resort to authority, either social or cultural.  Social
authority involves the positions held by individuals and their expertise in playing
roles incumbent to a certain position.  Cultural authority is derivative, following
from widely shared beliefs and values.  An essential function of authority, in
whatever form it takes, is to convey certainty in an uncertain world.  Thus, a great
deal of human effort is spent interacting with others for the purpose of evoking
authority in an attempt to achieve clarity and agreement upon matters that would
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otherwise be disturbing or even disruptive.  Such was the circumstance at the three
sites under study here.  This section presents a brief overview of various ways in
which the miners strove to reach a consistency of perspective.
Adelaide
It was stated earlier that the utilityman on 1 Right suggested the crew, once
they encountered smoke on their track, retreat to 35 or 36 stopping and walk
across the bleeders to Peterson shaft.  Evidently, he did not argue his point; at
least, this is what one of the roof bolter operators remembered:  "Well, he kind
of mentioned it, see, then he just left it go."  A missing piece of information, and
one that, in the opinion of the bolter operator, would have predisposed the group
to follow the utilityman's suggestion, was the fact that 2 Northwest had been
forced to abandon their mantrip near the mouth of 1 Right:
When they got into the intake...they called the dispatcher and told him,
"Hey, we're going in the intake.  The smoke is too heavy at the mouth
of 1 Right."  So when we called the dispatcher and told him we're going
in the return, he should have told us that 2 Northwest stopped down at
the mouth...the smoke may be too thick down there.
Instead, the 1 Right group, thinking they might soon be out of the worst of the
smoke, entered their return and traveled in increasingly worsening conditions.
According to one of the shuttle car drivers, the group engaged in some
discussion of where the fire was probably located:
We were going to try...getting to Peterson, but we didn't know exactly
where the fire was.  We thought that the fire was at 3 Left.  No. 2
transfer, the low spot, there's always a bad place the belts fall in and
everything else.  So that was our idea...I wished we knew where the fire
was for one thing.  It's like you're going into the unknown; you don't
know exactly where you're going.
Near the end of the crew's escape, this individual, recognizing his location from
a series of overcasts he had helped construct, left the group.
After the members of the group from 2 Northwest abandoned their mantrip,
they walked back into the face area in order to reach their intake escapeway:
The boss, he said, "We'll be all right."  He said, "Everything'll be fine as
soon as we get up into the fresh air."  So we was scooting along pretty
good and went back up the track, went over to the intake...It was smoke.
There wasn't any fresh air there.  So that was the point there where we
all put on our rescuers.
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The crew proceeded down their intake for a short distance and then decided to
get into the right return.  According to one of the roof bolter operators there was
not a lot of conversation, although group members engaged in stock taking
during rest stops:
Yeah, we stopped different times—one guy fell down.  I pulled him
back up.  He fell down.  He was a little red and hysterical there a little
bit of the time.  And we stopped and the boss talked to him and calmed
him down.  We stopped periodically if anybody was having problems.
We'd stop and check.  Not long, but long enough to talk and see where
to go and calm down.
The right return was designated an alternate escapeway, so all that was required
of the 2 Northwest crew was that they stay in that entry until they were outby the
fire.  Because group members did not know the fire's location, the face boss, who
was leading, would feel and open each mandoor they came to.  At last he opened
the door in No. 3 stopping and encountered fresh air.  The bolter operator quoted
above was one of the first through:
I know I went through it and hit that fresh air and I was hollering at the
other ones, because they was kneeling down there taking a little break.
I told them to get...over here and get out of there.  We appreciated that
air more than you ever did.
After contacting the shift foreman and notifying him that everyone had gotten
off 2 Northwest, the face boss was given instructions to take his crew to the
surface.
The crew from 3 Left contained some members who had not been on the
section for very long.  One of these was the bratticeman who, because he was
new, had been selected recently to walk the escapeways:
I walked that the first day I was there, 3 weeks before.  My boss
wanted—he comes to me and says, "I want you to walk out with me and
I want to get a couple of other volunteers to walk out.  So you'll know
in case something happens."  But it's kind of—when you're walking out
and you know there's nothing wrong, you're just strolling through
because you have to do it.  You know the reflectors are up there so you
really don't pay attention to the markings or anything other than the
reflectors and what door you go through; you know, where you go out.
At one point the group became disoriented and was actually headed back into
their section.  The bratticeman recounted how this confusion raised the miners'
anxiety level:
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We went down this breakthrough and we couldn't go through and we
come back, we come back like around the block and we got confused
and we sort of all just grouped together in one place trying to decide
what would be the best way to go out...We were walking down—we ran
into our shift foreman who said at six more breakthroughs, five or six,
make a right and you'll be out of this.  That's when the two guys that
always seemed to be ahead really took off.
One individual who was having problems received help from the utilityman,
a shuttle car driver, and the shift foreman who had been looking for them.  The
crew finally reassembled outby the fire and found transportation to take them out
of the mine.
Brownfield
4 South's face boss was able to take advantage of the Federal inspector's
presence during that group's escape:
So we started down the belt line and there was three guys that wanted
to take off. They ran like deer...I was trying to stay in the back being the
last one to make sure everybody was ahead of me.  And it got to the
point where I could see these guys were going too quick.  The Federal
inspector was back there with me, too, and I finally told him, I said that
if he would stay with the slower three guys or four guys, I was going to
go ahead with those faster guys, 'cause I didn't want them to walk into
something that they weren't ready for.  I walk that belt line every day...
I didn't know what we had down there.
Near the mouth of 4 South the face boss led those workers who were with him into
a future longwall face area.  His intention was to get them out of the worst of the
smoke and give everyone a chance to catch their breath.  At this point he outlined
the route they would take to try to get into the right-hand aircourse of 6 West:
So everybody got settled again and we went back out and worked our
way down the belt line.  It was a slow process.  The smoke was so heavy
you just couldn't see.
The group members eventually arrived at 6 West track but were unable to find
a door that would let them into the intake entry they were trying to reach.  At
that point, one miner left the others:
My supplyman, he had gotten ahead.  He took off again.  He was the
quickest one of the bunch, so when we got out into the high track,
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I called for him 'cause I didn't know—he could have took a left, took a
right, fell down, I wouldn't have seen him.  So I yelled—that's when the
people down below the fire yelled that there was fresh air down that
way.
After getting his small group outby 4 South supply chute, the face boss learned
that his miner operator had not made it out.  He then went back into the smoke
in search of this individual.
A rapid pace was set by the bratticeman, who was leading initially as
5 South crew made its escape.  One of the roof bolter operators recounted how
this put stress on everyone else:
To the best of my recollection, the bratticeman just took off running.
He says, "Come on—we got to get out this way."  And he took off.
Well, he took off and he was leading the pack, okay.  When we got
down to where the regulator was at and put the self-rescuers on, that's
when [the boss] took over.  One of the things I told him later on, I says,
"You're the boss—one thing you got to do if this ever happens again,
you should have a man that's in charge that's going to take his time and
walk out of there slow and easy with his self-rescuer on."...[You go] six,
seven, eight hundred feet before you even try to put one of them things
on, you're winded.  [Then], it's like trying to suck through a straw.
A shuttle car operator also discussed the difficulties group members were having
getting enough oxygen from their apparatus.  Added to this concern was the fact
no one knew the fire's location at first:
So we went and then we run onto three other guys coming down from
6 West, too, which was the maintenance foreman and an inspector—and
a mechanic.  Yeah.  And then they told us where the fire was at.  But we
was still up away from where it was at a good bit.  But they told us it
was down at—what was it—4 South—4 South sidetrack where the
motor was sitting.  But we had to go down below that, so then we had
an idea how far we had to go, so it took a little bit of the pressure off
'cause we knew we was going—we had a pretty good chance now.
5 South crew, together with the three individuals from 6 West, eventually came
out onto the track one door down from the burning locomotive.
The maintenance foreman on 6 West intended originally to ride out in his
three-wheeled jitney.  He was dissuaded from doing so, however, by the State
mine inspector accompanying him:
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Well, it could cause an explosion, he said, for one thing.  I mean, I was
on the damn thing and so was [the mechanic] when he says no.  I know
one thing—if it ever happens again and there's something to ride...I'm
riding.
The fact that he knew how far his group must travel in order to get outby the fire
influenced this person's approach to their escape.  During their walk out, the
maintenance foreman kept an eye on his two companions and made sure all three
stayed together.
Cokedale
The workers from 8 Face Parallels apparently kept up an almost constant
stream of communication.  At first, conversations were directed toward assuring
each other that nothing much was out of the ordinary:
The dispatcher started calling us, and...said that they had detected some
smoke and that we should come out.  Well, this isn't real uncommon
because...belts or something might burn off a pump or...you can get a
hot hanger once in a while.  So at that point we really weren't all that
concerned.
People's tendency to treat a nonroutine situation as normal until it is no longer
possible to do so is a well-documented phenomenon [McHugh 1968].  This fits
well with the notion that human beings have a predisposition to impose order on
their world as a way to minimize uncertainty.  However, in events needing a
quick response, critical time may be lost.  This is especially true in cases where
there is an effort to reach group consensus before action is taken.
As the escape off 8FP progressed, miners' talk shifted from efforts to nor-
malize their situation and focused instead on a need for cohesive performance:
The older man...said, "Why don't you guys stay right here, and [we] will
take a walk up through and just see if...it looks passable."  So those two
proceeded to walk—I couldn't tell you how long they were gone...And
they came back and they said, "This is definitely the return, and I think
we can get through, so we should try it."
To bolster this endeavor, which the workers were unsure would be successful,
they used various interpretive strategies [Kaplan and Kaplan 1982].  Chiefly, the
men seemed to seek information about their location and progress, even though
these actions did not always appear to make sense.  A couple of cases in point
are the motorman's account of people looking over into old bleeders and the
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general inside laborer's bemused reaction to an observation that his group was
walking parallel to the track.  Additionally, however, some individuals imputed
expertise they did not have to someone else.  For this group, their authority
became the general inside laborer, who had once been a boss and who had
"worked in those returns off and on."
7 Butt personnel were less distressed during their escape because there was
a convergence of formal authority and expertise in the general foreman who led
this group out.  These workers seemingly devoted more effort to dealing
internally with their predicament than in information seeking:
I felt pretty confident...because I knew [the general foreman] had been
up there for a long time walking returns and this and that and he was
real familiar with this area.
Having someone in control, as they did, enabled group members to pose al-
ternative scenarios based on properties of individual cognitive maps:
If I would have been left to my own devices, I knew that I could have
made it out following the track.
This activity undoubtedly had a calming effect on the person, but may also have
helped each worker establish a better grounding in relation to his environment
and how it could be negotiated.
Both groups, in essence, utilized strategies that differed according to their
circumstances.  The 8 FP group focused more on information exchange and a
search for authority; the 7 Butt group tended to deal "intrapsychically" [Kaplan
and Kaplan 1982] with the situation that confronted them, getting their heads
straight by talking to themselves.  In this event, the effects of social dynamics
can be seen in those coping mechanisms used.  It is thus arguable, given these
divergent patterns of interaction and reaction, that individuals' conceptual con-
tent was shaped by their shared experience.  Such a notion takes cognitive
mapping and wayfinding beyond the psychological domain and situates it within
a broader social science perspective.  Also, this paradigm focuses on group
effects rather than positing personal differences as a variable of interest.
Discussion
What can be gained from introducing a diverse level of analysis to the
problem of wayfinding? First, it opens up a new realm of possible questions and
answers.  As Simmel [1971] pointed out, each level of the social world provides
valid insights, but can only be understood in terms of its own unique rules of
evidence.  Second, since the escape behavior discussed above clearly took place
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in a group context, an individual differences approach would lack explanatory
power when applied to wayfinding in that situation.  Clearly, broader analysis
is needed in relation to these mine fires.  By considering the cultural and social
milieu of cognitive mapping and wayfinding behavior, social scientists will be
able to more readily explain how people in crisis go about deciding what to do
next when more than one person is likely to have input into the decision.
Several key points about wayfinding and cognitive mapping have been
raised in this chapter.  First, the way human beings make sense of their
environment is, according to some theorists, socially mediated.  In other words,
people's definition of even the most taken-for-granted elements, such as time or
distance, is a result of group consensus.  Thus, mental maps are not wholly
idiosyncratic constructs.  Second, cognitive mapping is a dynamic process.  The
map one has in his or her mind can be acted upon by forces both internal and
external to the individual.  As a wayfinding tool, then, a cognitive map acts
mutably rather than in some mechanistic fashion.  Personal decisions about a
best course of action are therefore more problematic than they have sometimes
been portrayed as being.  Third, it has been suggested that some settings in
modern society may be characterized by a sameness of cognitive maps.  This
would help to ensure predictability in situations calling for close coordination
of action.  Finally, wayfinding is a spatial problem-solving activity in which
factors external to the individual (such as ecology and interpersonal relations)
have a significant impact upon outcomes.
 The purpose of applying certain theoretical notions to real-world problems
is to attempt a better understanding of some empirical phenomenon or
phenomena.  In the present case, the issue to be understood is how workers go
about moving from one point to another in a mine fire.  The approach used here
should be highly generalizable, however.  It is hoped that in the future, more
attention will be paid to those intersubjective factors once thought to have little
bearing on such "intrapsychic" processes as cognitive mapping.  Social scientists
may benefit from new avenues of inquiry.  In addition, planners and engineers
would almost certainly gain by having a deeper understanding of what variables
motivate the behavior of those who inhabit their structures.
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CHAPTER 9.—LEADERSHIP IN ESCAPE FROM
UNDERGROUND MINE FIRES
This chapter explores leadership behavior in a life-threatening situation—
fire in a coal mine.  Previous chapters have discussed the database of interviews
with miners who escaped from underground fires.  Researchers raised questions
such as:  (1) Who led the miners out of the mine?  (2) Did leadership make a dif-
ference in the escapes?  (3) Was the escape leader the hierarchal leader?
(4) What, if any, characteristics did the escape leaders possess?  Subsequently,
researchers analyzed the mine fire database from a group interaction perspective
to address the leadership questions posed.
Leadership has been one of the most researched topics of human behavior
in the twentieth century.  Studies have ranged from individual characteristics of
leaders, to situational leadership, to interaction of leader and follower, sug-
gesting different leadership techniques for different followers.  The question that
emerges here is:  Are there different types of leadership that "fit" different kinds
of situations?  In a crisis situation like that examined in the present study, such
information about leadership may significantly improve the chances of escape.
To address these issues, the study team looked at the formal authority
structure before each fire, considered leadership behavior or lack of leadership
during the escapes, and examined those conditions associated with the emer-
gence of leadership.  According to Bardo [1978], "Emergent behaviors are those
forms of action, and the norms, values and beliefs governing those actions, that
rise out of the disaster situation."  This chapter discusses previous studies in the
area of crisis leadership and examines the emergent behaviors of leaders under
duress during the mine fire escapes.
Previous Studies
The research on leadership during emergency situations has consisted
mainly of simulation and field studies, with the principal concern being escape
from building fires.  During the 1980s, Hayashi [1988] created a computer sim-
ulation model to evaluate leader behavior in a fire.  Although his purpose was
to aid in planning for disaster prevention, his findings are relevant because they
address the issue of situational leadership in crisis—where a leader changes his
or her behavior to fit the situation.  Essentially, his simulation model was de-
signed to judge the actions and thinking of leaders.  The simulation was tried by
101 subject/leaders 4 times each.  The simulation consisted of a maze containing
the leader, an informal leader, and 50 evacuees.  Interestingly, the results in-
dicated that the leader's actions were not dictated by circumstances.  Any differ-
ences in behavior were attributed to the individual characteristics of each leader.
The study also showed that the worse the situation became, the less individual
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differences emerged.  Hayashi thus concluded that an evacuation plan should not
be based or rely on circumstance, but should consider the anticipated behavior
patterns of leaders.
Sugiman [1984] and Misumi [1988] conducted field tests comparing two
evacuation methods:  the Follow-Direction Method and the Follow-Me Method.
The studies took place in an underground shopping mall with volunteer escapees
and confederate leaders.  In the first method, the leader indicated the direction
of the exit in a loud voice and by bodily gesture as he moved toward the exit.
In the second, the Follow-Me Method, the leader told a few evacuees to follow
him and then actually proceeded to the exit.  To make the evacuation more
complicated, two exits were set up, one not visible from where the evacuees
were located.  In addition, the lights were turned off and a siren sounded for
20 seconds before evacuation.
In the first study, the researchers found that the Follow-Me Method
evacuated people more quickly than the Follow-Direction Method, because a
multiple number of small groups formed around each leader.  A followup study
focused on leader-evacuee ratio, presuming that the formation of groups would
be different if there were fewer leaders.  It was concluded that when each leader
had a small number of evacuees (a 1:4 ratio), the Follow-Me Method was more
effective than the Follow-Direction Method.  With fewer leaders and a large
number of evacuees, e.g., a 1:8 ratio, the Follow-Me Method was not effective
because the instructions from the leader did not reach every evacuee.
Misumi and Sako [1982] analyzed leader behavior in emergencies using a
laboratory simulation with one confederate leader and four naive subjects.  Re-
sults showed that if the leader first attempted to reduce tensions and then in-
dicated the direction to take, the subjects followed more closely than if the
sequence of behaviors was reversed.  These authors concluded that panic is re-
duced by introducing appropriate leadership.
Hodgkinson [1990] noted that panic typically influences behavior in fires.
He defined panic as nonsocial, blind, irrational behavior.  His research into al-
most 1,000 fires, however, found that most people acted appropriately; a mere
5% behaved in such a manner as to increase risk.  Johnston and Johnson [1988]
studied the behavior of workers in the 1977 Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in
Kentucky.  They supported Hodgkinson's work in the conclusion that panic is
not "automatic" in a disastrous fire and that groups can indeed adjust to meet the
increased demands of a crisis.
Sime [1983] noted that most models of escape behavior support the panic
model of "every man for himself."  The panic model says that people will revert
to highly emotional, primitive, self-preservation behavior.  Researchers generally
have concluded that individuals will panic and try to save themselves at the ex-
pense of others only when a situation is extremely threatening.  The panic model
"assumes that escape will involve a homogeneous population of individuals
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concerned with self-preservation, competing with each other for limited exits"
[Sime 1983].  An alternative model studied by Sime focused on affiliation
behavior during escape from a building fire.  His affiliative model predicts that
"individuals with close psychological ties will attempt to escape in groups of two
or more" [Sime 1983].  The affiliative model predicts that in life-threatening es-
capes individuals will be concerned not only with self-preservation, but will
experience a heightened concern for other group members.
It is clear that there are two different schools of thought on group interaction
in crisis—panic:  "every man for himself" versus  affiliation or attachment:
"united we are safer."  During a simulation study [French 1944, in Sime 1983],
subjects were left in a room and after a short period smoke was leaked into the
room.  The results showed that organized groups of sport teams responded more
quickly to the appearance of the smoke than unorganized groups.  The presence
of other people, and the type of group threatened, influences responses.  Further,
it has been suggested that attachment or affiliative behavior has survival value
[Bowlby 1973, in Sime 1983].  The function of attachment behavior is in gaining
proximity, and consequently, protection from the threat.
Sime studied the 1973 fire that occurred at the Summerland seaside leisure
complex in the United Kingdom.  Of 3,000 vacationers, 50 died when a fire,
started by 3 boys playing with matches, engulfed the solarium area.  Five hun-
dred accounts of the event were collected by police.  In analyzing the data, Sime
targeted four areas:  group membership, attachment at cue (cue:  signal of the
fire), nature of cue (example:  ambiguous, unambiguous), and affiliation at exit.
The results strongly support the affiliation model.  Sime concluded that:
In an entrapment setting people maintained as far as possible their ties
with close relatives during escape.  In normal evacuations people are
likely to maintain primary group ties.  These psychological ties will be-
come even more important rather than disappear in a fire emergency.
Kelley et al. [1965, in Sugiman and Misumi 1988] demonstrated the im-
portance of the emotional aspects of panic.  Subjects were placed under a time
pressure and could avoid an electric shock by depressing an escape switch which
only worked if other members of the group were not pushing theirs.  The re-
searchers showed that a sign from one or more subjects indicating they would
wait for others to escape increased the number of successful escapes for the
group, i.e., cooperation increased the chances for effective escape.  Hodgkinson
[1990] recognized that the interaction among people is important when there is
a choice of exits because people tend to follow the route others are using.
Familiarity behavior in disasters seems to extend beyond affiliation and
escape routes.  Johnston and Johnson [1988] hypothesized that disaster roles as-
sumed by individuals within an organization are extensions of the ordinary,
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everyday roles they normally perform.  Johnston and Johnston were interested
in what organizational roles could be expanded to include disaster-related
responsibilities.  They concluded that the routine roles of individuals were ex-
tended in a crisis and thus the social order was maintained.  Canter [1990] ech-
oes this thought:  "The social behavior and cognitive processing of individuals
stays remarkably close to what can be seen in ordinary, daily behavior."  Thus,
familiarity with organizational roles affects the ability to survive.
Abe [1976] analyzed the behavior of survivors and victims of a fire in a de-
partment store in Japan.  He discussed three behavior patterns each, of survivors
and victims.  The analysis concluded that survival behavior can be more effec-
tive with prior knowledge of an area.  The research also found that people often
return to the familiar and to habit in times of crisis (e.g., they will return to a
familiar area).  This supports Sime's finding that the tendency of individuals and
groups to head towards a familiar route is likely to increase during fires.  Abe
noted that, in a crisis situation, people lose flexibility.  In addition, Abe found
that in an unfamiliar place, under dire circumstances, many subjects decided that
the only and best thing to do was to follow the person in authority.  In this par-
ticular department store fire in Japan, this was an unfortunate decision that
resulted in the deaths of many subjects.
Although the majority of research has been on individual behavior under
stress, with group interaction as a secondary research focus, there is some
information on what happens to formal organizations versus small groups under
stress.  Driskell and Salas [1991] suggest that organizations under stress tend to
centralize authority.  Decisions move to the upper levels of the hierarchy.  A study
of small groups under stress, however, found the opposite phenomenon:  the group
leaders and group members became more receptive to information from others.
The research on the concept of leadership is vast.  As Warren Bennis noted,
"Of all the hazy and confounding areas in social psychology, leadership theory
undoubtedly contends for top nomination.  And, ironically, probably more has
been written and less known about leadership than any other topic in the
behavioral sciences.  Always it seems the concept of leadership eludes us or
turns up in another form to taunt us again with its slipperiness and complexity
[Smyth 1985]."
Holsti [1990] wrote a chapter on crisis management in the book
Psychological Dimensions of War.  Although the focus situations of the text
were political crises, not natural disasters or fires, Holsti's observations about
leadership in crisis are a propos to further understanding the leadership concept
as it applies to escapes from mine fires.  The author cites observations of leaders
in action that "appear to confirm the conventional wisdom that in crisis decision-
making, necessity is indeed the mother of invention."  In the mining industry,
most underground workers can attest to the necessity of "invention" on a daily
basis in their dangerous work environment.
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In a study on perceptions of leadership traits, Morris [1991] compared ado-
lescent and adult leaders.  He concluded that "integrity and knowledge or skills,
are traits of leadership highly valued" and that "effective leaders have positive
identities."  He characterized them as self-assured, self-actualized, honest, open,
and trustworthy.  Another valued trait was knowledge or skills.  The adults in
this study considered consistency and flexibility important components of lead-
ership, a finding that suggests a practical, pragmatic, and realistic approach to
problem-solving situations.
In conclusion, the research on leadership during crisis has shown that (1) the
importance of studying leader behavior patterns [Hayashi 1988], (2) leaders can
have a calming influence and be instrumental in helping others avoid panic
[Misumi and Sako 1982], (3) panic is not automatic and indeed individuals have
a tendency to follow the prevailing social order [Hodgkinson 1990; Johnston and
Johnson 1988], (4) people tend to follow the routes of others and familiar paths
[Hodgkinson 1990], (5) attachment/affiliation may have survival value [Sime
1983], (6) cooperation contributes to successful escape [Sugiman and Misumi
1984], (7) people lose flexibility in life-threatening situations [Abe 1976], and
(8) information/knowledge can be significant to survival [Abe 1976].
Finally, it is important for the reader to recognize that simulation exercises
on human crisis behavior raise ethical issues.  Exposing subjects to the threat of
electric shock, or an appropriate degree of threat to evoke the panic and fear
necessary for accurate data collection is a concern in this type of research.  Fur-
thermore, disaster circumstances are unpredictable.  Subjects who have faced
some type of threat subsequently must be questioned carefully because of the
possibility of emotional trauma coloring their responses.  In analyzing the data
from the mine fires, researchers focused on the behavior and characteristics of
leaders from the view of the survivors, official reports, and circumstantial data
evaluated after the event.
Profile Characteristics
In the three mine fires studied, there were eight groups of miners that es-
caped.  For each group, a profile of leadership in crisis emerged from the
analysis of the eight mine fire escape scenarios.  The data suggest several
characteristics based on the behavior of the leaders.  The leader of each escape
may be described as an aware, knowledgeable person or as an individual who
is alert to his environment, attentive, and discerning.  Typically, this person
notices details—more so than do other people.  The researchers believe that this
quality of discernment probably is not limited to the mine environment or to
crisis circumstances, but is a typical characteristic of these individuals in all
circumstances.  Such persons may also excel at incidental learning.  Each of the
leaders retained information that was instrumental to the escapes.  They
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"remembered" specific details and repeatedly referred to the fact that they
"knew" what they were doing through information or deduction.
A second generally shared characteristic of the leaders was the manner in
which they took charge.  In groups where the regular authority led workers out
of the mine, leadership was a natural evolution of group dynamics.  It was a
continuation of the social order before the fire.  A similar dynamic occurred,
however, in groups where a definite leader emerged.  These emerging leaders did
not "muscle in and take charge"; the leadership developed in a natural way.
Third, the leaders were decisive, yet flexible.  They made decisions; yet if
circumstances changed they adapted.
Fourth, leaders were open to input from others.  There is evidence that in
most of the escape groups there was a "second lieutenant," an individual who
offered worthwhile suggestions, support, and who served as a "sounding board."
In instances where there was emergent leadership, the leader usually began in a
consulting function to the regular authority.
Fifth, effective leaders seemed to have a calming effect on their group.  They
were aware of others' fears and offered reassurance when it was needed.  Miners
in each group had confidence in the leader's ability to direct them to safety.
Finally, there was a logic to the leadership.  Decisions were appropriate and
congruent with available information.
Findings
Each of the group escapes was unique, but some consensus crisis leadership
characteristics emerged.  Technical descriptions of each of the eight escapes are
contained in appendix A.  Specific details relative to leadership issues are dis-
cussed and supporting evidence for the profile addressed above are organized
according to section and mine.
1 Right - Adelaide
This group was a production crew with a new section foreman who was un-
familiar with the affected area of the mine.  In fact, the night of the fire was his
first night back in the mine after a 5-year absence.  In addition, at least three
members of the crew were new to the section.  While each of the new members
had many years of experience in mining, all had been assigned to this crew for
only 3 weeks.
The foreman, although the authority figure, did not lead their escape.  His
behavior was initially appropriate in that he assembled everyone and called the
dispatcher with a proposed escape route.  He also called back to the dispatcher
when the escape route was changed.  As the group entered heavy smoke, the
foreman simply did not have the knowledge base to make appropriate decisions.
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The group was accepting of the foreman's inability to lead in the situation
because it was obvious he could not possibly have the appropriate information
on his first night back at the mine.  The miner operator from the section gave his
view:  "The boss, I can't blame the boss.  This was the first time he was on the
section in 5 years."  A utilityman from the section expressed a similar sentiment:
"It wouldn't have been [the boss's] fault, it was [his] first day in the mine."
 It was also clear the crew was protective of this authority figure:
I'll say he [the boss] did all he could.  He did the best he could.  He led
us, you know, to the fresh air escapeway.  He made sure we got through
into the return.  But as far as being well-versed in the mine, I don't
know.  There again, I'd really rather not have to make a statement.
On the night of the fire, a former fire boss was working as the continuous
miner helper on this section.  The position of fire boss had required him to travel
throughout the mine, thereby becoming familiar with the mine layout, including
the escapeways.  As the group's escape progressed, this former fire boss emerged
as the leader.  Interviews with other members of the group documented this lead-
ership.  The former fire boss began his emergence as leader by consulting with the
authority figure, the section foreman, making suggestions and advising on
alternative actions.  The fire boss viewed himself as working with the foreman.
When directly asked in his interview who led the group out, he responded that
although probably the other members of the group would suggest he did, actually
he and the foreman led the group out.  A bratticeman indicated that the fire boss
"was saying what we could do" and the foreman was "like making the decisions."
When asked if there was any confusion among the men about leadership, the
bratticeman said, "It was pretty much follow [the fire boss] and the boss."
After sizing up the situation, the fire boss suggested that the group might
escape by traveling through the bleeder entries to Peterson Shaft on the other
side of the mine (see figure 2.1).  This suggestion was not accepted by the group,
and he chose not to push the idea.  Instead, the fire boss explored other possi-
bilities with the group.  His behavior at this point indicates decisiveness and
flexibility of thinking in crisis.  The fire boss said:
You know, I was thoroughly against going down it.  But like I said,
I knew, you know, I wasn't going to go by myself down there.  If I'd
have had to, I would have.  If I'd just been by myself, I would have went
across.  But I knew half them guys would want to walk right into a
bleeder.  I knew they would...and so I stuck with the guys.
In short, the fire boss tried to get the miners to go deeper into the mine to
explore another exit, but because they had only one frame of reference—to "get
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out"—they could not conceptualize going farther into the mine.  The continuous
miner operator said "[the fire boss] wanted to go back but nobody said, yeah,
let's do that.  I think their main concern was, let's get out."
At this point, the group entered the left return airway of the section.  Just
after getting into the return, the fire boss had trouble with his self-contained self-
rescuer (SCSR) and told the group to go on ahead, figuring that they would
know where to go from there.  A few moments later, several members of the
group got lost by following reflective markers they thought led to an escapeway,
but in fact marked a bleeder entry examination route which led to another part
of the mine.  The fire boss had to reassemble the group and told them:
Keep the stoppings to your left...if you don't see one, go over till you do
find one, and then always have the stoppings to the left of you...I told
them, ignore the reflectors, because you are going to get lost.
This advice is an example of this leader's awareness of the mine environment.
It was clear by the conclusion of the group's escape that the fire boss was in
charge.  When one miner did not come out into fresh air with the rest of the
group, it was the fire boss who said "we will go back for him" and went back
into the smoke with two other miners to look for their missing buddy.  "You
couldn't see nothing...They [two other miners] said they wanted to go back with
me.  So we went back."  Because of the thick smoke, the fire boss told the two
miners with him to hang on to a water pipe as they worked their way back to
where they believed their buddy became lost.  At strategic locations, the fire
boss positioned the other two miners with him so that they would know where
to make turns to get back out.  Again, he took the responsibility of leader, uti-
lizing his knowledge and giving directions.  Everyone in this group successfully
evacuated the mine, even though the missing miner followed another route of
travel with which he was familiar.
2 Northwest Main - Adelaide
This group, a production crew, was alerted to the fire, gathered together
under the foreman's direction, and rode the mantrip until they entered heavy
smoke.  At this point, the foreman decided to take the crew back to the section
and over to the intake escapeway.  As they proceeded out the intake escapeway,
they encountered smoke again.  The foreman then led the crew into the right-side
return aircourse, which was also the secondary escapeway.  Again the crew en-
countered smoke.  At this time they donned their SCSRs and proceeded out of
the mine on foot through the return escapeway.  This crew epitomized the value
of correct procedures in evacuation and basically escaped without incident.
A bolter operator from the section summarized the group's experience:
174
We were about as organized as you're going to get.  We did real good.
We have a mine rescue man that's been on mine rescue for years.  He
was with us.  He's our buggyman and we had the boss and the mine
rescue man set it up, the boss in front, he was in the rear.  The crew was
in the middle.  Worked fine, no problem at all.
The authority figure, the section foreman, was the leader and worked with
the "second lieutenant," the individual with mine rescue experience.  The crew
viewed "the boss and the other guy" as the leaders, and the two men saw them-
selves as working in tandem.  When asked who made the decision to put on the
SCSRs when they ran into smoke the second lieutenant answered:
Well, like I say, ...maybe we hit it together, simultaneously, let's say,
hey, ...we got to get these people on their oxygen now!
The only problem this group experienced occurred when the miners put on
their SCSRs.  One miner felt his SCSR was not functioning.  The leader dealt
with this problem by offering to trade SCSRs.  The continuous miner operator
described the situation:
That one guy was nervous.  He didn't think his worked right.  I remem-
ber the boss saying, well, do you want mine then?  Because there was
nothing much the matter with it.  He was just being nervous.
Another man became panicky when his rescuer also appeared not to work.  The
second lieutenant calmed him, blew into the apparatus to start it, and said, "It's
just like kissing you, you old bastard."  The leader also made the group slow
down so that they did not need as much oxygen and would not overwork the
apparatus.  A bratticeman described his experience:
And it seemed like the harder you used, you know, it seemed like you
wasn't getting the right amount of air out of them.  But then [the boss]
said, just slow the pace down.
This knowledge of the operation of the SCSRs and consequent adaptability of
behavior is a quality of an aware individual.
The leader's behavior also had a calming effect on the crew.  This calming
was evident in the interviews with the subjects from the group.  When asked if
the group stopped along the way, several miners commented:
Yeah, we stopped different times—one guy fell down.  I pulled him back
up.  He fell down.  He was a little red and hysterical there a little bit of the
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time.  And we stopped and the boss talked to him and calmed him down.
We stopped periodically, if anybody was having problems.  We'd stop and
check.  Not long, but long enough to talk and see where to go and calm
down.
And like I said, the boss, between him and whatcha-call-it, he more or
less kept everybody level-headed, you know, like, well, at least not have
no panic and everybody take off, you know.
The boss said, "We got to put these (SCSRs) on fellows.  This is no
drill.  Put them on but everybody stay calm, and we'll just take our time
and we'll walk out.  We'll be all right."
We all stuck together real well.  You know, if I got too far or [the miner
who] was with me, he'd get out in front of me and if we got too far, the
boss or somebody just said, take a break and the one guy was having
trouble and he said you know, that he needed to rest some and we just
stopped and rested with him.
The leader of the group who was also the authority figure was decisive, logi-
cal in his leadership behavior, had a calming influence, and was knowledgeable.
All members of this group evacuated the mine without undue difficulty.
3 Left - Adelaide
Most members of the production crew making up this group had been
working together for some time.  There were three new members on the section
the night of the fire, but each was an experienced miner who had worked in other
sections of Adelaide Mine.  A utilityman who had been with the crew since the
section was started noted:
We had some people come and people go, but the majority had been
together for at least probably 2½ years.
Despite their history of working as a crew, these miners did not escape as one
cohesive group.  Instead, they spread out forming a fast subgroup, a slow sub-
group, and by the end of their evacuation there were two miners in the middle.
After learning of the fire, the section foreman warned the crew and they
gathered at the dinner hole.  At this point, most of the miners did not think that
they were in danger:
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That did come up, how it (the belt) could catch fire when it wasn't
running.  You know, but still that hasn't sunk into us that it was burning
that hard.
In contrast to other groups where the foreman attempted to calm the miners
during the escape, this foreman tried to impress upon the group the seriousness
of the situation.  According to the utilityman:
The foreman said, "Hey, look, this is serious shit.  You know, we got to
get out of here."  And then everybody started saying, well, maybe it is
burning that hard.  But it was still hard to believe it was.
The crew began their escape by traveling outby on the mantrip.  When they
encountered  smoke in the track entry, the miners got off the mantrip, distributed
the SCSRs, and planned on going into the intake escapeway.  At this point, some
miners "took off" and the group began to separate.  One miner commented:
They started passing the self-rescuers out and everybody just started
taking one and that's how...we got spread out.
The front group saw themselves as leading the way:
So we were more or less in the front, leading the way and the foreman
was back with some of the other people...We were the ones that were
picking the escapeway out.
When the miners hit smoke in the intake escapeway, they moved to the right
return aircourse which was the secondary escapeway, but still had to contend
with heavy smoke.  The crew continued down the return and crossed one over-
cast.  At a second overcast, the group experienced fear beyond that of any other
escape group:
I was the first one there.  I had like one guy on either side of me, walked
up there to the overcast and I stepped right into it.  And it was like a
black wall.  It was like burning fifty tires and trying to walk through it...
And I said we can't go that way.  So we walked out and there was
some—I know there was doors in those overcasts.  I said, the intake's
here someplace.  All we've got to do is find it.  And you'd open up the
door and it'd just billow out; and you'd open up another door, and it
would billow out.  And that's when we had a little team meeting; that's
when people really started getting tight.  It was like, which way do we
go?...And I remember asking the foreman as we opened up the door, it
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looked like it was a black river running by.  That's how thick it was.
And I said, "Was that the intake?"  He said, "Yeah," and—it's not real
registered in my head—I remember, "It can't be!  It couldn't have burned
through already!"
The amount of smoke in the intake and other aircourses led the miners to believe
that all exits were blocked by fire.  In this case, knowledge about the mine and
its ventilation patterns hindered rather than helped those miners with this
information.  It was later discovered that a door had been left open and the
smoke was not following the usual mine ventilation pattern.  At the time of their
escape, however, the crew had no way of knowing this and logically assumed the
fire was blocking all exits.
The group then walked back into the mine, toward the faces, searching for
a door into another entry.  Near the mouth of the section, the miners in the
became lost.  The miner operator said:
We got confused and started going back into the section till we run into
the first door and we just made a complete circle and come right back
to that main overcast again.
It is important to note that the boss was not in the lead when the group got lost;
the group in the front had gone off in the wrong direction.
The crew stopped, realizing that they were lost.  The foreman probably
figured at that point that the fire was between the crew and any chance of
escape.  With a door left open, the smoke was entering areas of the mine that
"made no sense."  In this situation, the foreman's knowledge of the mine con-
fused him because seeing smoke in the return indicated to him that the whole
mine was on fire, or at least fire was blocking all of the exits.  It appears that this
analysis made him too upset to make a clear decision on the direction to travel.
The miner operator yelled at the foreman, telling him to calm down so that he
could think about their escape:
Then I myself told the boss—I said, "[Boss], get your composure and
get us the hell out of here.  We're all scared you know."
The miner operator continued, explaining that at this point the section foreman
pulled himself together and demonstrated his knowledge of the section and his
awareness of his surroundings, saying:
"This pile of dirt shouldn't be here."  I think he said right or left—I don't
remember—but he said, "This pile of dirt shouldn't be here."
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This information was all that was needed to point the group in the right
direction.
After getting back on track, the front subgroup took off again.  The section's
utilityman seemed to take charge of this subgroup to some degree.  He was the
individual who initially asked questions and made suggestions ("Can't we do
this, can't we do that?") and potentially could have filled the "second
lieutenant's" role, but did not.  Instead, this person went with the faster miners
and left the foreman and slower people behind.
As mentioned before, the front group saw themselves as leading the way.
The slower group, however, did not see it that way.  The miner helper said:
I told them come on, why don't you guys wait for...One of them said,
"This is every man for himself."  People were scared, do you know what
I mean?
One of the bolter operators commented:
Everyone was together.  Then when we got to the return, why someone
just took off, you know, never waited on anybody.  They panicked and
got scared.  That's the worst thing in the world to do.  Everybody should
stick together.
Toward the end of the escape, one of the roof bolter operators was having
a great deal of difficulty and the slower group stayed behind with him.  The
operator's buddy described what happened:
I was the last one in line and [the bolter operator], I don't know how old
he is, he's probably between 55 and 60 years old.  I don't know, but
I could hear him starting to have trouble breathing in his device (SCSR).
And it sounded to me like he was hyper-ventilating himself.  He was
trying to out-breathe the device.  That's what it sounded like to me.
I talked to myself, this man is going to go down and when I started to
think that he did go down.  He fell onto the ground and I spit out my
mouthpiece on my unit and I hollered as loud as I could, I need help
here.  This man's down.  Only two people came back.  I said there was
either 9 or 10 of us going out in a single-file line and I was the last and
I hollered as loud as I could and only two people came back.  That was
the boss and [another miner].
This splitting of the crew resulted in two miners finding themselves in the
middle, between the faster and slower groups.  Neither heard the bolter operator
call for help and did not know a man was down.  These miners continued on, as
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did the faster group, unaware of the problem behind them.  All of the miners
eventually continued out to fresh air.
The section foreman, the authority in the group, started out in control but
eventually lost it and never recovered the authority position with his group.  The
utilityman characterized the foreman as:
Excitable...yeah...but he's not to the point of panic or anything like that.
He still keeps his composure about it but he's kind of a high-strung guy.
That would be more of a term to put on him.
Continuing later in his interview, the utilityman said:
I do remember the boss was quite excitable and I remember the miner
operator telling him, "Now, you're a foreman.  Get your shit together.
Now where the hell are we at?"
Instead of any one person fulfilling the role of leader, various members of
the group displayed some of the characteristics of a leader.  The foreman took
control of the situation initially and used his knowledge to get the group back on
track after they had become lost.  The utilityman seemed to assume some leader-
ship of the faster subgroup and directed them to don their SCSRs.  When the
foreman seemed to be losing his ability to make logical decisions, the miner
helper calmed him down.  At another point, one of the bolter operators took the
lead and went to explore the way over an overcast.  A bratticeman on the section
that shift, one of the two miners in the middle, assumed the role of assisting the
other, who was older and having some difficulty.
The dynamics of the escape for this group were foreshadowed when the
SCSRs were distributed and people simply took off.  One group member
explained the lack of discussion saying:
Our crew, most of them have a good bit of time in the mine and it was
just—as soon as we run into smoke, that was the first thing everybody
thought, get into the escapeway.
Throughout the escape, no one person was looked to as the leader.  When
queried as to who was making the decisions, the miners of this group provided
various answers, resulting in no consensus.
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4 South - Brownfield
This group consisted of a production crew plus a mine inspector who was
in the section the day of the fire.  The authority figures in this escape group were
the section foreman and the mine inspector.  As it happened, these two
individuals knew each other and jointly led the escape.  The section supplyman
commented:
The boss and the inspector was there, and they were discussing which
way to go—which would be the best way to get out.  So they decided it
would be down the belt.  We all went down the belt.
This group, like the 3 Left crew at Adelaide Mine, had a split escape but with
dynamics and leadership characteristics dissimilar to those of 3 Left crew.  The
major problem in the faster group, led by the foreman, was with breathing
through the SCSRs because they were moving so fast.  The slower group, led by
the inspector, had a miner who experienced breathing problems and was
continually falling down.  Toward the end of the escape, he fell a final time, was
left behind by the other miners, and was later rescued.
The foreman felt and assumed responsibility for the men but was
strengthened by the support of the inspector. An indication of how well the two
men worked together is found in both of their interviews.  The inspector, when
asked who was in charge, replied:
I didn't feel like I was in charge, [he] is the section foreman but anything
either of us said or did, I've got a lot of respect for [him].  I know [him].
Anything he said I didn't question.  Anything that it appeared I said, he
didn't question and anything that either of us said wasn't, like I said,
there was never once any talk.  Even when it came down to who's going
to go with the fast men and who's going to go with the slow men, there
was never no discussion.  It was just one of us said what we'll do, and
we did it.
Commenting on his leadership role, the section foreman noted:
Well, I'm responsible for them.  I didn't want them splitting up.  I was
glad the inspector was there because I felt he's going to watch these
people and I'm going to watch the other group...I wanted to stay in the
back and know where my people are.  That was my first concern.  I just
didn't like the idea, but didn't want them taking off the way they were.
I was afraid, you know.  I can't sit on them.
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The above explanation documents that the foreman was decisive, yet
flexible.  During the escape, some of the men began to take off and the foreman
was concerned, yet aware enough to know how frightened the men were.  The
inspector understood the dynamic too, and although against accepted
"evacuation policy" of not splitting up a group, considered the decision to allow
the faster men to go ahead with the supervisor.
The manner in which the inspector, who functioned as the "second
lieutenant" in the group, communicated the fire to one of the crew is evidenced
in the following comment from a bratticeman:
So I started to pick up my tools.  He [the inspector] said, "leave the tools
behind, don't worry about them, let's get out of here," and with his
advice and his quickness and alertness, I became aware that it was
serious.
Initially, some of the miners took off immediately ("they ran like deer"), but
were stopped by the supervisor who "made them wait till everybody was there
so we had everybody before we started." Both leaders responded calmly.
It is interesting to note the behavior of the inspector when the man in the
slower group continued to fall:
I know at one point...I said let's stop and take a minute and the man is
sitting there and the mechanic was still with us and I recall looking at
my watch, and I thought we had been under oxygen, I believe, it was
20 minutes at this time and I knew we still had a ways to go.
The inspector was continually evaluating the situation and reasoning alterna-
tives, similar to the other group leaders.  This same individual made a prophetic
observation when the men were first putting on their SCSRs:
I looked around to make sure they were starting to put theirs on and
when I looked over and saw the bigger man—that's about the first time
I started getting a little worried because he was shaking somewhat
severely, his hands were, you know, very noticeably trembling and I just
thought to myself, "Oh, boy."  I said, "I think we are going to have
trouble because he's having a hard time."
This miner was a large man who weighed in excess of 250 pounds.  When
he went down the final time, the inspector was in a serious dilemma:
I don't recall how far, but I know I was struggling with this man and
I know he was making me tired and I hadn't had any problem up until
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this point but when I looked down, I realized the bags in my SCSR were
flat and I know here again I thought, boy, there was no discussion about
it, but the section foreman and those other guys, they're probably way
ahead of us by now and here I'm back here with this guy and he having
all this trouble and now I'm having trouble breathing and breathing was
getting harder and harder.  I didn't think to look at my watch, but I didn't
know, had I exhausted the machine (SCSR) or was I running the same
problems as this man?  I was using more, you know, demanding more
out of the machine than it was giving.  I knew I was working a lot harder
now and I started getting concerned about that now too and I guess we
continued.  I continued with this man.  We finally came to a high spot
and, like I said, I was still having—I was taking as much outside air in
as I was out of the machine...I realized how this man is now because my
machine is not giving me air or what, but when we got to the high spot,
I knew exactly where we were because from traveling the belt, I knew
we were at the intake over where they had cut the overcast for the intake
and the man that was having so much trouble, he's down again. He
looked at [the mechanic].  I saw him look at [him] and he said, "You
guys go.  You just leave me here."  He said, "I can't go no more."  He
said, "I'm just going to stay here."  I looked at the other guy and I said,
"I got to go."  I said, "There is no sense in me staying"...I said, "I can't
breathe now."  I said, "I know where I'm at.  I can send somebody back.
I'll go out and get somebody."
In desperate circumstances, the inspector continued to follow what seemed to
him a logical path.  In recounting his story, the inspector noted that although he
would like to have thought he was in control, he realized he was not.  Each
leader had taken an extra SCSR.  Although the inspector was running out of
oxygen, he forgot he was carrying an extra SCSR ("Maybe I'd taken too much
smoke.")  This point emphasizes the severity of the situation.  The inspector got
to fresh air, saw the foreman, and told him of the miner who was down.  The
foreman said, "He's my boy," and went back in for him.  In the meantime, the
miner who was down was left alone.  The final person who had been trying to
assist this miner decided he was:
Not going to make it, I'm going to try and get out.  So I started out and
I was only about a hundred foot from [him] when I came through the
overcast and I opened the door and I saw No. 7 and I thought, good, this
is fresh air, or this is a, you know, the way out...So I thought, "Well, I'm
going back in to get [him]."
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Actually, this miner was mistaken about his location.  However, while he was
trying to convince the miner who was down that they could reach safety, the
foreman arrived.  Together they got the miner going again and out of the smoke.
Everyone was then accounted for.
 Several leadership questions emerge in relation to this group:  Should they
have come out together?  Should the leaders have insisted on more unity, or had
better control over the group to facilitate a cohesive group evacuation?  The
inspector responded to the inquiry about split groups by stating that there were
two individuals who could show leadership and if you have two groups, "don't
hinder the one group because of the problems of the other group."  Clearly,
despite the split escape, there was decisive leadership by both individuals in this
group.
5 South - Brownfield
The group, a production crew, was led out of the mine by their section
foreman and a roof bolter operator.  A shuttle car operator remarked:
[The foreman] is our boss.  He knew—he done right.  He got us on the
right track and kept us on the right track.  Between him and [the bolter
operator].
Again, the leadership in this group was basically the authority figure, with the
particular assistance of one of the men, a roof bolter operator, but with input of
others.  This group, after an uneven beginning, ultimately stuck together, even
though there were several older miners in the group and one person who had
continual difficulties breathing with his SCSR.
After being alerted to the smoke, the crew assembled and began its
evacuation.  Two miners, both bratticemen, ran ahead of the others in the group.
A bolter operator noted that one of the men said at this time:
"Come on, let's go.  We got to get out this way."  And he took off.  Well,
he took off and went down like—and he was leading the pack, okay.
When we got down to where the regulator was at and put the self-
rescuers on, you know, that's when [the boss] took over.  But that's one
of the things that I told [him] later on, I says, "You're the boss.  One
thing you got to do if this ever happens again, you should have a man
that's in charge that's going to take his time and walk out of there slow
and easy with his SCSR on."
In the course of the escape, the bolter operator assumed the role of advisor to the
foreman.  One miner explained why the two men took the lead initially:
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See, bratticemen know pretty much what's going on, where everything
is at.  I'd say the two bratticemen up there pretty much took the lead
out—pretty much took us out.
When asked who took the lead in the group, one of the bratticemen said:
Well, me and my buddy, 'cause we knew everything, every place up
there.  Some of the bosses don't know their way around, and I've been
in that place for eight—near nineteen years.
Both bratticemen felt they had the knowledge to lead, yet they took off, traveling
too fast for the group.  They were unaware of the needs of other members of the
group and the surrounding circumstances.  This behavior is not characteristic of
effective leaders.  In this case, the foreman stayed in the back to assist the slower
individuals.
At one point, the foreman left the slower miners to check the mandoors
ahead hoping to find clear air.  As the foreman opened one door, he saw thick
smoke:
Right then, panic hit, believe me.  'Cause all the teaching and training
everything, these are all supposed to be separate splits.  Well, the first
thing that goes through your mind is everything is burning.  In my
opinion, there was no sense in even trying to get [out, but] you're still
thinking—so I come back.
This leader, although voicing his consideration of giving up when he thought the
whole mine was on fire, rapidly moved on to explore alternatives ("you're still
thinking").
When the foreman returned to the group, the group members were panicky.
He felt everything was out of control at that moment and he knew the group was
in trouble.  The men had decided that they would wait only 10 minutes for him
to return, indicative of the anxiety and the need to "do something".
I told the guys, I said, you guys want to try to make it over there and
before I said much more...the bratticeman said, "We're ahead of the
smoke.  Let's go."  Well, right then—well, everybody seen the smoke
here.  That's when there was not much control, you know, everybody
started just going.
Again the group spread out somewhat, the foreman staying behind with the
slowest group members.  The section foreman responded when one of the men
"took his self-rescuer off and threw it out.  [The man] said he couldn't breathe
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out of it, so I helped him get the little one (filter self-rescuer) off his belt and got
it open.  He couldn't even open that one, but he got to breathing in it."
The leader of this group made sure everyone was supervised during the
escape by taking a position toward the back of the group.  He was concerned
about the slower men and about someone going down.  When the group entered
fresh air, everyone was accounted for.
6 West - Brownfield
This group consisted of three individuals, including a maintenance foreman
and a mechanic who usually worked together, plus a State mine electrical
inspector.  The only interviewee from this escape group was the maintenance
foreman, who assumed the leadership role.  The mine inspector, although an out-
sider, represented authority and at first exercised that authority.  When apprised
of the fire, the maintenance foreman initially wanted to ride out on a mantrip, but
the inspector said no.  When asked about the inspector's reason for this, the
maintenance foreman said, "Well, it could cause an explosion he said, for one
thing.  I mean, we were on the damn thing when he says no."
The maintenance foreman, the authority in this group, went along with the
mine inspector until the group hit heavy smoke.  He then decided the appropriate
escape route and "they never disagreed." When the group encountered the heavy
smoke they searched for a mandoor in an overcast but could not find it.  The
maintenance foreman knew they had to go back and he told this to the other two
men:
I knowed where I was going here in this case, so I mean I knowed
exactly where I wanted to get to.
This was an important moment in the leadership dynamics of the group, a natural
evolution based on knowledge, logic, and decisiveness.  The maintenance
foreman continued:
I mean, the inspector, when I turned around and said, "We got to go
back," he says, "No," and I says, "You can do what you want to do, I'm
going back."  I said, "You can follow me or do what you want."  At that
point I didn't give a damn who followed me or who didn't.  I was getting
out of a heavy concentration.
It is interesting to note that the next day the maintenance foreman returned to the
area of the mine to find the door; it was there where he "knew" it should be.
The maintenance foreman did not lead thinking only of his own safety.
During the entire escape he was attentive to the rest of the group.  He said:
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I was in the lead all the while and I mean, I knowed they were in back
of me.  I mean, if one of them would have dropped back, we would have
gone back and got him, or tried to anyway.
This leader had a critical piece of information that none of the other groups
had:  he knew exactly where the fire was.  When the fire boss called to alert
them about the fire, the maintenance foreman had asked where the fire was:
I was the only one out of the guys that knowed where the fire was...and
the reason for that is I took and asked [the fire boss] where the fire was.
The maintenance foreman was the only person in all eight groups who knew the
exact location of the fire and knew that the group had to travel past the fire to
escape.  He also knew that the return aircourse was double timbered; there were
two rows of posts supporting the roof.  He was aware that as long as they walked
between the timbers with the beltline on the left, they would pass the fire.
At one point in the escape, this group was passing under an overcast and
heard footsteps overhead.  It was the crew from 5 South:
I heard them coming over the overcast, and then I was relieved a little
bit because I knowed that boss coming with that crew was real familiar
with the mine.  I was familiar with it, but not like him.
Knowing that the other crew was going in the same direction increased the
maintenance foreman's confidence.  The three individuals in this group then
continued down the 6 West return aircourse to safety.
7 Butt - Cokedale
This group, under the supervision of a construction foreman, was assigned
to relocate a power center on the section.  The construction foreman, the author-
ity figure, took charge and led the group out of the mine.  Although this group
experienced some problems during their escape, the group members never lost
confidence in their leader and his ability to manage a successful escape.  This
individual had set up the ventilation for the section and, according to a motor-
man on the section the night of the fire, the foreman "knew which way to go...we
just followed him 'cause he, he knew the area."  A mechanic working in the
section said:
I felt pretty confident though because I knew [the construction foreman]
had been up there for a long time walking returns and this and that and
he was real familiar with the area.
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The construction foreman was aware and knowledgeable as evidenced by the
comments of another mechanic on the section:
We were lucky because we had [the construction foreman] and he just
spent a whole, he probably just spent 6 months in that return, posting it
and cleaning it up, so we really didn't have any trouble with the return
and we basically had enough knowledge of the area.
The leader himself indicated his knowledge of the mine in that everybody:
Was asking me where we were at, what direction we were headed.  And
with the information that I had, because the biggest part of this I set up;
the ventilation, the overcast and so on, the return escapeway.  And
I knew first hand, you know what direction we were in, where the
mandoors were at.
The group's faith in the foreman continued even when some major problems
were encountered early in their evacuation.  When notified of the fire, the con-
struction foreman gathered the group together and the crew began their escape
in three vehicles: a lead jeep, the foreman's jeep, and a portal bus.  When the
group encountered smoke in the track entry, they experienced two vehicle
wrecks, one of which actually knocked the construction foreman and another
miner off their vehicle.  In the wreck, the miner lost his hard hat and cap lamp
and had to escape without them.  This became a problem, since the miner was
continually hitting his head against the mine roof on the way out.  In addition,
this miner pulled the SCSR that he was about to don out of its carrying case.
The SCSR could not be reattached to the case, resulting in the device having no
carrying straps.  To help this miner carry the device, another miner used
electrical tape to fasten the SCSR to his buddy's chest.  Since SCSRs tend to get
very warm with use, the miner also had to contend with this discomfort.
During the escape, the construction foreman remained aware of the con-
dition of others in the group and responded to a miner who was having trouble
with his SCSR.  When the construction foreman said to put on the SCSRs,
a wireman said:
I was like shakin' like a leaf, couldn't get the damn thing open.  And he
finally come up to this control and said, "Here, pop this, stick this in
your mouth."
It is of interest to note that, whereas in some of the other groups there was
a "second lieutenant," in this group the construction foreman was totally in
charge:
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I was a foreman in charge of that area, and when I said to these people
what we had to do, there was no second-guessing my decision.  These
people were counting on my knowledge that this was right and there was
no second-guessing it.  I had no problem with these people as far as my
decision...I didn't ask for information or input from anybody else.  That
was my decision that we were gonna take this course to get out.
The foreman was authoritarian, but did not act as a dictator; he told the
group the what and why of his decisions.  He remarked:
I think that once they knew where they were, the direction that they
headed, where they were going to come out at and get into a fresh air
area, it kinda eased their minds as to knowing.  Basically, they knew
how long it would take to walk to these different locations and they
knew that there would be communications to the surface at these
locations.  And it pretty much eased their minds.
Leadership of the group was decisive, informed, logical, and confident.  All
group members safely evacuated the mine.
8 Face Parallels - Cokedale
This group was not normally a working group, and none of the members
were involved in coal production.  Members of the group typically performed
maintenance or support tasks and were doing construction work and moving
supplies in the section at the time of the fire.  In addition, there happened to be
two motormen in the section delivering rails when notified of the fire.  Normally,
these individuals worked on their own across many areas of the mine.
 This group was effectively out of control most of the time during their
escape.  The foreman, the authority figure, was not in control, and there was
considerable notation of blame and emotion evidenced in the interviews of this
group.  The manner in which the group donned their SCSRs was indicative of
the lack of leadership.  When asked who decided it was time to put them on,
a mechanic responded, "Well, I think everybody decided together but, you know,
I already had mine on."  Another miner said he kept asking, "Should we put
these on?" and the foreman never answered.  The regular authority figure, the
foreman, proved to be a poor leader.  As a mechanic described:
The guys were more or less talking amongst themselves, and I said,
"You know, this is real serious and this boss if we're not careful he's
going to get us killed."
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A trackman with the group was not familiar with the section and became
concerned:
I can understand how people could be excited and you know, improper
decisions could be made. But, you know, it kept snowballing. You
know, his improper decisions that he was making, you know.  I was
getting more and more negative about following this man as we went...
I'm not saying that I was the only person that was cognizant that [the
boss] didn't know what he was doing.  I believe everybody had some,
you know, at some level had that feeling.  But the fear level was starting
to rise.
A mechanic remarked:
There was a lot of confusion...the [foreman] couldn't figure out how to
get into the intake escapeway...a lot of the guys started getting kind of
real, losing a lot of confidence in him.
A leader who fit the profile characteristics did emerge:  he was know-
ledgeable and discerning, his leadership evolved, and he was responsive to
others in the group.  The miner who emerged as leader began in the "second
lieutenant" position as an advisor.  He "knew" based on an odor that there was
something wrong.  There was an odor and some smoke and he said to another
miner, "Turn that machine off, there is something bad wrong here."  This miner
was acutely aware and noted numerous details while continually processing
information.  He could "hear that the power center was on," and that confused
him.
A general inside laborer (GIL) at the time of the fire, this miner was a former
maintenance foreman and knew that the power center should not be on.  He was
one of the first to recognize the gravity of the situation while the rest of the
group were speculating what was on fire.  The GIL knew by the amount of
smoke that the fire was not just a trolley wire hanger burning.  He recognized
that the men were getting upset, and as he explained:
I am a personal friend of [the foreman] and...the situation, I wanted to
talk to [him] but I did not want other people to hear what I wanted to tell
him because people were getting upset right off the get-go...I was
thinkin' of people I can count on...I guess you would say that it was kind
of a feeling of if you were in an airplane and you had to count on
someone to hold that parachute for you could you count on that person.
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During the group's escape, this miner was continually evaluating the
situation.  A further example of this was when he discussed his concern that the
men were struggling:
If these guys start droppin', there is no way we, the three of us can pick
up three other guys and carry them and get through these old workings,
there's no way.  So then I'm thinking well the next steps we're gonna
have to start barricading ourself, that's all.
The GIL told the interviewer that when the group was in the returns in heavy
smoke, he was looking for footprints.  He knew that the returns had to be walked
periodically by the fire bosses who examine the area for hazards.  The GIL said:
When I see footprints I feel better...Somebody was through here already,
there is only one set going out.  So chances are that if there was a return
set of footprints, I would think somebody had to turn around because it's
blocked.
This route, in fact, led the group to safety.
The leader of this group was conscious of the behavior of other members
and careful in how he presented his advice to them.  When some members of the
group left their lunch buckets behind, he was concerned.
How can I say it?  Being a foreman for 8 years, it's hard not to say things
sometime...I could see things going on that was wrong, especially the
discarding [of the buckets].  So I would say, "I sure wouldn't throw that
away."  I wouldn't say, "Don't throw that away, you don't know how
long we're going to be here or what's going to happen."
The statement above characterized this general inside laborer who had once
been a foreman.  He presented himself as the foreman's helper during his
interview, whereas the other members of the group clearly indicated their
foreman was inept and that the GIL led them out.  He placed himself in a peer
relationship with the group and a peer relationship with the foreman.  In his
interview, the foreman quoted the GIL often and was resplendent with the
sentiment:  "I should have."  At one point the foreman stated, "I plain freely
admit, I screwed up."
Discussion
A comparison of the three mine sites revealed no evidence of differences
among the sites that would be relevant to this study.  There were no appreciable
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disparities in communication, emergency systems, firefighting response, safety
issues, or subject demographics.  Leadership in the eight groups thus will be
compared across mines without bias.
Among the persons who led each of the eight groups to safety, five of the
group leaders were the regular person in charge (usually the foreman) and three
individuals emerged as leaders during the groups' escapes.  As described
previously, analysis revealed consensus characteristics which, taken together,
create a leader profile.  The individuals who assumed positions of leadership
during the underground mine fires fit a profile that included the following
characteristics:
•   Aware, knowledgeable
•   Decisive, yet flexible
•   Open to input from others
•   Calming influence; gained followers' confidence
•   Logical decision-makers
•   Allowed leadership to develop naturally
The reasons that leaders emerged other than the regular authority varied in
each of the three groups.  In the case of the group from 1 Right at Adelaide, it
was the foreman's first night on the job.  He maintained his authority in the
group but was recognized as incapable of leading because he was not familiar
with the mine.  For the group from 3 Left at Adelaide, there was a split escape
and no clear leader emerged.  The third emergent leader, found in the group that
escaped from 8 Face Parallels at Cokedale, took over when the hierarchal leader
panicked and was ineffective in making decisions.
In examining the instances where there was a lack of leadership from the
authority figures, two characteristics emerged.  First, a lack of knowledge
contributed to an individual's inability to guide his group.  Second, leaders "lost
personal control" and thus heightened anxiety in their groups.  As shown in the
group from 1 Right, a lack of knowledge did not necessarily result in a loss of
authority.  A lack of self-control, however, was more likely to have such an
outcome. This seems true even though no evidence of actual panic behavior was
found in any of the authority figures or leaders.
Throughout this analysis, support was found for the affiliation model of
emergency response, as opposed to the panic model.  Although there was
evidence of "nonsocial, blind, irrational behavior" as defined by Hodgkinson
[1990], the study reported in this chapter found that the majority of subjects
behaved appropriately and within the accepted social framework.  In fact, the
social structure was defended, in several instances beyond reasonable evidence
to the contrary, an example of which can be seen with the group from 8 Face
Parallels.  In this group, the members initially continued to turn to the foreman
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even after he had shown his indecision and evidenced his inability to lead the
escape.
The present study supports previous research in concluding that panic is
reduced by introducing appropriate leadership [Misumi and Sako 1982].
Effective leadership also increased the likelihood of efficient evacuation.  As
found in earlier research [Hodgkinson 1990; Sime 1983; Abe 1976], the miners
tended to head for a familiar route and/or follow the route others were using.  In
all cases, the group's first direction of travel and mode of transportation chosen
were those used in routine trips out of the mine.  Numerous times throughout the
interviews, miners mentioned following the person ahead when the familiar
route became impassable.  When a knowledgeable person was in the lead and the
followers had confidence in that person, the evacuation proceeded more
smoothly.
Future Research
Are characteristics identified in the profile presented required for an
individual to fulfill the role of leader during a crisis situation?  What if an
individual has some, but not all of the noted characteristics?  Some individuals
identified during this study evidenced several, but not all, of the profile
characteristics.  Further analyses are needed to determine the fit of these
individuals in the group dynamics and their contributions to the successful
escapes.  Another realm of crisis behavior only mentioned in this study is the
influence of leader/follower familiarity on the ability to lead.  Is personal
relationship in crisis leadership a component of success or failure?  Affiliation
theory suggests that familiarity influences behavior.  However, analyses were
not completed to document relationships between leaders and followers prior to
their escapes.
This work supports Hayashi's [1988] emphasis on the study of the
anticipated behavior patterns of leaders as complementary to the study of the
circumstances of disaster escape.  Training for response to mine emergencies,
and therefore to other emergency situations as well, should consider the likely
human behavior tendencies.  Perhaps work crews should be evaluated to ensure
that at least one person can and would lead the group in the event of an
emergency.  These potential leaders may, or may not, be the authority figure who
leads during routine production.
This research suggests that the quality of leadership shown during these
mine evacuations affected the responses of victims and the efficiency of their
escapes.  Furthermore, a profile was developed based on the actions and words
of the most successful leaders.  Perhaps these findings can be generalized to
other emergency situations.  If so, it may be helpful to share the profile with
individuals who could be in positions of authority during a worksite emergency.
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The profile could be used as a guide for training in leadership development.
Another important finding of this work is the need for explicit communication
about all facts known during an emergency.  In these fires, increased knowledge
of the danger allowed better planning for evacuation and for more decisive
actions to be taken.  Even in very dangerous situations, knowledge of the prob-
lem did not cause miners to panic and act irrationally; instead they continued to
think and act based on all the information available.  It is therefore suggested
that training be given to all miners to promote effective leadership and to
reinforce the importance of detailed communication during mine emergencies.
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CHAPTER 10.—FORMAL LEARNING FROM ESCAPE
NARRATIVES THROUGH THE CREATION AND USE
OF TABLE-TOP SIMULATIONS1
This book has employed miners' narratives to illustrate basic concepts about
the escape process.  One of the most powerful means by which people make
sense of their experiences is through the telling and internalization of stories
[Bruner 1990].  By couching one's own and others' motives and actions in terms
of a coherent narrative, a person is able to learn from mistakes and plan future
behaviors that may help ensure survival.  A growing body of research suggests
that decision-making skills used to deal with emergency situations can be taught
and assessed by simulations based on narratives from the real world [Bransford
et al. 1986; Brecke 1982; Brener 1984; Connolly et al. 1989; Halff et al. 1986;
Jones and Keith 1983; Lacefield and Cole 1986].  Such techniques have been
used to address the decision-making of medical personnel, civil and military
flight crews, and even people involved in broader life events such as political
and military situations [Babbott and Halter 1983; Dugdale et al. 1982; Farrand
et al. 1982; Gilbert 1975; McGuire 1985; McGuire et al. 1976; Flathers et al.
1982; Giffin and Rockwell 1984; Jensen 1982; Janis and Mann 1987].  Given the
validity of this method of study and the promise it holds for helping people
improve the quality of their responses to nonroutine occurrences, it is perhaps
surprising that there have been no studies of emergency decision-making among
blue-collar workers prior to those conducted by the present authors and their
colleagues.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe underground coal miners' decision-
making performance on a table-top simulation whose problem structure is de-
rived from interviews with a group of eight miners who escaped from the 5 Left
section at Brownfield Mine.  The exercise was constructed by a panel of domain
experts (mine safety and rescue personnel) with the assistance of an educational
psychologist.  The simulation includes actual predicaments with wise and un-
wise decision alternatives that, in the opinion of these domain experts, are
characteristic of such escapes.  Results reported in this chapter are the scores of
a sample of experienced mine workers who completed the simulation.  Because
the exercise is a series of objective performance tasks coupled with detailed and
immediate feedback, this simulation can be used to teach and refresh critical
escape skills, as well as to provide data concerning the proficiency of miners at
the time of exercise administration.
1A revised version of this chapter has been published as:  Cole HP, Vaught C, Wiehagen WJ, Haley JV,
Brnich MJ Jr. [1998].  Decision making during a simulated mine fire escape.  IEEE Trans on Eng Management
45(2):153-162.
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Complexity of Escaping From a Mine Fire
When a fire occurs, miners must make their escape to the surface by seeking
out and traveling accessible routes to a mine portal or shaft.  The ventilation sys-
tem that is designed to bring fresh air to the working faces, carrying away meth-
ane and dust in the process, now provides oxygen to a blaze that has a nearly
unlimited supply of coal.  Fires therefore may produce very high temperatures,
dense toxic smoke, and, as they burn through stoppings and other ventilation
control devices, unpredictable changes in the direction and velocity of fresh air
moving into the mine.  If the mine atmosphere is oxygen-deficient or con-
taminated with carbon monoxide, as is often the case, miners must promptly and
correctly don emergency breathing apparatus in order to stay alive.
The process of escaping from a mine fire presents myriad predicaments and
requires quick decisions in the face of uncertainty.  Information about the lo-
cation of the fire, conditions in the mine at points along various escape routes,
and the whereabouts and condition of other miners are often unknown.  The
choice of evacuation methods may present dilemmas.  For instance, riding out
on a mantrip can enable a rapid escape but could ignite a lethal methane ex-
plosion if there has been disruption to the ventilation system.  Walking out may
forestall a methane explosion, but would require increased time and effort, and
might result in miners becoming lost.  When escaping miners make decisions
about these sorts of concerns, many of their subsequent actions are irreversible.
Furthermore, the outcomes of these actions cannot be known until they are
completed.  It is evident, therefore, that miners should be prepared to predict as
accurately as possible how future events will be influenced by their choices
among alternative actions.
Need for Research and Training in Mine Escape Decisions
In a review of decision-making theory and research, Halpern [1984] made
the following points:  A decision always involves choosing among two or more
competing alternatives.  Decisions are made in response to a recognized prob-
lem.  Yet, unlike traditional academic problem solving, real-world decision-mak-
ing involves dilemmas in which there is no clear "best" solution to a problem.
Inadequate or conflicting information about alternatives always exists.  Risks are
associated with each choice, and these choices, once made, are often irreversible.
The difficulty lies in making judgments about which alternative action is best for
maximizing gain and minimizing loss.  The decision-maker must attempt to pre-
dict how future events will be influenced by his or her choices and does so in an
atmosphere of uncertainty.
Halpern also noted two additional characteristics of decision-making as
determined from empirical studies.  First, even highly trained professionals often
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make errors in real-world decision-making.  Second, when teaching decision-
making there is a tendency to use case studies where the outcome of persons'
choices are known to those who review the case study, and where the choices of
the persons facing the problem are judged sound or unsound in light of the
outcome (often by reference to some algorithm).  However, this type of in-
struction may be counterproductive, because during the dilemmas faced in real-
world decision-making, the choices among alternatives must be made without
knowledge of their effects on outcomes.  Good decisions depend on inference
and flexible use of heuristics rather than rigid application of algorithms based
on a post hoc analysis of events.
The information miners are given in their initial classroom training, required
annual refresher training, and mandatory fire drills tends to provide little op-
portunity for them to engage in problem solving and decision-making [Digman
and Grasso 1981; Cole et al. 1988a,b].  That is because traditional classroom
instruction tends to produce "inert" knowledge rather than "active" knowledge
[Bruner 1990; Cole et al. 1988a,b].  Generally, inert knowledge is presented in
the form of simple rules (algorithms) such as the following:  "At the first sign of
smoke, don your FSR and proceed to the [mine evacuation] assembly point."
"Remember the location of the nearest cache of SCSRs (self-contained
self-rescuers) and when you get to them, immediately don an apparatus."  "Stay
together at the designated assembly point until your section foreman orders an
evacuation from the mine."  "Follow the primary escapeway and stay with the
other members of your group."  "If the primary escapeway is impassable, exit
from the mine by the secondary escapeway."  "If escape is not possible, find a
good place to barricade, then barricade and wait for rescue."
In actual emergency situations, many factors may prevent the simple ap-
plication of these rules.  For example, although miners are drilled that they
should all gather at designated assembly points to begin their evacuation, during
actual fires some workers are usually missing and do not arrive at the assembly
point.  In this event, the gathered miners must decide whether to wait for their
missing coworkers, conduct a search, or leave without them.  If and when all of
the workers are assembled on a working section, they must still decide which
routes and methods will be used to leave the mine.  Miners are taught that they
should stay together when they evacuate, but if a section crew is forced to walk
out of the mine, the crew members may have to hurry or risk becoming trapped
by the fire.  Often, travel is difficult because of low seam height, poor footing,
and heavy smoke.  Because of individual differences in physical fitness, some
miners will always be able to travel faster than others, yet the possibility that
individuals may fall behind is rarely addressed in miner training classes, or
during fire drills in the mine.
When individual differences do enter the equation, what ought miners do?
Should the entire group travel as slow as the slowest crew member and thus risk
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having their SCSRs run out of oxygen, or risk becoming trapped?  Should the
group split up, allowing the most able to escape, and perhaps get help for their
slower coworkers?  A confounding factor is that on many mining sections there
are only one or two persons who fully understand the complex escape routes out
of the workplace.  During an escape, when the smoke becomes thick and the
crew is strung out along several hundred feet, what can be done to make sure the
persons at the front of the line and those at the rear all make correct turns at key
intersections of the giant maze that composes the mine?
The rather cut-and-dried rules that miners are usually taught concerning
evacuation and escape procedures do not address these types of questions.
Consequently, when workers are involved in actual mine fires, they may be ill-
prepared to deal with the ambiguities and complex interactions of real-world
variables that turn what might appear to be a straightforward escape task into an
ill-defined problem.
Utility of Simulation Exercises for Fire Escape Decision Training
Active knowledge that helps workers become better problem solvers can be
facilitated by simulation exercises based on actual mine fires and escapes.  These
exercises are one way to provide miners with more accurate and realistic
conceptualizations of escape procedures.  Most workers will never experience
an escape from a mine fire.  Yet all miners need a good understanding of what
such situations are like and how the basic escape rules in which they are drilled
must always be moderated by the types of situational factors described in the
previous section.  Well-designed simulations can provide powerful vicarious
learning experiences that may better prepare miners to cope effectively with
actual mine emergencies.  It is for this reason that the training of mine rescue
teams, military personnel, and firefighters routinely make use of both full-scale
field simulations and so-called "paper and pencil" (or "table-top") exercises.  It
is the table-top simulation with which this chapter is concerned.
Table-top simulations are typically based on actual case materials.  Unlike
case study reviews, however, table-top exercises do not present the outcome of
an emergency as a means for evaluating individual decisions made during the
course of the event.  Rather, the simulation problem unfolds and requires de-
cisions to be made among alternatives with incomplete information similar to the
process involved in an actual emergency.  Good exercises will simulate the con-
ceptual and emotional decision-making aspects involved in coping with an event.
Table-top simulations have some advantages over full-scale field problems,
or even participation in actual emergencies.  First, a table-top exercise can fore-
shorten lengthy problem situations and long sequences of decision-making.  An
event that might be days in the making can be concluded in 1 to 2 hours with a
table-top simulation.  Second, errors made during a table-top simulation may be
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embarrassing but are not dangerous.  Similar errors in a full-scale field exercise
or during an actual emergency response could be dangerous or even fatal.  Third,
table-top simulations can provide the learner with a system perspective on the
problem situation.  During an actual mine fire an individual focuses on his or her
situation and role, and may not pay much attention to key relationships and in-
teractions among the other personnel, physical factors, and equipment.
A simulation can show such relationships as well as reveal both the predictable
and capricious events that are always part of any emergency.  This type of
overall comprehension of the "problem space" is thought to result in greater in-
sight on the part of the participant.  Fourth, table-top simulations provide in-
dividuals an opportunity to reflect upon, debate, and gain enhanced wisdom from
their decisions.  In aviation circles, interactive table-top simulations of the paper
and pencil or computer-administered type are used to teach what is often referred
to as "air wiseness," with promising results [Flathers et al. 1982; Giffin and
Rockwell 1984].
The Escape From a Mine Fire (EMF) Exercise
The 5 Left crew at Brownfield Mine encountered extreme difficulty in
making its escape.  The workers were located nearly 3 miles from the nearest
mine portal, and their first warning of the fire came when they observed smoke
being carried into their section by the mine ventilation system.  The smoke was
coming through the intake entry, which was the section's designated primary
escapeway.  The smoke made this escape route impassable.  The return entry,
designated as the secondary escapeway, was also filled with smoke.  The belt
entry, which was not a designated escape route, but which was the only entry not
filled with smoke initially, was selected by the miners as the most viable
alternative.  This entry was constricted by a conveyor belt on one side and a
double row of roof support timbers on the other.  These obstacles and the 48- to
54-inch seam height left a walkway approximately 3 ft wide, 4 ft high, and a
0.5 miles long (at which juncture the section connected with 6 West Mains, a set
of eight entries that eventually led out of the mine over an additional 2.5-mile
route).
The workers did not know the location of the fire, were not provided such
information by surface personnel, and did not make adequate attempts to obtain
this critical knowledge.  During their escape, the eight miners worried that they
would exhaust the 1-hour supply of oxygen in their SCSRs, because they knew
it would take much longer than an hour to stoop-walk the nearly 3 miles to the
portal, and as far as they knew, the mine atmosphere could have been con-
taminated by smoke the entire distance.  They therefore chose to "save" their
SCSRs by not donning them immediately.  Thus, the workers traveled in
increasingly heavy smoke until it became impossible to proceed without the
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breathing apparatus.  All eight miners were in dense smoke before they donned
their SCSRs and might very well have died from carbon monoxide poisoning if
the smoke had been more toxic.
Once they donned their breathing apparatus, and after traveling only a short
distance (approximately 200 ft), two miners found that they could not keep up
with the group.  One was physically unfit and the other old.  The older miner
could travel, although slowly.  The younger, unfit man soon became unable to
travel at all without help.  The eight miners then made a decision to split up.
Four members of the crew who could move rapidly left the section.  The older
miner followed these four at his own pace.  Two fit individuals remained with
the disabled worker and attempted to half-carry and half-drag him from the
section.  After falling down many times and stopping frequently, all three men
were exhausted, out of oxygen, and were exposed to smoke.  One person then
left the other two.  The disabled miner and his lone companion remained behind
in the smoke, with one man semiconscious and the other hoping they might be
rescued, but fearing they would die.  The individual who left the section reported
being nearly overcome by carbon monoxide, and stated that he was incoherent
when he finally encountered fresh air approximately 1,000 ft outby the place
where he had left his two coworkers.
Structure and Design of the EMF Exercise
Given the widespread practice of longwall mining, the setting described
above is typical of many sections on which miners now work.  Additionally, the
problems these workers encountered during their escape are characteristic of
those recounted by miners who have escaped other fires.  Because of these two
factors, it was decided to construct a simulation exercise around the experiences
of workers on the 5 Left section.  The initial simulation was developed by six in-
dividuals.  One of these was a Federal inspector who happened to be on the
5 Left section that shift.  This person escaped with the crew and subsequently
helped conduct an official investigation of the fire.  Four other developers were
domain experts in mine safety or mine rescue who, collectively, represented a
wide range of mining conditions and methods.  All five experts worked together
and in conjunction with an educational psychologist.  The mine fire exercise was
designed to be both a teaching tool to improve miners' decision-making skills
and a research instrument to provide information about the proficiency of
workers in planning an escape.  The domain experts agreed that data from an
administration of this problem applied to a large group of miners could help
direct future training as well as the design and deployment of mine monitoring
systems.
The structure of the Escape From a Mine Fire (EMF) exercise is based on
the theory of narrative thinking from Bruner [1990], Bower and Morrow [1990],
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Sarbin [1986], and others.  Bruner notes that there are two ways to understand
one's own behavior and the conduct of others.  The first way is through narrative
thinking.  The second is through formal analysis of behavior through logical
rules and systems.  Persons generally make important personal decisions by ref-
erence to compelling stories that they have internalized, not by applying formal
logical rules.  These life-directing narratives have been called "culture tales" and
"stories we live by " [Howard 1991].  Since the beginning of human culture,
stories and parables have been recognized universally as one of the most
effective forms of instruction [Vitz 1990].  On a personal level, lessons learned
and insights gained through stories also tend to be highly memorable and easily
generalizable to one's own circumstances and plights [Bruner 1990; Sarbin
1986].
The EMF exercise is presented as an interactive story.  The content and
structure of the story are derived from the actual events that occurred in the mine
fire on which the simulation is based.  The miners who work the exercise in-
teract with each other and with characters in the story.  The exercise is con-
structed so that each miner assumes the role of a character who must make
decisions as the story plot develops.  The plot includes obstacles and pre-
dicaments that thwart the achievement of the goals (escaping from the fire,
staying together, and saving one's buddies).  At key points throughout the un-
folding story, the miners select from among alternative actions and strategies.
The consequences that follow each choice are subsequently presented as part of
the interactive story line.  Thus, the narrative exercise simulates many of the af-
fective and cognitive dilemmas experienced by miners who are involved in
similar decision-making when escaping from actual underground mine fires.
The paper and pencil exercise consists of a linear series of questions at each
major decision point.  The first 10 questions interspersed in the narrative rep-
resent what the domain experts determined to be key decision points en-
countered by the 5 Left miners during their escape from the fire.  The experience
of these miners provides the basis for the scenario.  The last three questions ask
miners to make additional judgments about the merit of particular persons'
actions in the face of events that occur in the simulation.  Twelve of the ques-
tions are followed by three to eight decision alternatives presented in a multiple-
choice format.  One requires a short written response in which the learner must
decide among four alternative actions.  The alternatives consist of both correct
and incorrect actions (as indicated by expert consensus) at each major decision
point (question) in the scenario.  The consequences of incorrect answers range
from useless to harmful or potentially lethal.  These wrong alternatives were
compiled from case studies and the interviews of miners who escaped from real
fires, and represent judgment errors that workers actually made in such
situations (some reasons why they made these errors are echoed by subjects'
responses to the simulation questions).
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Four of the questions or decision points have only one correct action among
the alternatives listed.  However, the remaining questions have a combination of
two or three correct alternatives along with the incorrect ones.  A miner's per-
formance on a given major decision point is not scored dichotomously as a
0 or 1, but is awarded full or partial credit based on the total number of good
decision alternatives selected, and the total number of poor decisions avoided
(not selected).  Finally, each decision point is weighted equally so that when the
13 question scores are added together the exercise total score is scaled from 0
to 100.  Thus, the final observed total score for any given miner can be directly
interpreted as a percentage of mastery of the exercise skills and content.
The exercise consists of two parts:  a problem booklet and a latent-image
answer sheet with an attached questionnaire.  The problem booklet presents the
relevant background information that any miner who was at work in this mine
would know, e.g., information about the height of the coal seam, mine venti-
lation, location and distances of the portals, and the type of mining method and
equipment used.  The miner working the exercise is directed to play the role of
the section foreman, and to make choices among decision alternatives at each
question in the exercise.  The initial observation is then presented as the arrival
of smoke on the section where the crew is working.  The booklet includes a
section map (see figure 10.1) that shows the number and layout of entries, the
location of the smoke, workers' positions, equipment locations, and the direction
and distance from this section to the mine's main entries (and to the portal where
the miners must exit).  Each decision point (question) determined by the domain
experts to be a major one is presented in the problem at the rate of one frame
(page) at a time.  After the miner examines the question and studies the alterna-
tives, he or she then selects the "best" actions by using a special developing pen
to mark the appropriately numbered space on the answer sheet.
Each numbered space on the answer sheet corresponds to a numbered
decision alternative in that frame of the problem booklet.  When the blank space
on the answer sheet is rubbed with the developing pen, the invisible ink or
"latent-image" answer immediately becomes visible.  The message contains two
types of information:  first, it tells if the decision was correct or incorrect (as
determined by the panel of domain experts); second, it provides additional
information related to the decision.  For example, in question D (the sixth frame
and fourth major decision point in the exercise), miners are asked which actions
they should take as they prepare to leave the section on foot in the belt entry.
One of the eight decision alternatives for this question is:
Before you leave, send one miner to the pager (section telephone) to ask
for information about the location of the fire, and to report (to the
surface) that you are walking out.
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Figure 10.1.—Section map of imaginary mine in problem booklet.
When the miner rubs the corresponding blank space between the brackets on the
answer sheet, the following message is instantly developed:
[Correct!  But the miner returns and says the pager is no longer
working.]
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Each frame in the problem booklet presents the scenario over a sequence of time
and contingencies.  The miner working the exercise knows only what has hap-
pened to the point at which the problem has been worked.  The correctness and
consequences of the decision alternatives selected for each question are also
known only as these choices are made.  In this manner the trainee must work
through the problem as it unfolds, without knowing the outcome or the effects
of his or her decisions until after they have been made.
Figures 10.2 and 10.3 depict two frames in the problem booklet.  Figure 10.2
shows question B with six decision alternatives; figure 10.3 shows the latent-
image answers that correspond to the decision alternatives.  The entire exercise
is constructed to teach and assess the choice of alternative actions at major
decision points like those encountered by the miners who experienced the fire.
The major decision points include (1) deciding what to do when the smoke
is first noticed, (2) ordering priorities in terms of alerting other miners versus
first donning emergency breathing apparatus, (3) seeking more information
about the fire, (4) choosing an escape route and method, (5) deciding what
equipment to take along during the evacuation, (6) modifying the escape plan
when heavy smoke reduces visibility to less than 2 ft and when two miners in the
crew are unable to keep up, and (7) deciding how best to rescue a worker who
had to be abandoned in a smoke-filled area of the mine.  The options chosen by
those working the exercise are discussed in a section to follow.
Interactive Latent-Image Format
The paper problem booklet and latent-image answer sheet system were
chosen because they were inexpensive to develop and are easy to administer in
any setting with a minimum of equipment.  Only a problem booklet, a specially
printed latent-image answer sheet, and a developing pen are needed.  This com-
bination of high technology instructional design with respect to exercise struc-
ture, combined with the low-technology latent-image delivery mode, provides
a very effective interactive simulation—a basic format which has, in fact, been
used for many years in medical education [Bollet 1984; Kacmarek et al. 1985].
Field Evaluation of the Exercise
After its construction, the EMF exercise underwent two rounds of field
testing.  A preliminary round involved authentication of the exercise by a group
of 10 nationally recognized mine fire and mine rescue authorities using well-
established mine rescue criteria.  The criticisms, corrections, and comments of
these persons were used to revise the exercise before its formal field test.  This
second round of field testing was conducted at four sites with six groups of
experienced miners from several States.
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Figure 10.2.—Question B with six decision alternatives in problem booklet.
Figure 10.3.—Latent-image answers that correspond to the decision alternatives shown
in figure 7.
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Figure 10.4.—EMF exercise:  percentage of sample by job category (n = 134).
A total of 134 underground coal miners, including two females, were in-
volved in formal field testing of the exercise.  The mean age of these workers
was 41.1 years, with a standard deviation of 8.83.  These miners averaged 15.9
years of experience in underground coal mining, with a standard deviation of
7.16.  The persons in the sample represented three major job categories found
in the underground mining industry.  These include (1) miners/laborers who are
hourly employees and who are engaged in the various jobs directly related to
extracting and transporting the coal out of the mine; (2) maintenance/technical
staff who are electricians, mechanics, health and safety inspectors, engineers,
surveyors, and other personnel who do not directly mine coal but who work
underground in and around the sections; and (3) supervisors/managers who are
salaried employees and who include the first-line supervisor (section foreman)
all the way up to the mine superintendent.  Figure 10.4 presents the proportions
of these persons in the sample.
In the mining industry the job categories depicted in figure 10.4 are
associated with increasing levels of skill and knowledge.  Mine foremen and
other supervisors must pass examinations and be certified in such areas as mine
maps, ventilation, health and safety, first aid, escape, and rescue procedures.
Similarly, mine maintenance and technical workers must be certified in their
specialties.  In addition, their work often requires them to travel widely through-
out the mine, usually in pairs.  Because they have to be responsible for them-
selves as they work and travel about, maintenance/technical workers need to be
more aware of the mine layout, escape routes, and escape procedures than do the
typical miners/laborers.
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This sample is somewhat older than and has greater experience than a more
typical sample of miners.  In addition, miners/laborers are underrepresented in the
sample, while mine maintenance/technical personnel and supervisors are over-
represented.  An earlier national sample of 3,658 underground coal miners from
12 States found a mean age of 37.2 years with a standard deviation of 9.0, and a
mean of 11.9 years of mining experience with a standard deviation of 7.2 [Cole
et al. 1988a,b].  Miners/laborers comprised about 50% of that much larger sample;
maintenance/technical personnel and supervisors comprised about 25% each.
Two important generalizations can be made about the field test sample.
First, this group of miners had more experience and better training in either
fighting or escaping from mine fires than would a representative grouping of
miners.  Second, most of the working miners, technical personnel, and super-
visors included here were attending regional health and safety meetings for
persons in the mining industry.  These facts suggest that the exercise perform-
ance scores of this sample ought to be higher than the scores of miners from a
completely random selection.
Results
The results of the field test are presented in three parts.  The first part pre-
sents miners' evaluation of the authenticity and utility of the simulation.  The
second part analyzes psychometric properties of the exercise, including assess-
ments of its validity and reliability.  The third part describes the performance of
miners in choosing among the 63 alternatives contained in the 13 questions or
major decision points.
Miner Evaluation of the Exercise
Each person who worked the simulation was asked to complete a standard
10-item Likert scale rating form.  The first three items on the form were de-
signed to elicit the miner's evaluation of the authenticity of the problem and its
worth as a training device.  The remainder of the items addressed the func-
tionality of the exercise structure and design.  Ratings of all miners on each of
these 10 items are presented in table 10.1.  Even though this sample consisted
of highly experienced workers, all persons reported that the exercise was au-
thentic and would help them remember important details.  Additionally, nearly
94% reported that they learned something new from working the exercise.
Validity
Four estimates of exercise validity were obtained.  First, the 10 experts who
reviewed the simulation during its authentication stage and in its final form
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judged the content validity to be high.  This is not surprising, since the problem
was based on the behavior and decision choices of miners who had escaped from
actual mine fires.  Second, the 134 miners in the field test sample judged the face
validity of the exercise to be high, as can be seen from their ratings in the first
three items in table 10.1.  Third, the 63 decision alternatives discriminated pos-
itively with respect to the exercise total score.  When decision alternatives are
valid, the number of wrong alternatives selected should correlate negatively for
persons with high total scores, but correlate positively for persons with low total
scores.  Likewise, the number of correct alternatives selected should correlate
positively for persons with high total scores, but negatively for persons with low
total scores.  When multiple-choice test questions (or exercise alternatives) be-
have in this manner, they are said to discriminate positively among levels of
ability within the sample.  Table 10.2 presents the proportion of exercise alterna-
tives that positively and significantly discriminated with respect to high exercise
total score.
Table 10.1.—Miners' rating of exercise validity, relevance, quality, and utility
(frequency %, n ' 134)
Content
      4
(definitely
    yes)
    3     2       1
(definitely  




Exercise is realistic/authentic 88.5 11.5 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.32
Helped me remember impor-
   tant things . . . . . . . . . . . . 62.3 37.7 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.49
Learned something new . . . 52.7 41.1 3.1 3.1 3.4 0.71
Exercise is too long . . . . . . . 3.1 7.0 29.5 60.5 1.5 0.76
Liked working the exercise . 60.6 31.5 6.3 1.6 3.5 0.69
Instructor's directions are
    clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
64.9 29.1 1.5 0.0 3.7 0.51
Written exercise directions
    are clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62.2 35.4 1.6 0.8 3.6 0.57
Graphics are easy to under-
    stand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65.1 33.3 0.8 0.8 3.6 0.55
Scoring is easy to understand 43.1 44.8 6.0 6.0 3.3 0.82
Exercise is easy to read . . . 66.4 33.6 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.47
Table 10.2.—Proportion of answers discriminating positively, negatively,
 and not at all with the exercise total score (p<.05)
Positive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51/60 (85.0%)
Negative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2/60 (3.3%)
No relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7/60 (11.7%)
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The final estimate of exercise validity was determined by conducting an
ANOVA of exercise total scores by job category.  As explained earlier in the
section that described the sample, knowledge of mine rescue and escape skills
may be expected to increase across job categories from miners/laborers through
maintenance/technical workers to supervisors/managers.  The analysis was run
on 106 persons for whom there was a complete vector of exercise question and
total scores, and for whom there was also a definitive job category assignment.
Table 10.3 presents means and standard deviations of the exercise total score for
these three groups, and table 10.4 presents the ANOVA results by job categories.
Figure 10.5 plots observed total score means and standard deviations for the
three job categories.  Job category was found to account for approximately 29%
of the observed variance in exercise total scores.
Table 10.3.—Means and standard deviations for exercise 
total score by job category
Job n Mean, % Standard
deviation
Miners/laborers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 71.1 11.03
Maintenance/technical staff . . . . . . . . . . 48 79.9 7.47
Supervisors/managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 85.5 7.38








Between groups . . . . . 2 3,051.92 1,525.96 21.31 0.00
Within groups . . . . . . . 103 7,302.54 71.59 — —
Eta squared ' 0.293.
Reliability
The Cronbach alpha generalizability coefficient was calculated for the
exercise as an estimate of its internal consistency.  The observed reliability of
0.74 might be expected to increase if a more heterogeneous sample of miners
were used to achieve a more symmetrical performance distribution on item and
total scores.
Question and Total Score Performance
Individual performance on each of the exercise questions was scored by
awarding full or partial credit based on the total number of good decision al-
ternatives selected and the total number of poor decision alternatives avoided.
A mean percentage and standard deviation for each question score was then cal-
culated.  An ANOVA was carried out for each question score to determine
which of the 13 items significantly discriminated among the three job categories.
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Figure 10.5.—EMF exercise:  means and standard deviations by job category.
The ANOVA was based on the 106 persons who could be clearly identified as
belonging to one of the three categories.  Figure 10.6 presents the pooled means
and standard deviations for each of the 13 questions for the entire sample of
134 miners who completed the exercise.  The total exercise score (TS) and its
standard deviation are represented in the last column of the histogram.  The
scoring metric is the percentage of correct responses, so that all question scores
and the exercise total score can be compared to one another in terms of diffi-
culty.  The eight questions that significantly discriminated among job categories
are marked with an asterisk.
Inspection of figure 10.6 reveals an important finding.  Questions H and K
were the most difficult decision points in the exercise, as evidenced by the fact
that there was no significant difference among the scores on these items across
workers in the three job categories.  Additionally, the mean score for question H
was 53.2%, with a standard deviation of 25.8.  The mean for question K was
62.3%, with a standard deviation of 39.9.  These means are well below the de-
sirable proficiency level and the variance is very large.  Questions H and K are
difficult because they have in common a dilemma, described below, that is en-
countered in actual escapes from mine fires (and that participants reported as a
rationale for their chosen options) but that is rarely discussed in training classes
because these classes tend to focus on escape algorithms and rules.
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Figure 10.6.—Question score means and standard deviations.  (An asterisk (*) indicates
a question that significantly discriminates among job categories (p#.05).  TS = total exercise
score.)
In question H, the scenario has developed to a point at which the miners are
in heavy smoke wearing their SCSRs and having difficulty moving in the
narrow, low walkway along the belt entry.  The unfit miner is unable to maintain
a pace needed to escape from the section before conditions become fatal.  The
three decision alternatives include (1) trying to force the straggler to keep up and
having all of the other miners slow down, (2) letting the group split up and leav-
ing the straggler on his own, and (3) having members of the crew take turns car-
rying the unfit miner.  The weight of the straggler (260 pounds), his poor phys-
ical condition, the narrow and low walkway, and restrictions on heavy work
imposed by wearing an SCSR, make the first and third options difficult and
dangerous.  The correct (but troubling) decision is to let the group split up so
that those miners who can travel rapidly have a chance to escape.  Discussions
following the exercise suggest that this experienced group of miners understood
the dangers of the two incorrect alternatives and the logic of the correct decision.
Many persons in all three job categories, however, selected wrong alternatives
to this question.
Question K addresses an issue that arises when miners are missing in mine
fires and other workers wish to find and rescue them as soon as possible.  Prior
to this point in the problem scenario, two of the escaping miners had tried to
help the straggler but were unable to do so.  Finally, he was abandoned, semi-
conscious but still alive.  All of the other miners had reached relative safety in
fresh air about 1,000 ft farther along the escape route.  The question concerns
two miners who wish to don new SCSRs and reenter the smoke filled area to
search for and bring out the missing worker.  The predicament arises from the
need (as perceived by the survivors in our interviews) for prompt rescue of the
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missing miner if he is to live, and weighed against the dangers of using SCSRs
to attempt the rescue.  The person working the exercise is asked to weigh the
merits of the two miners' rescue plan, and decide if rescue attempts should wait
until the fire is under control, fresh air is restored to the area being searched,
and/or a mine rescue team with proper breathing apparatus and related equip-
ment arrives.  Based on many accident investigations and interviews, such de-
cision alternatives are known to be problematic for miners.  Likewise, these de-
cision alternatives proved difficult (as indicated by low scores and failure to
discriminate) for the persons who worked the simulation exercise.  This outcome
was observed even though the sample was a highly knowledgeable and select
group who clearly understood the risks.
The issue centers around the design of SCSRs—they are designed for
self-rescue and escape.  They do not provide an adequate supply of oxygen for
rescue work and are not mechanically and ergonomically suitable for such
activity.  Yet, if a missing miner is not rapidly retrieved from the smoky area of
a mine, he or she may die from CO intoxication and smoke inhalation.  The issue
of mounting rescue efforts with the aid of SCSRs is hotly debated by workers
involved in both the field tests of this simulation and other similar exercises.
While all persons recognize the good intentions of miners who want to use
SCSRs to rescue missing individuals, they disagree on the merit of such at-
tempts.  Experienced mine rescue personnel and other experts often argue that
it is very difficult to travel and work in smoke while wearing SCSRs, and that
the risks are too great to justify any attempt to rescue a trapped miner while
using the apparatus.  Potential problems associated with such attempts, ac-
cording to these individuals, include (1) would-be rescuers becoming lost or
disoriented, (2) workers having great difficulty finding, lifting, and moving a
disabled miner, and (3) potential rescuers displacing their SCSR mouthpiece or
nose clips, and/or running out of oxygen during the rescue attempt.  Some or all
of these difficulties are very likely during the rescue attempt.  Singularly or in
combination, these problems could easily result in serious injury or death for the
would-be rescuers.
Such an outcome would further complicate a rescue of the original missing
miner(s), and endanger additional lives because (1) more miners would be mis-
sing and need to be rescued, (2) fewer persons would be immediately available
at the scene to conduct the support work necessary for a successful rescue,
(3) those individuals who subsequently must attempt a rescue of the additional
victims would be endangered even when they were properly equipped with mine
rescue apparatus, and (4) rescue of the original victim(s) might be delayed, thus
increasing the probability of their death.
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Figure 10.7.—Percent of miners attaining various mastery levels on the EMF exercise.
Mastery Levels
Each question score is weighted equally so that when the 13 subscores are av-
eraged the exercise total score is scaled from 0% to 100% (figure 10.7).  Each ques-
tion score in figure 10.7 is also presented on a 0% to 100% scale.  Thus, the final ob-
served total score and the question scores for any given miner or group of miners can
be directly interpreted as the percentage of  mastery of exercise skills and content.
Self-rescue skills like those presented in this simulation should be learned
to high levels of mastery in order to minimize errors that can be very costly in
terms of death, injury, economics, and public image.  As a general rule,  pro-
ficiency levels for these types of critical skills are set at a minimum of 90%
correct performance by at least 90% of the trained population [Cole et al. 1984].
Figure 10.7 plots the percentage of individuals in the sample who scored in one
of seven mastery level intervals.  As shown, only 13.6% of the miners scored at
or above the 90% mastery level as assessed by total score performance.  Nearly
50% of the sample performed below 80% mastery.  A completely random sam-
ple of miners might be expected to perform at lower levels of mastery than did
this group of highly experienced and well-trained workers.  If the exercise is
valid and reliable, this suggests that miners need additional training in the
decision-making that is involved when escapes from mine fires must be planned
and executed.  Simulations like the Escape From a Mine Fire exercise may be




The mean performance scores of groups in all three job categories fell well
below the 90% level of mastery for the self-rescue and escape  skills presented
in the EMF simulation.  However, the exercise total score discriminated
significantly among job categories (F = 21.314, p#0.0001), with  supervisors
obtaining the highest mean score (85.8%), maintenance/technical workers an
intermediate mean score (79.9%), and miners/laborers the lowest mean score
(71.1%).  The exercise total score also discriminated significantly (F=17.352,
p#0.0001) between those persons with mine rescue training (mean = 81.6%) and
those without such training (mean = 73.0%).  For the dilemmas presented in
questions H and K, though, there are no significant differences in the mean
performance scores by job category or by mine rescue training level.  This
finding suggests that the issues associated with having to abandon a helpless
miner, or engaging in unsafe rescue attempts of missing workers by using
SCSRs, are clearly problematic decisions for all miners regardless of training
level.  Workers in all three job categories appeared to understand the potentially
lethal consequences of unsafe rescue attempts, but frequently chose unwisely in
the simulation.  It should be noted that this also happens in real life, where a
significant proportion of deaths in confined spaces are would-be rescuers of
victims who are usually already dead [Manwaring and Conroy 1990].
We have observed that when miners and accident investigators alike discuss
actual escape or rescue attempts, the merits of workers' decisions are nearly al-
ways judged post hoc in relation to the outcome of their actions.  If the decision
choices were successful, the miners are seen as brave and wise.  If the decisions
were unsuccessful, and especially if more persons were injured or died, the
workers' actions may be seen as well intentioned but foolish (and perhaps
illegal).  Nevertheless, this approach to reviewing the merit of actual decisions
in terms of prior knowledge of the outcomes may be counterproductive, because
it develops a mindset that cannot be effective in the decision-making required
during an actual mine emergency.  When these types of decisions are made in
real life, the participants cannot know the outcome of their actions prior to the
action.  Knowledge of the outcome cannot be the basis for the decision [Fischoff
1975].  Rather, such decisions must be based on the incomplete information that
is available at the moment, estimates of the feasibility of alternative actions and
their likelihood of success, and a weighing of the relative risks associated with
each alternative.
The simulation discussed in this chapter was designed to provide a vicarious
experience that would enable miners to confront the life and death choices in-
volved in escaping from a mine fire.  Undoubtedly the vicarious experience of
completing such an exercise is not sufficient to prepare a miner for such a real-
world experience.  However, it is almost certainly better to have studied and
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debated the decisions encountered in such a simulation than to encounter them
for the first time in a field situation.  The EMF exercise is not just a "story."
Rather, it is a composite of a type of emergency that too often claims workers'
lives.  To the extent that such simulations accurately reflect the dilemmas and
decisions encountered in actual fires (and the present one is taken directly from
a real incident), they provide better training for these nonroutine events than the
more traditional method of teaching facts and escape algorithms.  Likewise, they
are more effective than a post hoc analysis of case studies where the merits of
decisions are judged by knowing their outcomes a priori.
The EMF exercise is a dual teaching and testing device that presents a series
of decision tasks embedded in a text or narrative.  These types of educational
materials have a long research tradition.  Skinner [1965], Rothkopf [1966] and
many others independently developed instructional programs consisting of a
series of test items embedded in text.  These programs were used to teach and
test knowledge and skills of military personnel and many other groups.  More re-
cently, simulation problems with embedded test items have been used to teach
and test proficiency among a wide range of technical personnel including health
professionals, veterinarians, military and civil aviators, and other groups [Cole
1994].  The EMF exercise teaches miners through immediate feedback about the
consequences and correctness of each decision they make.  The immediate feed-
back reinforces correct knowledge and judgments and remediates incorrect de-
cisions.  At the same time, the objective nature of the exercise decision alterna-
tives allows a performance score to be recorded and calculated for each in-
dividual.  As demonstrated earlier, these performance data can be treated as test
scores.  To the extent that the exercise is valid and reliable, performance scores
aggregated across groups of persons provide useful information about the degree
to which miners have mastered particular skills and concepts and where more
training is needed.
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A major reason for the previously mentioned scarcity of systematic know-
ledge about social and behavioral aspects of fire is that most efforts to minimize
human and economic loss have focused on engineering solutions.  Canter [1980]
argued that there is already enough evidence to support the argument that, as far
as "hardware" solutions are concerned, "such provisions are frequently insuf-
ficient and in many cases inappropriate...human aspects of the causes and de-
velopments of fire must be understood if its disastrous effects are to be min-
imized."  According to Canter, what is known empirically about human response
to fire follows certain general themes that may be used as a base for un-
derstanding the phenomenon theoretically (and which, incidentally, also provide
some insights applicable to mining).
First, the literature asserts that the place of human action in the cause of fires
must be considered, even when arson is exempted.  It is likely that many fires
start as the result of human error.  For instance, according to a preliminary report
released by the Mine Safety and Health Administration [1987], the Wilberg
disaster originated with an electric air compressor whose overtemperature safety
shutdown switch had been bypassed.  At Adelaide, while the cause of the fire is
in doubt, a contributing factor is not.  A stopping near the head drive had been
knocked out because float dust was collecting behind it.  This allowed
60,000 cfm of air to go across the belt.  According to the account of the mine ex-
aminer who discovered the blaze, things got out of hand quickly.  At Brownfield,
a trolley motor was left energized and on first point.  In addition, a door in the
supply chute was left open.  Thus, not only did combustion take place, the smoke
was quickly carried into the mine's primary escapeways.
A second theme in the literature deals with the fact that much information-
gathering must take place before an individual comes to understand the nature
of the problem, his or her role, and the appropriate rules that should be followed
[Canter et al. 1980].  Given that a fire, at least in its early stages, is an uncertain
event, it can be seen that a lot of time may be lost in defining the situation.  On
the night of the Adelaide fire, the dispatcher, who stated that the mine had "been
getting tons of those false alarms," engaged in a series of conversations with the
dumper underground.  Following that, he (1) received a phone call from the face
boss on the section contacted by the dumper wanting to know what was going
on, (2) got through to another section and told the person who answered that
there was a fire on the belt and to "get your guys out of there," (3) contacted the
remaining section and "told the man on the phone to get the guys together," and
1An earlier version of this discussion is contained in:  Vaught C, Wiehagen WJ [1991].  Escape from a
mine fire: emergent perspective and workgroup behavior.  J Appl Behav Sci 27(4):452-474.
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(4) received a call 5 minutes later from the last section contacted wanting to
know what was going on.  Only one worker (the maintenance foreman) at
Brownfield took time to learn where the fire at his mine was located.
The third theme involves people's reactions once the situation has been de-
fined.  Sime [1980], among others, has offered evidence that the concept of
"panic" does not apply to human behavior in fires.  In fact, the reverse is more
nearly true; people continue to carry out their normal roles long after the time
for action has arrived.  The severity of conditions at Adelaide was not com-
municated to the miners in such a way that they felt obliged to depart from nor-
mal routine—individuals who were operating equipment recounted how they
went through regular shutdown procedures, tramming back from the face, going
to the load center to kill the power, retrieving lunch buckets and coats, and
walking to the mantrip.  This same tendency to normalize their situation was re-
ported by workers at the other two sites.
A fourth theme involves what happens once the decision is made to take
action.  Best [1977], in his account of the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire, illus-
trated the fact that even when people have entered an escape mode, their
behavior tends to take place within the organizational parameters that existed
prior to the emergency.  For instance, waitresses at the restaurant showed their
patrons out of the building.  One professional firefighter, who happened to be
dining at the club, allowed the waitress assigned to his table to lead the group to
safety, and then reentered the building to help fight the blaze.  At Adelaide, lead-
ership emerged more or less gradually out of an initial state of disorganization.
There was no previous determined gathering point in case of a fire like this one,
which occurred outby the section.  Although an escapeway map was posted on
each section, no one thought to take it—despite the fact that there were miners
on all three sections who had not had an opportunity to walk the escapeways and
hence did not know the way out.  At all three sites, the workers delayed donning
their self-contained self-rescuers an average 10-15 minutes after encountering
smoke—the reason most often given for this delay was "I knew these things
[SCSRs] only last for an hour, and I didn't know how long it would take me to
get out."  Yet, no one thought to protect himself or herself in the meantime by
using the filter self-rescuer every miner carries on his or her belt.  Individuals
took their mouthpieces out to talk or to get a deeper breath at points where the
smoke was less concentrated, despite the fact that there was no way to determine
how much CO might be in the atmosphere.  Miners were disoriented by the
smoke, and on at least one section, misinterpreted cues and became momentarily
lost.
The final theme concerns the behavior of people once they have reached an
area of relative safety.  Bryan [1977], in a cross-cultural comparison of two large
data sets, noted that fully a third of the individuals who made it to safety
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subsequently reentered the fire site to look for others, to check on the progress
of the fire, to "do something" while waiting for firefighters, or to get personal
property.  At Adelaide, three individuals went back to search for a miner they
believed to have "frozen up," but who had actually left the group and had come
out another way.  These three miners placed themselves in great jeopardy.  At
Brownfield, a mechanic put his own safety at risk in order to stay with a co-
worker who had given up and believed himself unable to travel farther.  Finally,
a face boss jeopardized himself in a successful attempt to locate these two men.
In essence, there seems to be enough substantive agreement at this point to
suggest that it is possible to arrive at a scientific understanding of people's
activities in fire.  The present analysis of worker behavior in mine fires supports
existing research regarding human responses to structural fires.  At the same
time, however, it adds some complementary insights into individual and group
behavior in a type of social subsystem different from those usually studied.  In
these mine fires, strong continuities between organized and collective behavior,
hypothesized to exist in all emergencies, induced the workers to help each other
negotiate thousands of yards of smoke-filled entryways to safety, and led them
to define any actions that seemed to violate the sacred code of "buddyhood" as
somehow needing explanation.
 Given that escape, for many of these workers, seems to have been a very
problematic group effort, this book can be used to increase an awareness of
some difficulties that may be encountered during any escape from a mine.
Readers should gain an appreciation for the following factors:  (1) Initial
warnings are often unclear, sometimes due to the way technology behaves, and
sometimes due to faulty or incomplete communication.   This can lead to dif-
ferent interpretations of the problem.  (2) People frequently fail to gather the
right kinds of information which prevents them from making appropriate re-
sponses to the situation.  (3) Once any decision is made, individuals respond
well to a leader.  If leadership is lacking, however, people tend to become con-
fused.  (4) Apparatus used in mine emergencies, such as page phones and
self-rescuers, may not work as expected, or may fail.  (5) Individuals become
disoriented very quickly in smoke.  Additionally, smoke rises, obscuring markers
and landmarks in enclosed spaces.
Given these five factors, the following recommendations are offered to mine
safety specialists.  It is expected they can be related back to procedures in place
at their operations:
Trainers should periodically review with workers the escape and evacuation
procedures at their mine(s).  Include a description of (1) how warning messages
will be communicated, who will make the call, or how the warning will be con-
veyed; (2) what the content of the message will be; (3) what information to seek
when communicating with someone outby the fire area (location, distance to
fresh air, suggested escapeways, etc.); (4) mine rescue team support; (5) the
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marking system for primary and secondary escapeways; (6) the storage plan for
SCSRs; (7) what equipment, supplies, and materials to take from the section; and
(8) the assembly points for workers on each section.
Research on fires in complex structures such as high-rise buildings (some
of which was cited earlier) shows that there is an overdependence on the tele-
phone as an emergency warning device.  Such was the case at the mines dis-
cussed in this book—miners at the operation did not routinely answer section
telephones.  There are undoubtedly certain aspects of the warning and com-
munications system at any mining operation that are taken for granted and, on
reflection, could be a problem.  These attributes should be spelled out and, in-
sofar as possible, made foolproof.  For instance, a separate device such as a
flashing strobe could be mounted on or near the telephone to alert workers that
the incoming call is not routine.  These features should then be spelled out
during training.
There seems to be too much dependence on engineering hardware solutions
without a concomitant understanding of how miners will use those systems.  For
instance, state-of-the-art mine monitoring equipment may be installed without
providing adequate training to the dispatcher or communications person.  In
many cases, a definition of what constitutes adequate training can only be ac-
complished by testing the system; thus, there is a need for emergency simu-
lations and structured fire drills, activities that are not widely practiced in the
industry.
Once a decision is made to take action during a fire, people respond well to
leadership.  If this leadership is lacking for some reason, they tend to become
confused.  On Adelaide's 2 Northwest section the foreman took the lead and a
section utilityman, who was trained in mine rescue, brought up the rear.  Every-
one stayed together and had relatively little trouble during their evacuation of the
mine.  Safety managers should compare this scenario with those situations on
some of the other sections at all three sites and develop a strategy allowing for
the most competent person (whether a supervisor or a rank-and-file miner with
specialized experience) to assume leadership early in an event.
As an emergency progresses, people who are less well-prepared tend to ex-
perience sensory overload.  This causes them to focus on small parts of the
problem rather than trying to comprehend the entire situation.  This point is il-
lustrated by the miners' tendency to "save" their SCSRs until the smoke got
heavy, but not protect themselves from CO in the meantime by using their filter
self-rescuers.  Miners should be assisted in developing a protocol for how they
will employ their emergency breathing apparatus—one that goes beyond the
trainer's rote "put on your SCSR at the first indication of fire or smoke," which
may be good advice but obviously is not heeded in actual situations.
Research on fires in buildings has shown that people frequently reenter a fire
site after reaching safety, often to search for someone they believe is still inside
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the structure.  This observation is borne out here as well.  One of the miners
went back with two buddies to look for an individual who left the group.
Trainers should impress upon their workers some of the consequences of leaving
the group, either to help a buddy, or to escape on their own.  If groups are to split
up, it should be according to a previously determined plan of action.
Finally, it is recognized that people become disoriented very quickly in
smoke.  Unless one knows the escape route very well, such disorientation could
be fatal in a mine fire.  It is suggested that safety managers review their site plan
for conducting fire drills.  This review might be an opportunity to elicit renewed
commitment to a company's emergency preparedness program and procedures
for ensuring that miners walk their escapeways periodically.  Measures could
then be enacted, if needed, to ensure these plans and procedures are implemented
in the manner intended by law.
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APPENDIX A.—DESCRIPTION OF APPROXIMATE ESCAPE
ROUTES TAKEN BY THE GROUPS
Adelaide Mine
1 Right
This group boarded the rail-mounted mantrip and started to come out of the
mine.  They traveled nearly 0.7 miles before encountering smoke.  At this point
the crew stopped the mantrip, got out, and began walking off in various direc-
tions.  The foreman and another miner got the crew back together.  After re-
assembling, the crew decided to go to the intake escapeway and walk the rest of
the way out of the mine.  After getting into the intake escapeway, the crew
traveled about 500 ft on foot before encountering smoke in this escapeway.  The
crew then moved into the left-side return entry where they confronted smoke
again.  After putting on their rescue breathing apparatus, group 1 continued for
about 0.3 miles before turning right.  After turning right, this crew continued to
move through the smoke-filled return entry for another 0.8 miles before finally
getting past the location of the fire and reaching clear air.
2 Northwest
This group boarded the rail mounted mantrip and started to come out of the
mine.  The crew traveled about 0.1 miles in the mantrip before encountering
smoke.  At this point, the crew stopped the mantrip, got out, and decided to
move to the intake escapeway and continue to egress the mine on foot.  The crew
traveled about 0.1 miles on foot in the intake escapeway before encountering
smoke.  Upon being confronted with smoke, the crew moved to the right return
entry to continue their escape.  After traveling several hundred feet more in the
return entry, this group encountered smoke again.  At this point, the group put
on their rescue breathing apparatus and continued their escape, traveling about
0.4 miles in the return before turning right.  After turning right, the group
traveled another 0.2 miles in the smoke-filled return entry.  At this point, the
group became disoriented in the smoke and began to go the wrong way by walk-
ing back toward the working section.  The group traveled about 200 ft in the
wrong direction before a miner in the group realized that they were going back
into the mine.  At this point, the group turned around, and continued to egress
the mine, traveling an additional 0.4 miles before passing the location of the fire
and reaching clear air.
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3 Left
This group boarded the rail-mounted mantrip and started to come out of the
mine.  The crew traveled about 0.1 miles in the mantrip before encountering
smoke.  At this point, the crew stopped the mantrip and decided to go back to the
section.  The crew rode the mantrip back to the section, got off the mantrip,
proceed to the intake escapeway, and began walking out.  This group walked
about 500 ft before encountering smoke in the intake escapeway.  The crew then
moved into the right-side return entry and continued to proceed out of the mine.
After moving into the return entry, this group walked several hundred feet more
before running into smoke in the return.  At this point, the miners put on their
rescue breathing apparatus and then continued on foot about 1 mile through
smoke before passing the location of the fire and reaching clear air.
Brownfield Mine
4 South
The foreman and mechanic with this group noticed smoke coming up the in-
take escapeway.  This crew assembled at the section power center.  This group
elected not to follow the intake escapeway since it was already filled with
smoke.  Similarly, the miners chose to avoid the alternate escapeway in the re-
turn aircourse since they knew that it would be filled with smoke.  The crew
decided to escape via the mine entry in which the conveyor haulage belt was
located, since they believed that this entry should have clear air.  This group
walked the belt entry for about 600 ft when they encountered smoke.  Group 4
traveled for about 0.4 miles in heavy smoke to the point where the conveyor belt
entry intersected with the main supply haulage track.  Here, the group turned
right and moved into the haulage entry and followed the main haulage entry for
about 0.1 miles until they were past the fire location and in clear air.
5 South
This group assembled at the rescue breathing apparatus storage station in the
No. 1 intake entry.  The group traveled on foot several hundred feet and, after
being confronted with heavy smoke, moved into the belt conveyor entry where
the smoke was lighter.  This group traveled about 400 ft on foot in the belt entry
until they hit heavy smoke again.  At this point, the group moved into the al-
ternate escapeway entry and proceeded to travel the section and main return
aircourse through smoke for about 0.25 miles before passing the fire location
and reaching clear air.
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6 West
These miners assembled at the beginning of the intake escapeway on the
working section.  After putting on their rescue breathing apparatus, this group
traveled on foot for about 700 ft in the intake escapeway before being confronted
with heavy smoke.  At this point, the group moved to the alternate escapeway
where the smoke was lighter.  After moving to the alternate escapeway, the
group continued to travel on foot for about 0.25 miles before passing the location
of the fire and reaching clear air.
Cokedale Mine
7 Butt
Because the primary escapeway was filled with smoke, this group decided
to follow the alternate escapeway out of the section.  These miners got into the
alternate escapeway in the left return aircourse of the section and traveled this
escapeway on foot for about 0.3 miles.  The crew then made a right turn and
followed the escapeway for another 0.25 miles.  At this point, the group turned
left and continued on foot for about 1 mile before reaching fresh air.
8 Face Parallels
These miners gathered at the beginning of the primary escapeway and pro-
ceeded to travel this escapeway on foot about 0.3 miles before being confronted
with heavy smoke.  Upon hitting heavy smoke, the crew turned around and fol-
lowed the primary escapeway back to the section.  After returning to the section,
the group then got in the section's left return aircourse.  The group followed the
left return aircourse for about 0.2 miles before realizing that they were not in a
designated escapeway.  The group turned around and followed this aircourse
back to the section.  At this point, the group crossed the section and made their
way into the right return airway (the designated alternate escapeway) and
followed it for 0.1 miles before turning left.  After turning left, the group con-
tinued on foot through the alternate escapeway for about 0.2 miles before turning
right.  After turning right, the group continued on foot for another 0.3 miles
before turning left into the main alternate escapeway.  After turning into the
main alternate escapeway, the crew continued for about 1 mile before reaching
clear air.
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APPENDIX B.—MINE FIRE INTERVIEW GUIDE
1. Where were you when you first became aware that there might be a
problem in the mine, and how did you learn of it?
• Who told you?
• What were you doing?  Did you finish?
• What were your feelings at this time?
• Did you think that there might be a problem in getting out of the
mine?
• Did you communicate with anyone?  With whom?
2. What did you do after making sure that there was a problem?
• Walk with anyone?  Where?
• Did you go anywhere to get anything after you left your equipment?
• Did you pick up anything on the section?
• Did you talk with anyone?  About what?
3. Was there a point where the crew assembled?
• Where was the assembly point?
• Was this a designated point?  Were you trained to go to it?
• What was the conversation about when you met up with the whole
crew?
• Does anything about the conversation stand out?
• How would you describe the feeling within the crew?
• Did you or anyone have any concerns about getting out?
• Was there any sign of smoke at this point?
4. When did you first encounter smoke?
• What was the crew's reaction?
• Did someone take charge?
• What was being said at this time?
• Was there any confusion or indecision?
• What were your thoughts at this point?
5. How was the plan of action to escape decided on?
• Did the crew meet to decide the course of action?
• Did anyone distribute assignments?
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• Was there general agreement about what to do?  Who disagreed?
How was that handled?
• What was the feeling within the crew?
• Would the crew have walked out the intake without donning their
SCSRs if it were smoke-free?
• How did you begin to go out?
• How much time passed between starting out and donning the
SCSR?
• How would you describe that period of time?
• Did you at any time feel that this was a life-threatening situation?
6. What was it like when you first began to don your SCSR?
• Who made the decision to don?
• What were the conditions?  Could you see?
• Did anyone take a CO reading?
• Did you check the apparatus?
• Did you get more than one?
7. What part did you SCSR training play when you began donning the
apparatus?
• Which of the devices have you been trained on?
• What position were you in?
• Can you show us the steps you used to get the SCSR on?
• Did you have any problems?  Did you see anyone else having
problems?
• Did anyone help you?  Did you help anyone?
• Did you have confidence that the SCSR would work correctly?
• Did anyone experience any problems once the device was on?
What were they?
• How long did it take everyone to get ready to move out?
8. How did you go about actually escaping from the mine?
• Who made the decision?
• Did you escape alone or in a group?
• How was the escape route chosen and followed?
• Were markers visible?
• Were there communications along the way?  What was it like?
• Were there problem, especially with the SCSR?
• Were you aware of any risks in taking out your mouthpiece?
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• Did anyone advise you not to remove the mouthpiece?
• How many times did you or the crew stop to rest or talk?
• Did you get rid of anything along the way?
9. At what points were there strategic decisions in making your escape?
• What were the conditions?
• How was decision made?  Who made it?
• Was there any disagreement or confusion?
• Did you feel other crews were in trouble?
• Where did you think the fire was?
10. Thinking back, what would have made your escape less complicated?
• Would you have done anything differently?
• Would you have taken anything else with you?
• Probe about walking the escapeways.
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